1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
63 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72 #include "internal/x509_int.h"
75 /* CRL score values */
77 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
79 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
81 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
83 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
87 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
89 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
91 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
93 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
95 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
97 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
99 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
101 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
103 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
105 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
107 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
109 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
111 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
113 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
114 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
115 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
116 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
126 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
127 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
128 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
129 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
130 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
131 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
132 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
134 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
135 unsigned int *preasons);
136 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
137 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
139 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
141 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
149 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
151 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
152 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
158 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
160 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
162 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
165 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
166 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
169 /* Look for exact match */
170 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
171 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
172 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
175 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
179 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
183 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
185 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
187 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
188 int depth, i, ok = 0;
190 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
191 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
192 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
193 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
196 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
198 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
199 * cannot do another one.
201 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
208 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
209 * the first entry is in place
211 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
212 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
213 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
216 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
217 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
219 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
220 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
221 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
222 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
226 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
227 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
228 depth = param->depth;
231 /* If we have enough, we break */
233 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
234 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
235 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
238 /* If we are self signed, we break */
239 if (cert_self_signed(x))
242 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
244 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
245 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
249 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
258 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
259 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
260 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
262 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
263 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
267 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
268 ctx->last_untrusted++;
272 * reparse the full chain for the next one
280 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
283 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
284 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
290 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
292 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
293 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
294 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
295 /* we have a self signed certificate */
296 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
298 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
299 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
300 * possible impersonation.
302 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
303 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
304 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
305 ctx->current_cert = x;
306 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
315 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
316 * version so we get any trust settings.
320 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
321 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
325 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
327 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
328 ctx->last_untrusted--;
331 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
334 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
336 /* If we have enough, we break */
339 /* If we are self signed, we break */
340 if (cert_self_signed(x))
342 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
349 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
351 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
358 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
359 i = check_trust(ctx);
361 /* If explicitly rejected error */
362 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
365 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
366 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
367 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
371 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
372 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
373 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
375 STACK_OF(X509) *chtmp = ctx->chain;
376 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
378 * Temporarily set chain to NULL so we don't discount
379 * duplicates: the same certificate could be an untrusted
380 * CA found in the trusted store.
383 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
387 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
390 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
395 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
399 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
403 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
412 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
413 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
414 * and set bad_chain == 1
416 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
417 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
418 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
419 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
421 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
422 ctx->current_cert = x;
425 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
427 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
428 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
429 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
433 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
440 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
441 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
446 /* Check name constraints */
448 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
458 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
459 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
462 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
463 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
466 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
470 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
472 if (i != X509_V_OK) {
474 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
480 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
481 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
482 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
484 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
489 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
490 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
493 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
498 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
499 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
500 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
505 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
513 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
516 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
519 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;;
520 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
521 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
522 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
524 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
531 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
533 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
537 return cert_self_signed(x);
538 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
539 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
542 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
543 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
545 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
546 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
547 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
548 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
554 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
556 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
557 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
561 ctx->current_cert = x;
562 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
563 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
566 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
568 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
570 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
572 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
579 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
583 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
585 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
587 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
588 int proxy_path_length = 0;
590 int allow_proxy_certs;
594 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
595 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
596 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
597 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
598 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
599 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
600 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
604 /* CRL path validation */
606 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
607 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
610 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
612 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
615 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
616 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
617 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
620 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
621 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
623 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
624 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
625 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
626 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
627 ctx->error_depth = i;
628 ctx->current_cert = x;
633 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
634 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
635 ctx->error_depth = i;
636 ctx->current_cert = x;
641 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
642 switch (must_be_ca) {
644 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
645 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
647 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
654 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
660 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
669 ctx->error_depth = i;
670 ctx->current_cert = x;
675 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
676 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
678 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
680 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
681 ctx->error_depth = i;
682 ctx->current_cert = x;
688 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
689 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
690 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
691 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
692 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
693 ctx->error_depth = i;
694 ctx->current_cert = x;
699 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
700 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
703 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
704 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
705 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
707 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
708 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
709 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
710 ctx->error_depth = i;
711 ctx->current_cert = x;
726 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
730 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
731 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
732 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
733 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
734 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
737 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
738 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
739 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
742 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
743 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
745 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
746 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
748 ctx->error_depth = i;
749 ctx->current_cert = x;
750 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
759 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
761 ctx->error = errcode;
762 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
763 ctx->error_depth = 0;
764 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
767 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
770 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
773 if (id->peername != NULL) {
774 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
777 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
778 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
779 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
785 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
787 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
788 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
790 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
791 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
794 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
795 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
798 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
799 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
805 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
809 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
811 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
812 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
813 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
814 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
815 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
816 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
817 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
819 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
822 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
823 ctx->error_depth = i;
824 ctx->current_cert = x;
825 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
828 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
832 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
835 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
837 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
838 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
839 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
840 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
842 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
844 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
845 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
850 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
851 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
853 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
856 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
858 int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
859 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
861 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
862 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
864 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
869 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
870 ctx->error_depth = i;
871 ok = check_cert(ctx);
878 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
