Integrate host, email and IP address checks into X509_verify.
[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  * 
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  * 
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  * 
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  * 
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  * 
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73 /* CRL score values */
74
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
78
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
82
83 /* CRL times valid */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
86
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
90
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
98
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
102
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
106
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
110
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121
122 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
123                         unsigned int *preasons,
124                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
128                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
129 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
130                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
131 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
132                                 unsigned int *preasons);
133 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
134 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
135                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
136                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
137
138 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
139 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
140
141
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
143         {
144         return ok;
145         }
146
147 #if 0
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
149         {
150         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
151         }
152 #endif
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
155         {
156         X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
157         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
158                 return 1;
159         else
160                 return 0;
161         }
162
163 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
164         {
165         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
166         int bad_chain = 0;
167         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
168         int depth,i,ok=0;
169         int num;
170         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
171         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
172         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
173                 {
174                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
175                 return -1;
176                 }
177
178         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
179
180         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
181          * present and that the first entry is in place */
182         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
183                 {
184                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
185                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
186                         {
187                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
188                         goto end;
189                         }
190                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
191                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
192                 }
193
194         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
195         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
196             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
197                 {
198                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
199                 goto end;
200                 }
201
202         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
203         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
204         depth=param->depth;
205
206
207         for (;;)
208                 {
209                 /* If we have enough, we break */
210                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
211                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
212                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
213                                          * code later.
214                                          */
215
216                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
217                 if (cert_self_signed(x))
218                         break;
219                 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
220                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
221                         {
222                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
223                         if (ok < 0)
224                                 return ok;
225                         /* If successful for now free up cert so it
226                          * will be picked up again later.
227                          */
228                         if (ok > 0)
229                                 {
230                                 X509_free(xtmp);
231                                 break;
232                                 }
233                         }
234
235                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
236                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
237                         {
238                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
239                         if (xtmp != NULL)
240                                 {
241                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
242                                         {
243                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
244                                         goto end;
245                                         }
246                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
247                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
248                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
249                                 x=xtmp;
250                                 num++;
251                                 /* reparse the full chain for
252                                  * the next one */
253                                 continue;
254                                 }
255                         }
256                 break;
257                 }
258
259         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
260          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
261          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
262
263         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
264          * is self signed.
265          */
266
267         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
268         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
269         if (cert_self_signed(x))
270                 {
271                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
272                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
273                         {
274                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
275                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
276                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
277                          */
278                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
279                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
280                                 {
281                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
282                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
283                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
284                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
285                                 bad_chain = 1;
286                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
287                                 if (!ok) goto end;
288                                 }
289                         else 
290                                 {
291                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
292                                  * so we get any trust settings.
293                                  */
294                                 X509_free(x);
295                                 x = xtmp;
296                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
297                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
298                                 }
299                         }
300                 else
301                         {
302                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
303                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
304                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
305                         num--;
306                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
307                         }
308                 }
309
310         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
311         for (;;)
312                 {
313                 /* If we have enough, we break */
314                 if (depth < num) break;
315
316                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
317                 if (cert_self_signed(x))
318                         break;
319
320                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
321
322                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
323                 if (ok == 0) break;
324
325                 x = xtmp;
326                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
327                         {
328                         X509_free(xtmp);
329                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
330                         return 0;
331                         }
332                 num++;
333                 }
334
335         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
336
337         i = check_trust(ctx);
338
339         /* If explicitly rejected error */
340         if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
341                 goto end;
342         /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
343         if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
344                 {
345                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
346                         {
347                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
348                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
349                         else
350                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
351                         ctx->current_cert=x;
352                         }
353                 else
354                         {
355
356                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
357                         num++;
358                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
359                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
360                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
361                         chain_ss=NULL;
362                         }
363
364                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
365                 bad_chain = 1;
366                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
367                 if (!ok) goto end;
368                 }
369
370         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
371         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
372
373         if (!ok) goto end;
374
375         /* Check name constraints */
376
377         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
378         
379         if (!ok) goto end;
380
381         ok = check_id(ctx);
382
383         if (!ok) goto end;
384
385         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
386         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
387
388         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
389          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
390          */
391
392         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
393         if(!ok) goto end;
394
395         i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
396                                                         ctx->param->flags);
397         if (i != X509_V_OK)
398                 {
399                 ctx->error = i;
400                 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
401                 ok = cb(0, ctx);
402                 if (!ok)
403                         goto end;
404                 }
405
406         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
407         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
408                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
409         else
410                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
411         if(!ok) goto end;
412
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
414         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
415         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
416         if (!ok) goto end;
417         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
418         if (!ok) goto end;
419 #endif
420
421         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
422         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
423                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
424         if(!ok) goto end;
425         if (0)
426                 {
427 end:
428                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
429                 }
