5aafa90b1d52a06c676677ae65bced15c991475a
[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  * 
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  * 
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  * 
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  * 
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  * 
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72 #include "vpm_int.h"
73
74 /* CRL score values */
75
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
77
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
79
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
81
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
83
84 /* CRL times valid */
85
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
87
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
89
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
91
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
93
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
95
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
97
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
99
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
101
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
103
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
105
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
107
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
109
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
111
112 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
124                         unsigned int *preasons,
125                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
127                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
129                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
131                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
133                                 unsigned int *preasons);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
136                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
137                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
138
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
140 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
141
142
143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
144         {
145         return ok;
146         }
147
148 #if 0
149 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
150         {
151         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
152         }
153 #endif
154 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
155 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
156         {
157         X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
158         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
159                 return 1;
160         else
161                 return 0;
162         }
163
164 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
165
166 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
167         {
168         STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
169         X509 *xtmp = NULL;
170         int i;
171         /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
172         certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
173         if (certs == NULL)
174                 return NULL;
175         /* Look for exact match */
176         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
177                 {
178                 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
179                 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
180                         break;
181                 }
182         if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
183                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
184         else
185                 xtmp = NULL;
186         sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
187         return xtmp;
188         }
189
190 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
191         {
192         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
193         int bad_chain = 0;
194         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
195         int depth,i,ok=0;
196         int num;
197         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
198         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
199         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
200                 {
201                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
202                 return -1;
203                 }
204
205         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
206
207         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
208          * present and that the first entry is in place */
209         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
210                 {
211                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
212                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
213                         {
214                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
215                         goto end;
216                         }
217                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
218                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
219                 }
220
221         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
222         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
223             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
224                 {
225                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
226                 goto end;
227                 }
228
229         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
230         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
231         depth=param->depth;
232
233
234         for (;;)
235                 {
236                 /* If we have enough, we break */
237                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
238                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
239                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
240                                          * code later.
241                                          */
242
243                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
244                 if (cert_self_signed(x))
245                         break;
246                 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
247                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
248                         {
249                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
250                         if (ok < 0)
251                                 return ok;
252                         /* If successful for now free up cert so it
253                          * will be picked up again later.
254                          */
255                         if (ok > 0)
256                                 {
257                                 X509_free(xtmp);
258                                 break;
259                                 }
260                         }
261
262                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
263                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
264                         {
265                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
266                         if (xtmp != NULL)
267                                 {
268                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
269                                         {
270                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
271                                         goto end;
272                                         }
273                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
274                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
275                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
276                                 x=xtmp;
277                                 num++;
278                                 /* reparse the full chain for
279                                  * the next one */
280                                 continue;
281                                 }
282                         }
283                 break;
284                 }
285
286         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
287          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
288          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
289
290         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
291          * is self signed.
292          */
293
294         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
295         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
296         if (cert_self_signed(x))
297                 {
298                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
299                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
300                         {
301                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
302                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
303                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
304                          */
305                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
306                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
307                                 {
308                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
309                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
310                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
311                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
312                                 bad_chain = 1;
313                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
314                                 if (!ok) goto end;
315                                 }
316                         else 
317                                 {
318                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
319                                  * so we get any trust settings.