880 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
882 int ok = 0, cnum = 0;
883 unsigned int last_reasons = 0;
884 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
885 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
886 ctx->current_cert = x;
887 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
888 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
889 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
890 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
891 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
892 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
894 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
896 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
898 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
901 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
902 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
905 ctx->current_crl = crl;
906 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
911 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
914 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
920 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
922 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
932 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
935 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
936 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
937 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
945 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
950 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
952 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
957 ctx->current_crl = crl;
958 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
959 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
963 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
967 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
968 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
975 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
976 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
980 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
981 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
986 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
987 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
990 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
991 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
994 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
995 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1001 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1006 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1007 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1008 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1010 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1011 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1012 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1013 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1014 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1016 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1017 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1018 reasons = *preasons;
1019 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1021 if (crl_score > best_score) {
1023 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1024 best_score = crl_score;
1025 best_reasons = reasons;
1030 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1032 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1033 *pscore = best_score;
1034 *preasons = best_reasons;
1035 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1036 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1038 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1041 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1048 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1049 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1052 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1054 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1056 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1058 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1059 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1061 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1065 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1069 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1071 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1081 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1087 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1089 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1091 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1092 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1094 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1095 if (!base->crl_number)
1097 /* Issuer names must match */
1098 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1100 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1101 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1103 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1105 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1106 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1108 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1109 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1115 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1116 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1119 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1120 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1124 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1126 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1128 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1129 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1130 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1131 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1132 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1133 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1142 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1143 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1144 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1145 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1146 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1149 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1150 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1154 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1156 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1158 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1159 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1161 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1162 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1163 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1165 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1166 /* If no new reasons reject */
1167 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1170 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1171 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1173 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1174 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1175 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1178 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1180 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1181 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1184 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1185 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1187 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1188 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1190 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1192 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1195 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1197 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1198 /* If no new reasons reject */
1199 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1201 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1202 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1205 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1211 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1212 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1214 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1215 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1216 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1219 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1222 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1224 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1225 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1226 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1227 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1232 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1233 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1234 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1236 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1237 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1238 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1243 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1245 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1249 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1250 * untrusted certificates.
1252 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1253 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1254 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1256 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1257 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1258 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1265 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1266 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1267 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1268 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1271 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1273 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1275 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1278 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1281 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1282 /* Copy verify params across */
1283 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1285 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1286 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1288 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1289 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1294 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1296 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1298 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1303 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1304 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1305 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1306 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1307 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1311 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1312 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1313 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1315 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1316 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1317 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1318 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1324 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1325 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1326 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1327 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1328 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1331 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1333 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1334 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1335 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1342 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1346 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1351 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1353 gens = b->name.fullname;
1354 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1357 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1358 gens = a->name.fullname;
1362 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1364 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1365 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1366 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1368 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1374 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1376 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1377 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1378 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1379 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1380 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1389 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1392 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1393 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1395 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1396 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1397 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1398 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1400 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1406 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1408 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1409 unsigned int *preasons)
1412 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1414 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1415 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1418 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1421 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1422 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1423 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1424 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1425 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1426 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1431 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1432 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1438 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1439 * to find a delta CRL too
1442 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1443 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1446 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1448 unsigned int reasons;
1449 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1450 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1451 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1452 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1453 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1454 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1459 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1461 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1463 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1467 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1469 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1473 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1475 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1476 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1477 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1486 /* Check CRL validity */
1487 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1489 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1490 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1491 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1492 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1493 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1494 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1495 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1496 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1499 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1500 * certificate in chain.
1502 else if (cnum < chnum)
1503 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1505 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1506 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1507 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1508 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1509 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1517 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1519 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1520 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1521 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1522 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1523 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1524 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1529 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1530 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1531 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1536 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1537 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1538 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1539 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1545 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1546 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1547 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1554 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1555 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1560 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1561 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1564 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1565 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1570 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1571 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1573 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1577 /* Verify CRL signature */
1578 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1579 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1580 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1590 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1594 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1595 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1600 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1601 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1602 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1603 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1605 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1606 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1607 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1608 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1613 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1614 * is not removeFromCRL.