430         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
431         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
432         return ok;
433         }
434
435
436 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
437  */
438
439 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
440 {
441         int i;
442         X509 *issuer;
443         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
444                 {
445                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
446                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
447                         return issuer;
448                 }
449         return NULL;
450 }
451
452 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
453
454 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
455 {
456         int ret;
457         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
458         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
459                 {
460                 int i;
461                 X509 *ch;
462                 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
463                 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
464                         return 1;
465                 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
466                         {
467                         ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
468                         if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer))
469                                 {
470                                 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
471                                 break;
472                                 }
473                         }
474                 }
475
476         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
477                 return 1;
478         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
479         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
480                 return 0;
481
482         ctx->error = ret;
483         ctx->current_cert = x;
484         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
485         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
486         return 0;
487 }
488
489 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
490
491 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
492 {
493         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
494         if (*issuer)
495                 {
496                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
497                 return 1;
498                 }
499         else
500                 return 0;
501 }
502         
503
504 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
505  * with the supplied purpose
506  */
507
508 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
509 {
510 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
511         return 1;
512 #else
513         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
514         X509 *x;
515         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
516         int proxy_path_length = 0;
517         int purpose;
518         int allow_proxy_certs;
519         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
520
521         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
522            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
523                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
524            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
525                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
526            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
527                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
528         */
529         must_be_ca = -1;
530
531         /* CRL path validation */
532         if (ctx->parent)
533                 {
534                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
535                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
536                 }
537         else
538                 {
539                 allow_proxy_certs =
540                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
541                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
542                    software happy */
543                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
544                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
545                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
546                 }
547
548         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
549         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
550                 {
551                 int ret;
552                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
553                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
554                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
555                         {
556                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
557                         ctx->error_depth = i;
558                         ctx->current_cert = x;
559                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
560                         if (!ok) goto end;
561                         }
562                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
563                         {
564                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
565                         ctx->error_depth = i;
566                         ctx->current_cert = x;
567                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
568                         if (!ok) goto end;
569                         }
570                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
571                 switch(must_be_ca)
572                         {
573                 case -1:
574                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
575                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
576                                 {
577                                 ret = 0;
578                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
579                                 }
580                         else
581                                 ret = 1;
582                         break;
583                 case 0:
584                         if (ret != 0)
585                                 {
586                                 ret = 0;
587                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
588                                 }
589                         else
590                                 ret = 1;
591                         break;
592                 default:
593                         if ((ret == 0)
594                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
595                                         && (ret != 1)))
596                                 {
597                                 ret = 0;
598                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
599                                 }
600                         else
601                                 ret = 1;
602                         break;
603                         }
604                 if (ret == 0)
605                         {
606                         ctx->error_depth = i;
607                         ctx->current_cert = x;
608                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
609                         if (!ok) goto end;
610                         }
611                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
612                         {
613                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
614                         if ((ret == 0)
615                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
616                                         && (ret != 1)))
617                                 {
618                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
619                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
620                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
621                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
622                                 if (!ok) goto end;
623                                 }
624                         }
625                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
626                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
627                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
628                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
629                         {
630                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
631                         ctx->error_depth = i;
632                         ctx->current_cert = x;
633                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
634                         if (!ok) goto end;
635                         }
636                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
637                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
638                         plen++;
639                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
640                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
641                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
642                    CA certificate.  */
643                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
644                         {
645                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
646                                 {
647                                 ctx->error =
648                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
649                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
650                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
651                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
652                                 if (!ok) goto end;
653                                 }
654                         proxy_path_length++;
655                         must_be_ca = 0;
656                         }
657                 else
658                         must_be_ca = 1;
659                 }
660         ok = 1;
661  end:
662         return ok;
663 #endif
664 }
665
666 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
667         {
668         X509 *x;
669         int i, j, rv;
670         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
671         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
672                 {
673                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
674                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
675                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
676                         continue;
677                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
678                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
679                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
680                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
681                  */
682                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
683                         {
684                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
685                         if (nc)
686                                 {
687                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
688                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
689                                         {
690                                         ctx->error = rv;
691                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
692                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
693                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
694                                                 return 0;
695                                         }
696                                 }
697                         }
698                 }
699         return 1;
700         }
701
702 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
703         {
704         ctx->error = errcode;
705         ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
706         ctx->error_depth = 0;
707         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
708         }
709
710 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
711         {
712         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
713         X509 *x = ctx->cert;
714         if (vpm->host && !X509_check_host(x, vpm->host, vpm->hostlen, 0))
715                 {
716                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
717                         return 0;
718                 }
719         if (vpm->email && !X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0))
720                 {
721                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
722                         return 0;
723                 }
724         if (vpm->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0))
725                 {
726                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
727                         return 0;
728                 }
729         return 1;
730         }
731
732 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
733 {
734         int i, ok;
735         X509 *x = NULL;
736         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
737         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
738         /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
739         for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
740                 {
741                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
742                 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
743                 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
744                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
745                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
746                 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
747                  * not overridden.