320                                  */
321                                 X509_free(x);
322                                 x = xtmp;
323                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
324                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
325                                 }
326                         }
327                 else
328                         {
329                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
330                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
331                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
332                         num--;
333                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
334                         }
335                 }
336
337         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
338         for (;;)
339                 {
340                 /* If we have enough, we break */
341                 if (depth < num) break;
342
343                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
344                 if (cert_self_signed(x))
345                         break;
346
347                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
348
349                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
350                 if (ok == 0) break;
351
352                 x = xtmp;
353                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
354                         {
355                         X509_free(xtmp);
356                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
357                         return 0;
358                         }
359                 num++;
360                 }
361
362         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
363
364         i = check_trust(ctx);
365
366         /* If explicitly rejected error */
367         if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
368                 goto end;
369         /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's
370          * a single self signed certificate in which case we've indicated
371          * an error already and set bad_chain == 1
372          */
373         if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain)
374                 {
375                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
376                         {
377                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
378                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
379                         else
380                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
381                         ctx->current_cert=x;
382                         }
383                 else
384                         {
385
386                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
387                         num++;
388                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
389                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
390                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
391                         chain_ss=NULL;
392                         }
393
394                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
395                 bad_chain = 1;
396                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
397                 if (!ok) goto end;
398                 }
399
400         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
401         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
402
403         if (!ok) goto end;
404
405         /* Check name constraints */
406
407         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
408         
409         if (!ok) goto end;
410
411         ok = check_id(ctx);
412
413         if (!ok) goto end;
414
415         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
416         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
417
418         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
419          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
420          */
421
422         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
423         if(!ok) goto end;
424
425         i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
426                                                         ctx->param->flags);
427         if (i != X509_V_OK)
428                 {
429                 ctx->error = i;
430                 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
431                 ok = cb(0, ctx);
432                 if (!ok)
433                         goto end;
434                 }
435
436         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
437         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
438                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
439         else
440                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
441         if(!ok) goto end;
442
443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
444         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
445         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
446         if (!ok) goto end;
447         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
448         if (!ok) goto end;
449 #endif
450
451         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
452         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
453                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
454         if(!ok) goto end;
455         if (0)
456                 {
457 end:
458                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
459                 }
460         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
461         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
462         return ok;
463         }
464
465
466 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
467  */
468
469 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
470 {
471         int i;
472         X509 *issuer;
473         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
474                 {
475                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
476                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
477                         return issuer;
478                 }
479         return NULL;
480 }
481
482 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
483
484 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
485 {
486         int ret;
487         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
488         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
489                 return 1;
490         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
491         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
492                 return 0;
493
494         ctx->error = ret;
495         ctx->current_cert = x;
496         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
497         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
498         return 0;
499 }
500
501 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
502
503 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
504 {
505         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
506         if (*issuer)
507                 {
508                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
509                 return 1;
510                 }
511         else
512                 return 0;
513 }
514         
515
516 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
517  * with the supplied purpose
518  */
519
520 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
521 {
522 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
523         return 1;
524 #else
525         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
526         X509 *x;
527         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
528         int proxy_path_length = 0;
529         int purpose;
530         int allow_proxy_certs;
531         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
532
533         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
534            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
535                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
536            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
537                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
538            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
539                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
540         */
541         must_be_ca = -1;
542
543         /* CRL path validation */
544         if (ctx->parent)
545                 {
546                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
547                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
548                 }
549         else
550                 {
551                 allow_proxy_certs =
552                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
553                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
554                    software happy */
555                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
556                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
557                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
558                 }
559
560         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
561         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
562                 {
563                 int ret;
564                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
565                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
566                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
567                         {
568                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
569                         ctx->error_depth = i;
570                         ctx->current_cert = x;
571                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
572                         if (!ok) goto end;
573                         }
574                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
575                         {
576                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
577                         ctx->error_depth = i;
578                         ctx->current_cert = x;
579                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
580                         if (!ok) goto end;
581                         }
582                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
583                 switch(must_be_ca)
584                         {
585                 case -1:
586                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
587                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
588                                 {
589                                 ret = 0;
590                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
591                                 }
592                         else
593                                 ret = 1;
594                         break;
595                 case 0:
596                         if (ret != 0)
597                                 {
598                                 ret = 0;
599                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
600                                 }
601                         else
602                                 ret = 1;
603                         break;
604                 default:
605                         if ((ret == 0)
606                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
607                                         && (ret != 1)))
608                                 {
609                                 ret = 0;
610                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
611                                 }
612                         else
613                                 ret = 1;
614                         break;
615                         }
616                 if (ret == 0)
617                         {
618                         ctx->error_depth = i;
619                         ctx->current_cert = x;
620                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
621                         if (!ok) goto end;
622                         }
623                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
624                         {