1616 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1617 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1619 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1620 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1628 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1633 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1634 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1636 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1639 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1642 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1646 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1647 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1648 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1650 ctx->current_cert = x;
1651 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1652 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1658 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1659 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1660 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1663 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1664 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1665 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1666 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1673 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
1678 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1679 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1683 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1687 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1688 ctx->current_cert = x;
1689 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1696 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1697 ctx->current_cert = x;
1698 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1702 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1706 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1707 ctx->current_cert = x;
1708 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1715 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1716 ctx->current_cert = x;
1717 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1724 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1728 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1729 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1731 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1733 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1734 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1736 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1738 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1741 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1746 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1747 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1752 ctx->error_depth = n;
1753 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1757 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1759 ctx->error_depth = n;
1762 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1763 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1768 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1769 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1770 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1771 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1772 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1775 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1776 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1777 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1778 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1780 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1784 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1791 ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
1795 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1796 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1797 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1798 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1805 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1813 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1815 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1818 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1823 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1824 int i, j, remaining;
1827 remaining = ctm->length;
1828 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1830 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1831 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1832 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1833 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1835 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1836 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1837 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1838 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1839 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1846 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1847 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1848 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1849 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1857 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1868 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1869 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1870 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1872 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1875 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1876 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1885 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1894 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1896 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1899 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1900 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1902 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1903 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1907 atm.type = ctm->type;
1909 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1910 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1912 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1915 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1916 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1918 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1919 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1928 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1929 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1935 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1937 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1940 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1942 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1945 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1946 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1955 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1956 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1957 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1958 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1959 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1961 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1964 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1966 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1969 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1972 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1973 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1975 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1976 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1979 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1981 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1985 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1986 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1990 /* first, populate the other certs */
1991 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1992 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1993 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1994 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1998 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1999 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2003 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2005 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2006 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2008 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2010 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2011 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2012 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2013 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2016 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2017 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2018 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2021 /* Issuer names must match */
2022 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2023 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2026 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2027 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2028 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2031 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2032 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2035 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2036 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2037 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2040 /* CRLs must verify */
2041 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2042 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2043 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2046 /* Create new CRL */
2047 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2048 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2050 /* Set issuer name */
2051 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2054 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2056 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2059 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2061 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2065 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2066 * number to correct value too.
2069 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2070 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2071 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2072 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2076 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2078 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2080 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2081 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2082 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2084 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2085 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2087 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2088 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2091 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2092 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2097 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2099 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2105 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2110 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2111 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2112 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2113 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2116 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2117 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2119 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2120 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2123 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2125 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2128 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2130 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2133 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2138 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2143 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2145 return ctx->error_depth;
2148 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2150 return ctx->current_cert;
2153 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2158 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2162 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2165 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2167 return ctx->current_issuer;
2170 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2172 return ctx->current_crl;
2175 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2180 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2185 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2187 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2190 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2195 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2197 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2200 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2202 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2206 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2207 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2208 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2209 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2210 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2211 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2212 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2216 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2217 int purpose, int trust)
2220 /* If purpose not set use default */
2222 purpose = def_purpose;
2223 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2226 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2228 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2229 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2232 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2233 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2234 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2236 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2237 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2240 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2242 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2244 trust = ptmp->trust;
2247 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2249 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2250 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2255 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2256 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2257 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2258 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2262 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2264 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2267 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2273 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2277 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2281 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2282 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2286 ctx->current_method = 0;
2288 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2290 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2291 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2295 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2296 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2297 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2298 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2299 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2300 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2301 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2305 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2308 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2313 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2317 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2319 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2322 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2323 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2328 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2329 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2332 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2336 if (store && store->check_issued)
2337 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2339 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2341 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2342 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2344 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2346 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2347 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2349 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2351 if (store && store->verify)
2352 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2354 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2356 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2357 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2359 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2361 if (store && store->get_crl)
2362 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2364 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2366 if (store && store->check_crl)
2367 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2369 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2371 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2372 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2374 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2376 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2377 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2379 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2381 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2382 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2384 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2386 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2389 * Since X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we
2390 * put a corresponding "new" here.
2392 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2395 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2402 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2403 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2406 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2408 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2409 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2412 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2416 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2417 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2418 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2421 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2423 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2425 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2426 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2429 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2431 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2434 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2436 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2439 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2442 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2445 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2446 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2448 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2451 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2456 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2458 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2461 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2463 return ctx->last_untrusted;
2466 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2468 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2469 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2472 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2475 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2480 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2482 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);