748                  */
749                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
750                         {
751                         ctx->error_depth = i;
752                         ctx->current_cert = x;
753                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
754                         ok = cb(0, ctx);
755                         if (!ok)
756                                 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
757                         }
758                 }
759         /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
760          * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
761          */
762         return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
763 }
764
765 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
766         {
767         int i, last, ok;
768         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
769                 return 1;
770         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
771                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
772         else
773                 {
774                 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
775                 if (ctx->parent)
776                         return 1;
777                 last = 0;
778                 }
779         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
780                 {
781                 ctx->error_depth = i;
782                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
783                 if (!ok) return ok;
784                 }
785         return 1;
786         }
787
788 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
789         {
790         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
791         X509 *x;
792         int ok, cnum;
793         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
794         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
795         ctx->current_cert = x;
796         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
797         ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
798         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
799         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
800                 {
801                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
802                 if (ctx->get_crl)
803                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
804                 else
805                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
806                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
807                  * notify callback
808                  */
809                 if(!ok)
810                         {
811                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
812                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
813                         goto err;
814                         }
815                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
816                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
817                 if (!ok)
818                         goto err;
819
820                 if (dcrl)
821                         {
822                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
823                         if (!ok)
824                                 goto err;
825                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
826                         if (!ok)
827                                 goto err;
828                         }
829                 else
830                         ok = 1;
831
832                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
833                 if (ok != 2)
834                         {
835                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
836                         if (!ok)
837                                 goto err;
838                         }
839
840                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
841                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
842                 crl = NULL;
843                 dcrl = NULL;
844                 }
845         err:
846         X509_CRL_free(crl);
847         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
848
849         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
850         return ok;
851
852         }
853
854 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
855
856 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
857         {
858         time_t *ptime;
859         int i;
860         if (notify)
861                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
862         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
863                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
864         else
865                 ptime = NULL;
866
867         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
868         if (i == 0)
869                 {
870                 if (!notify)
871                         return 0;
872                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
873                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
874                         return 0;
875                 }
876
877         if (i > 0)
878                 {
879                 if (!notify)
880                         return 0;
881                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
882                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
883                         return 0;
884                 }
885
886         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
887                 {
888                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
889
890                 if (i == 0)
891                         {
892                         if (!notify)
893                                 return 0;
894                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
895                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
896                                 return 0;
897                         }
898                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
899                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
900                         {
901                         if (!notify)
902                                 return 0;
903                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
904                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
905                                 return 0;
906                         }
907                 }
908
909         if (notify)
910                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
911
912         return 1;
913         }
914
915 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
916                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
917                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
918         {
919         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
920         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
921         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
922         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
923         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
924
925         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
926                 {
927                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
928                 reasons = *preasons;
929                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
930
931                 if (crl_score > best_score)
932                         {
933                         best_crl = crl;
934                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
935                         best_score = crl_score;
936                         best_reasons = reasons;
937                         }
938                 }
939
940         if (best_crl)
941                 {
942                 if (*pcrl)
943                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
944                 *pcrl = best_crl;
945                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
946                 *pscore = best_score;
947                 *preasons = best_reasons;
948                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
949                 if (*pdcrl)
950                         {
951                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
952                         *pdcrl = NULL;
953                         }
954                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
955                 }
956
957         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
958                 return 1;
959
960         return 0;
961         }
962
963 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
964  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
965  */
966
967 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
968         {
969         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
970         int i;
971         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
972         if (i >= 0)
973                 {
974                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
975                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