625                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
626                         if ((ret == 0)
627                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
628                                         && (ret != 1)))
629                                 {
630                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
631                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
632                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
633                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
634                                 if (!ok) goto end;
635                                 }
636                         }
637                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
638                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
639                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
640                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
641                         {
642                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
643                         ctx->error_depth = i;
644                         ctx->current_cert = x;
645                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
646                         if (!ok) goto end;
647                         }
648                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
649                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
650                         plen++;
651                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
652                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
653                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
654                    CA certificate.  */
655                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
656                         {
657                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
658                                 {
659                                 ctx->error =
660                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
661                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
662                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
663                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
664                                 if (!ok) goto end;
665                                 }
666                         proxy_path_length++;
667                         must_be_ca = 0;
668                         }
669                 else
670                         must_be_ca = 1;
671                 }
672         ok = 1;
673  end:
674         return ok;
675 #endif
676 }
677
678 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
679         {
680         X509 *x;
681         int i, j, rv;
682         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
683         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
684                 {
685                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
686                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
687                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
688                         continue;
689                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
690                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
691                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
692                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
693                  */
694                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
695                         {
696                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
697                         if (nc)
698                                 {
699                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
700                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
701                                         {
702                                         ctx->error = rv;
703                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
704                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
705                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
706                                                 return 0;
707                                         }
708                                 }
709                         }
710                 }
711         return 1;
712         }
713
714 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
715         {
716         ctx->error = errcode;
717         ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
718         ctx->error_depth = 0;
719         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
720         }
721
722 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
723         {
724         int i;
725         int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
726         char *name;
727
728         for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
729                 {
730                 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
731                 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags,
732                                     &id->peername) > 0)
733                         return 1;
734                 }
735         return n == 0;
736         }
737
738 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
739         {
740         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
741         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
742         X509 *x = ctx->cert;
743         if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0)
744                 {
745                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
746                         return 0;
747                 }
748         if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0)
749                 {
750                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
751                         return 0;
752                 }
753         if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0)
754                 {
755                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
756                         return 0;
757                 }
758         return 1;
759         }
760
761 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
762 {
763         int i, ok;
764         X509 *x = NULL;
765         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
766         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
767         /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
768         for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
769                 {
770                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
771                 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
772                 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
773                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
774                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
775                 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
776                  * not overridden.
777                  */
778                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
779                         {
780                         ctx->error_depth = i;
781                         ctx->current_cert = x;
782                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
783                         ok = cb(0, ctx);
784                         if (!ok)
785                                 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
786                         }
787                 }
788         /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
789          * certificate return success.
790          */
791         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
792                 {
793                 X509 *mx;
794                 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
795                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
796                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
797                 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
798                 if (mx)
799                         {
800                         (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
801                         X509_free(x);
802                         ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
803                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
804                         }
805                 }
806
807         /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
808          * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
809          */
810         return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
811 }
812
813 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
814         {
815         int i, last, ok;
816         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
817                 return 1;
818         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
819                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
820         else
821                 {
822                 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
823                 if (ctx->parent)
824                         return 1;
825                 last = 0;
826                 }
827         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
828                 {
829                 ctx->error_depth = i;
830                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
831                 if (!ok) return ok;
832                 }
833         return 1;
834         }
835
836 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
837         {
838         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
839         X509 *x;
840         int ok, cnum;
841         unsigned int last_reasons;
842         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
843         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
844         ctx->current_cert = x;
845         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
846         ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
847         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
848         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
849                 {
850                 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
851                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
852                 if (ctx->get_crl)
853                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
854                 else
855                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
856                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
857                  * notify callback
858                  */
859                 if(!ok)
860                         {
861                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
862                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
863                         goto err;
864                         }
865                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
866                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
867                 if (!ok)
868                         goto err;
869
870                 if (dcrl)
871                         {
872                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
873                         if (!ok)
874                                 goto err;
875                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
876                         if (!ok)
877                                 goto err;
878                         }
879                 else
880                         ok = 1;
881
882                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
883                 if (ok != 2)
884                         {
885                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
886                         if (!ok)
887                                 goto err;
888                         }
889
890                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
891                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
892                 crl = NULL;
893                 dcrl = NULL;
894                 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
895                  * another iteration, so exit loop.