976                         return 0;
977                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
978                 }
979         else
980                 exta = NULL;
981
982         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
983
984         if (i >= 0)
985                 {
986
987                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
988                         return 0;
989                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
990                 }
991         else
992                 extb = NULL;
993
994         if (!exta && !extb)
995                 return 1;
996
997         if (!exta || !extb)
998                 return 0;
999
1000
1001         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1002                 return 0;
1003
1004         return 1;
1005         }
1006
1007 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1008
1009 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1010         {
1011         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1012         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1013                         return 0;
1014         /* Base must have a CRL number */
1015         if (!base->crl_number)
1016                         return 0;
1017         /* Issuer names must match */
1018         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1019                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1020                 return 0;
1021         /* AKID and IDP must match */
1022         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1023                         return 0;
1024         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1025                         return 0;
1026         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1027         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1028                         return 0;
1029         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1030         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1031                         return 1;
1032         return 0;
1033         }
1034
1035 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1036  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1037  */
1038
1039 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1040                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1041         {
1042         X509_CRL *delta;
1043         int i;
1044         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1045                 return;
1046         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1047                 return;
1048         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1049                 {
1050                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1051                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1052                         {
1053                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1054                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1055                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1056                         *dcrl = delta;
1057                         return;
1058                         }
1059                 }
1060         *dcrl = NULL;
1061         }
1062
1063 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1064  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1065  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1066  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1067  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1068  */
1069
1070 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1071                         unsigned int *preasons,
1072                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1073         {
1074
1075         int crl_score = 0;
1076         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1077
1078         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1079
1080         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1081         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1082                 return 0;
1083         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1084         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1085                 {
1086                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1087                         return 0;
1088                 }
1089         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1090                 {
1091                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1092                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1093                         return 0;
1094                 }
1095         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1096         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1097                 return 0;
1098         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1099         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1100                 {
1101                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1102                         return 0;
1103                 }
1104         else
1105                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1106
1107         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1108                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1109
1110         /* Check expiry */
1111         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1112                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1113
1114         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1115         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1116
1117         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1118
1119         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1120                 return 0;
1121
1122         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1123
1124         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1125                 {
1126                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1127                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1128                         return 0;
1129                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1130                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1131                 }
1132
1133         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1134
1135         return crl_score;
1136
1137         }
1138
1139 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1140                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1141         {
1142         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1143         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1144         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1145         int i;
1146
1147         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1148                 cidx++;
1149
1150         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1151
1152         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1153                 {
1154                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1155                         {
1156                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1157                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1158                         return;
1159                         }
1160                 }
1161
1162         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1163                 {
1164                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1165                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1166                         continue;
1167                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1168                         {
1169                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1170                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1171                         return;
1172                         }
1173                 }
1174
1175         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1176
1177         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1178                 return;
1179
1180         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1181          * set of untrusted certificates.
1182          */
1183         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1184                 {
1185                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1186                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1187                         continue;
1188                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1189                         {
1190                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1191                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1192                         return;
1193                         }
1194                 }
1195         }
1196
1197 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1198  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1199  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1200  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 
1201  * practice.
1202  */
1203
1204 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1205         {
1206         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1207         int ret;
1208         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1209         if (ctx->parent)
1210                 return 0;
1211         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1212                 return -1;
1213
1214         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1215         /* Copy verify params across */
1216         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1217
1218         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1219         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1220
1221         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1222         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1223
1224         if (ret <= 0)
1225                 goto err;
1226
1227         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1228
1229         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1230         err:
1231         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1232         return ret;
1233         }
1234
1235 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1236  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1237  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1238  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1239  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1240  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1241  */
1242
1243 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1244                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1245                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1246         {
1247         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1248         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1249         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1250         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1251                 return 1;
1252         return 0;
1253         }
1254
1255 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1256  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1257  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1258  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1259  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1260  */
1261
1262
1263 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1264         {
1265         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1266         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1267         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1268         int i, j;
1269         if (!a || !b)
1270                 return 1;
1271         if (a->type == 1)
1272                 {
1273                 if (!a->dpname)
1274                         return 0;
1275                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1276                 if (b->type == 1)
1277                         {
1278                         if (!b->dpname)
1279                                 return 0;
1280                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1281                                 return 1;
1282                         else
1283                                 return 0;
1284                         }
1285                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1286                 nm = a->dpname;
1287                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1288                 }
1289         else if (b->type == 1)
1290                 {
1291                 if (!b->dpname)
1292                         return 0;
1293                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1294                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1295                 nm = b->dpname;
1296                 }
1297
1298         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1299         if (nm)
1300                 {
1301                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1302                         {
1303                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);  
1304                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1305                                 continue;
1306                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1307                                 return 1;
1308                         }
1309                 return 0;
1310                 }
1311
1312         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1313
1314         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1315                 {
1316                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1317                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1318                         {
1319                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1320                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1321                                 return 1;
1322                         }
1323                 }
1324
1325         return 0;
1326
1327         }
1328
1329 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1330         {
1331         int i;
1332         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1333         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1334         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1335                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1336         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1337                 {
1338                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1339                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1340                         continue;
1341                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1342                         return 1;
1343                 }
1344         return 0;
1345         }
1346
1347 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1348
1349 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1350                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1351         {
1352         int i;
1353         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1354                 return 0;
1355         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1356                 {
1357                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1358                         return 0;
1359                 }
1360         else
1361                 {
1362                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1363                         return 0;
1364                 }
1365         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1366         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1367                 {
1368                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1369                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1370                         {
1371                         if (!crl->idp ||
1372                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1373                                 {
1374                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1375                                 return 1;
1376                                 }
1377                         }
1378                 }
1379         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1380                 return 1;
1381         return 0;
1382         }
1383
1384 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1385  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1386  */
1387         
1388 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1389                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1390         {
1391         int ok;
1392         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1393         int crl_score = 0;
1394         unsigned int reasons;
1395         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1396         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1397         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1398         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1399         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 
1400                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1401
1402         if (ok)
1403                 goto done;
1404
1405         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1406
1407         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1408
1409         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1410         if (!skcrl && crl)
1411                 goto done;
1412
1413         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1414
1415         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1416
1417         done:
1418
1419         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1420         if (crl)
1421                 {
1422                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1423                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1424                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1425                 *pcrl = crl;
1426                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1427                 return 1;
1428                 }
1429
1430         return 0;
1431         }
1432
1433 /* Check CRL validity */
1434 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1435         {
1436         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1437         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1438         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1439         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1440         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1441         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1442         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1443                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1444
1445         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1446          * is next certificate in chain.
1447          */
1448         else if (cnum < chnum)
1449                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1450         else
1451                 {
1452                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1453                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1454                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1455                         {
1456                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1457                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1458                         if(!ok) goto err;
1459                         }
1460                 }
1461
1462         if(issuer)
1463                 {
1464                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1465                  * been done
1466                  */
1467                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1468                         {
1469                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1470                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1471                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1472                                 {
1473                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1474                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1475                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1476                                 }
1477
1478                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1479                                 {
1480                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1481                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1482                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1483                                 }
1484
1485                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1486                                 {
1487                                 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1488                                         {
1489                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1490                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1491                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1492                                         }
1493                                 }
1494
1495                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1496                                 {
1497                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1498                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1499                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1500                                 }
1501
1502
1503                         }
1504
1505                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1506                         {
1507                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1508                         if (!ok)
1509                                 goto err;
1510                         }
1511
1512                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1513                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1514
1515                 if(!ikey)
1516                         {
1517                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1518                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1519                         if (!ok) goto err;
1520                         }
1521                 else
1522                         {
1523                         int rv;
1524                         rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1525                         if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1526                                 {
1527                                 ctx->error=rv;
1528                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1529                                 if (!ok)
1530                                         goto err;
1531                                 }
1532                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1533                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1534                                 {
1535                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1536                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1537                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1538                                 }
1539                         }
1540                 }
1541
1542         ok = 1;
1543
1544         err:
1545         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1546         return ok;
1547         }
1548
1549 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1550 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1551         {
1552         int ok;
1553         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1554         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1555          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1556          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
1557          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1558          */
1559         if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1560                 {
1561                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1562                         return 1;
1563                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1564                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1565                 if(!ok)
1566                         return 0;
1567                 }
1568         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1569          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1570          */
1571         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1572                 {
1573                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1574                         return 2;
1575                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1576                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1577                 if (!ok)
1578                         return 0;
1579                 }
1580
1581         return 1;
1582         }
1583
1584 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1585         {
1586         int ret;
1587         if (ctx->parent)
1588                 return 1;
1589         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1590                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1591         if (ret == 0)
1592                 {
1593                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1594                 return 0;
1595                 }
1596         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1597         if (ret == -1)
1598                 {
1599                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1600                  * callback.