896                  */
897                 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
898                         {
899                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
900                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
901                         goto err;
902                         }
903                 }
904         err:
905         X509_CRL_free(crl);
906         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
907
908         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
909         return ok;
910
911         }
912
913 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
914
915 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
916         {
917         time_t *ptime;
918         int i;
919         if (notify)
920                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
921         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
922                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
923         else
924                 ptime = NULL;
925
926         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
927         if (i == 0)
928                 {
929                 if (!notify)
930                         return 0;
931                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
932                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
933                         return 0;
934                 }
935
936         if (i > 0)
937                 {
938                 if (!notify)
939                         return 0;
940                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
941                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
942                         return 0;
943                 }
944
945         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
946                 {
947                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
948
949                 if (i == 0)
950                         {
951                         if (!notify)
952                                 return 0;
953                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
954                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
955                                 return 0;
956                         }
957                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
958                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
959                         {
960                         if (!notify)
961                                 return 0;
962                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
963                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
964                                 return 0;
965                         }
966                 }
967
968         if (notify)
969                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
970
971         return 1;
972         }
973
974 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
975                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
976                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
977         {
978         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
979         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
980         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
981         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
982         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
983
984         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
985                 {
986                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
987                 reasons = *preasons;
988                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
989
990                 if (crl_score > best_score)
991                         {
992                         best_crl = crl;
993                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
994                         best_score = crl_score;
995                         best_reasons = reasons;
996                         }
997                 }
998
999         if (best_crl)
1000                 {
1001                 if (*pcrl)
1002                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1003                 *pcrl = best_crl;
1004                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1005                 *pscore = best_score;
1006                 *preasons = best_reasons;
1007                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1008                 if (*pdcrl)
1009                         {
1010                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1011                         *pdcrl = NULL;
1012                         }
1013                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1014                 }
1015
1016         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1017                 return 1;
1018
1019         return 0;
1020         }
1021
1022 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1023  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1024  */
1025
1026 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1027         {
1028         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1029         int i;
1030         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1031         if (i >= 0)
1032                 {
1033                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1034                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1035                         return 0;
1036                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1037                 }
1038         else
1039                 exta = NULL;
1040
1041         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1042
1043         if (i >= 0)
1044                 {
1045
1046                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1047                         return 0;
1048                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1049                 }
1050         else
1051                 extb = NULL;
1052
1053         if (!exta && !extb)
1054                 return 1;
1055
1056         if (!exta || !extb)
1057                 return 0;
1058
1059
1060         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1061                 return 0;
1062
1063         return 1;
1064         }
1065
1066 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1067
1068 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1069         {
1070         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1071         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1072                         return 0;
1073         /* Base must have a CRL number */
1074         if (!base->crl_number)
1075                         return 0;
1076         /* Issuer names must match */
1077         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1078                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1079                 return 0;
1080         /* AKID and IDP must match */
1081         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1082                         return 0;
1083         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1084                         return 0;
1085         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1086         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1087                         return 0;
1088         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1089         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1090                         return 1;
1091         return 0;
1092         }
1093
1094 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1095  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1096  */
1097
1098 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1099                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1100         {
1101         X509_CRL *delta;
1102         int i;
1103         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1104                 return;
1105         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1106                 return;
1107         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1108                 {
1109                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1110                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1111                         {
1112                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1113                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1114                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1115                         *dcrl = delta;
1116                         return;
1117                         }
1118                 }
1119         *dcrl = NULL;
1120         }
1121
1122 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1123  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1124  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1125  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1126  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1127  */
1128
1129 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1130                         unsigned int *preasons,
1131                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1132         {
1133
1134         int crl_score = 0;
1135         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1136
1137         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1138
1139         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1140         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1141                 return 0;
1142         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1143         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1144                 {
1145                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1146                         return 0;
1147                 }
1148         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1149                 {
1150                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1151                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1152                         return 0;
1153                 }
1154         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1155         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1156                 return 0;
1157         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1158         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1159                 {
1160                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1161                         return 0;
1162                 }
1163         else
1164                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1165
1166         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1167                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1168
1169         /* Check expiry */
1170         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1171                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1172
1173         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1174         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1175
1176         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1177
1178         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1179                 return 0;
1180
1181         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1182
1183         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1184                 {
1185                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1186                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1187                         return 0;
1188                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1189                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1190                 }
1191
1192         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1193
1194         return crl_score;
1195
1196         }
1197
1198 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1199                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1200         {
1201         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1202         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1203         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1204         int i;
1205
1206         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1207                 cidx++;
1208
1209         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1210
1211         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1212                 {
1213                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1214                         {
1215                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1216                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1217                         return;
1218                         }
1219                 }
1220
1221         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1222                 {
1223                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1224                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1225                         continue;
1226                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1227                         {
1228                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1229                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1230                         return;
1231                         }
1232                 }
1233
1234         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1235
1236         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1237                 return;
1238
1239         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1240          * set of untrusted certificates.