1601                  */
1602                 X509 *x;
1603                 int i;
1604                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1605                         {
1606                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1607                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1608                                 continue;
1609                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1610                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1611                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1612                                 return 0;
1613                         }
1614                 return 1;
1615                 }
1616         if (ret == -2)
1617                 {
1618                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1619                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1620                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1621                 }
1622
1623         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1624                 {
1625                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1626                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1627                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1628                         return 0;
1629                 }
1630
1631         return 1;
1632         }
1633
1634 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1635         {
1636         time_t *ptime;
1637         int i;
1638
1639         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1640                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1641         else
1642                 ptime = NULL;
1643
1644         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1645         if (i == 0)
1646                 {
1647                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1648                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1649                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1650                         return 0;
1651                 }
1652
1653         if (i > 0)
1654                 {
1655                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1656                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1657                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1658                         return 0;
1659                 }
1660
1661         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1662         if (i == 0)
1663                 {
1664                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1665                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1666                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1667                         return 0;
1668                 }
1669
1670         if (i < 0)
1671                 {
1672                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1673                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1674                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1675                         return 0;
1676                 }
1677
1678         return 1;
1679         }
1680
1681 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1682         {
1683         int ok=0,n;
1684         X509 *xs,*xi;
1685         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1686         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1687
1688         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1689
1690         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1691         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1692         n--;
1693         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1694
1695         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1696                 xs=xi;
1697         else
1698                 {
1699                 if (n <= 0)
1700                         {
1701                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1702                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1703                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1704                         goto end;
1705                         }
1706                 else
1707                         {
1708                         n--;
1709                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1710                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1711                         }
1712                 }
1713
1714 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1715         while (n >= 0)
1716                 {
1717                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1718
1719                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1720                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1721                  * just wastes time.
1722                  */
1723                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1724                         {
1725                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1726                                 {
1727                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1728                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1729                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1730                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1731                                 }
1732                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1733                                 {
1734                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1735                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1736                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1737                                 if (!ok)
1738                                         {
1739                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1740                                         goto end;
1741                                         }
1742                                 }
1743                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1744                         pkey=NULL;
1745                         }
1746
1747                 xs->valid = 1;
1748
1749                 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1750                 if (!ok)
1751                         goto end;
1752
1753                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1754                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1755                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1756                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1757                 if (!ok) goto end;
1758
1759                 n--;
1760                 if (n >= 0)
1761                         {
1762                         xi=xs;
1763                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1764                         }
1765                 }
1766         ok=1;
1767 end:
1768         return ok;
1769         }
1770
1771 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1772 {
1773         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1774 }
1775
1776 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1777         {
1778         char *str;
1779         ASN1_TIME atm;
1780         long offset;
1781         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1782         int i,j;
1783
1784         p=buff1;
1785         i=ctm->length;
1786         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1787         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1788                 {
1789                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1790                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1791                 p+=10;
1792                 str+=10;
1793                 }
1794         else
1795                 {
1796                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1797                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1798                 p+=12;
1799                 str+=12;
1800                 }
1801
1802         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1803                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1804         else
1805                 { 
1806                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1807                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1808                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1809                 if (*str == '.')
1810                         {
1811                         str++;
1812                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1813                         }
1814                 
1815                 }
1816         *(p++)='Z';
1817         *(p++)='\0';
1818
1819         if (*str == 'Z')
1820                 offset=0;
1821         else
1822                 {
1823                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1824                         return 0;
1825                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1826                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1827                 if (*str == '-')
1828                         offset= -offset;
1829                 }
1830         atm.type=ctm->type;
1831         atm.flags = 0;
1832         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1833         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1834
1835         if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1836                 return 0;
1837
1838         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1839                 {
1840                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1841                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1842                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1843                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1844
1845                 if (i < j) return -1;
1846                 if (i > j) return 1;
1847                 }
1848         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1849         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1850                 return -1;
1851         else
1852                 return i;
1853         }
1854
1855 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1856 {
1857         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1858 }
1859
1860 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1861         {
1862         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1863         }
1864
1865 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1866                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1867         {
1868         time_t t;
1869
1870         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1871         else time(&t);
1872
1873         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1874                 {
1875                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1876                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1877                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1878                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1879                                                                 offset_sec);
1880                 }
1881         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1882         }
1883
1884 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1885         {
1886         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1887         int i,j;
1888
1889         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1890
1891         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1892                 {
1893                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1894                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1895                         {
1896                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1897                         return 0;
1898                         }
1899                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1900                         break;
1901                 else
1902                         {
1903                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1904                         ktmp=NULL;
1905                         }
1906                 }
1907         if (ktmp == NULL)
1908                 {
1909                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1910                 return 0;
1911                 }
1912
1913         /* first, populate the other certs */
1914         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1915                 {
1916                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1917                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1918                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1919                 }
1920         
1921         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1922         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1923         return 1;
1924         }
1925
1926 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1927
1928 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1929                         EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1930         {
1931         X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1932         int i;
1933         STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1934         /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1935         if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
1936                         {
1937                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1938                         return NULL;
1939                         }
1940         /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1941         if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
1942                         {
1943                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1944                         return NULL;
1945                         }
1946         /* Issuer names must match */
1947         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1948                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1949                         {
1950                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1951                         return NULL;
1952                         }
1953         /* AKID and IDP must match */
1954         if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1955                         {
1956                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1957                         return NULL;
1958                         }
1959         if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1960                         {
1961                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1962                         return NULL;
1963                         }
1964         /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1965         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
1966                         {
1967                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1968                         return NULL;
1969                         }
1970         /* CRLs must verify */
1971         if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1972                         X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
1973                 {
1974                 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1975                 return NULL;
1976                 }
1977         /* Create new CRL */
1978         crl = X509_CRL_new();
1979         if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1980                 goto memerr;
1981         /* Set issuer name */
1982         if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1983                 goto memerr;
1984
1985         if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
1986                 goto memerr;
1987         if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
1988                 goto memerr;
1989
1990         /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1991
1992         if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1993                 goto memerr;
1994
1995         /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
1996          * CRL number to correct value too.
1997          */
1998
1999         for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2000                 {
2001                 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2002                 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2003                 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2004                         goto memerr;
2005                 }
2006
2007         /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2008
2009         revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2010
2011         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2012                 {
2013                 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2014                 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2015                 /* Add only if not also in base.
2016                  * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2017                  * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2018                  */
2019                 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2020                         {
2021                         rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2022                         if (!rvtmp)
2023                                 goto memerr;
2024                         if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2025                                 {
2026                                 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2027                                 goto memerr;
2028                                 }
2029                         }
2030                 }
2031         /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2032
2033         if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2034                 goto memerr;
2035         
2036         return crl;
2037
2038         memerr:
2039         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2040         if (crl)
2041                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2042         return NULL;
2043         }
2044
2045 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2046              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2047         {
2048         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2049          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2050         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2051                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2052         }
2053
2054 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2055         {
2056         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2057         }
2058
2059 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2060         {
2061         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2062         }
2063
2064 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2065         {
2066         return ctx->error;
2067         }
2068
2069 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2070         {
2071         ctx->error=err;
2072         }
2073
2074 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2075         {
2076         return ctx->error_depth;
2077         }
2078
2079 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2080         {
2081         return ctx->current_cert;
2082         }
2083
2084 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2085         {
2086         return ctx->chain;
2087         }
2088
2089 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2090         {
2091         if (!ctx->chain)
2092                 return NULL;
2093         return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2094         }
2095
2096 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2097         {
2098         return ctx->current_issuer;
2099         }
2100
2101 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2102         {
2103         return ctx->current_crl;
2104         }
2105
2106 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2107         {
2108         return ctx->parent;
2109         }
2110
2111 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2112         {
2113         ctx->cert=x;
2114         }
2115
2116 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2117         {
2118         ctx->untrusted=sk;
2119         }
2120
2121 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2122         {
2123         ctx->crls=sk;
2124         }
2125
2126 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2127         {
2128         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2129         }
2130
2131 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2132         {
2133         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2134         }
2135
2136 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2137  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2138  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2139  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2140  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2141  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2142  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2143  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2144  */
2145
2146 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2147                                 int purpose, int trust)
2148 {
2149         int idx;
2150         /* If purpose not set use default */
2151         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2152         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2153         if (purpose)
2154                 {
2155                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2156                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2157                 if (idx == -1)
2158                         {
2159                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2160                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2161                         return 0;
2162                         }
2163                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2164                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2165                         {
2166                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2167                         if (idx == -1)
2168                                 {
2169                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2170                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2171                                 return 0;
2172                                 }
2173                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2174                         }
2175                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2176                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2177                 }
2178         if (trust)
2179                 {
2180                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2181                 if (idx == -1)
2182                         {
2183                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2184                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2185                         return 0;
2186                         }
2187                 }
2188
2189         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2190         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2191         return 1;
2192 }
2193
2194 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2195 {
2196         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2197         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2198         if (!ctx)
2199                 {
2200                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2201                 return NULL;
2202                 }
2203         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2204         return ctx;
2205 }
2206
2207 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2208 {
2209         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2210         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2211 }
2212
2213 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2214              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2215         {
2216         int ret = 1;
2217         ctx->ctx=store;
2218         ctx->current_method=0;
2219         ctx->cert=x509;
2220         ctx->untrusted=chain;
2221         ctx->crls = NULL;
2222         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2223         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2224         ctx->valid=0;
2225         ctx->chain=NULL;
2226         ctx->error=0;
2227         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2228         ctx->error_depth=0;
2229         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2230         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2231         ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2232         ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2233         ctx->current_reasons=0;
2234         ctx->tree = NULL;
2235         ctx->parent = NULL;
2236
2237         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2238
2239         if (!ctx->param)
2240                 {
2241                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2242                 return 0;
2243                 }
2244
2245         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2246          * use defaults.
2247          */
2248
2249
2250         if (store)
2251                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2252         else
2253                 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2254
2255         if (store)
2256                 {
2257                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2258                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2259                 }
2260         else
2261                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2262
2263         if (ret)
2264                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2265                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2266
2267         if (ret == 0)
2268                 {
2269                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2270                 return 0;
2271                 }
2272
2273         if (store && store->check_issued)
2274                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2275         else
2276                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2277
2278         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2279                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2280         else
2281                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2282
2283         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2284                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2285         else
2286                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2287
2288         if (store && store->verify)
2289                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2290         else
2291                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2292
2293         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2294                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2295         else
2296                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2297
2298         if (store && store->get_crl)
2299                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2300         else
2301                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2302
2303         if (store && store->check_crl)
2304                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2305         else
2306                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2307
2308         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2309                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2310         else
2311                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2312
2313         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2314                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2315         else
2316                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2317
2318         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2319                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2320         else
2321                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2322
2323         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2324
2325
2326         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2327          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2328          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2329         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2330         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2331                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2332                 {
2333                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2334                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2335                 return 0;
2336                 }
2337         return 1;
2338         }
2339
2340 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2341  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2342  */
2343
2344 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2345 {
2346         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2347         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2348 }
2349
2350 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2351         {
2352         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2353         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2354                 {
2355                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2356                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2357                 ctx->param=NULL;
2358                 }
2359         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2360                 {
2361                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2362                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2363                 }
2364         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2365                 {
2366                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2367                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2368                 }
2369         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2370         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2371         }
2372
2373 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2374         {
2375         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2376         }
2377
2378 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2379         {
2380         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2381         }
2382
2383 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2384         {
2385         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2386         }
2387
2388 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2389                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2390         {
2391         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2392         }
2393
2394 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2395         {
2396         return ctx->tree;
2397         }
2398
2399 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2400         {
2401         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2402         }
2403
2404 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2405         {
2406         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2407         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2408         if (!param)
2409                 return 0;
2410         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2411         }
2412
2413 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2414         {
2415         return ctx->param;
2416         }
2417
2418 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2419         {
2420         if (ctx->param)
2421                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2422         ctx->param = param;
2423         }
2424
2425 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2426 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2427
2428 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2429
2430 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2431 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)