1241          */
1242         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1243                 {
1244                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1245                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1246                         continue;
1247                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1248                         {
1249                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1250                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1251                         return;
1252                         }
1253                 }
1254         }
1255
1256 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1257  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1258  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1259  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 
1260  * practice.
1261  */
1262
1263 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1264         {
1265         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1266         int ret;
1267         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1268         if (ctx->parent)
1269                 return 0;
1270         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1271                 return -1;
1272
1273         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1274         /* Copy verify params across */
1275         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1276
1277         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1278         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1279
1280         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1281         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1282
1283         if (ret <= 0)
1284                 goto err;
1285
1286         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1287
1288         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1289         err:
1290         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1291         return ret;
1292         }
1293
1294 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1295  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1296  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1297  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1298  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1299  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1300  */
1301
1302 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1303                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1304                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1305         {
1306         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1307         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1308         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1309         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1310                 return 1;
1311         return 0;
1312         }
1313
1314 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1315  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1316  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1317  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1318  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1319  */
1320
1321
1322 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1323         {
1324         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1325         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1326         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1327         int i, j;
1328         if (!a || !b)
1329                 return 1;
1330         if (a->type == 1)
1331                 {
1332                 if (!a->dpname)
1333                         return 0;
1334                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1335                 if (b->type == 1)
1336                         {
1337                         if (!b->dpname)
1338                                 return 0;
1339                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1340                                 return 1;
1341                         else
1342                                 return 0;
1343                         }
1344                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1345                 nm = a->dpname;
1346                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1347                 }
1348         else if (b->type == 1)
1349                 {
1350                 if (!b->dpname)
1351                         return 0;
1352                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1353                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1354                 nm = b->dpname;
1355                 }
1356
1357         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1358         if (nm)
1359                 {
1360                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1361                         {
1362                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);  
1363                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1364                                 continue;
1365                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1366                                 return 1;
1367                         }
1368                 return 0;
1369                 }
1370
1371         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1372
1373         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1374                 {
1375                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1376                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1377                         {
1378                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1379                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1380                                 return 1;
1381                         }
1382                 }
1383
1384         return 0;
1385
1386         }
1387
1388 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1389         {
1390         int i;
1391         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1392         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1393         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1394                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1395         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1396                 {
1397                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1398                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1399                         continue;
1400                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1401                         return 1;
1402                 }
1403         return 0;
1404         }
1405
1406 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1407
1408 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1409                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1410         {
1411         int i;
1412         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1413                 return 0;
1414         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1415                 {
1416                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1417                         return 0;
1418                 }
1419         else
1420                 {
1421                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1422                         return 0;
1423                 }
1424         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1425         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1426                 {
1427                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1428                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1429                         {
1430                         if (!crl->idp ||
1431                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1432                                 {
1433                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1434                                 return 1;
1435                                 }
1436                         }
1437                 }
1438         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1439                 return 1;
1440         return 0;
1441         }
1442
1443 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1444  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1445  */
1446         
1447 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1448                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1449         {
1450         int ok;
1451         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1452         int crl_score = 0;
1453         unsigned int reasons;
1454         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1455         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1456         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1457         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1458         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 
1459                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1460
1461         if (ok)
1462                 goto done;
1463
1464         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1465
1466         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1467
1468         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1469         if (!skcrl && crl)
1470                 goto done;
1471
1472         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1473
1474         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1475
1476         done:
1477
1478         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1479         if (crl)
1480                 {
1481                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1482                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1483                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1484                 *pcrl = crl;
1485                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1486                 return 1;
1487                 }
1488
1489         return 0;
1490         }
1491
1492 /* Check CRL validity */
1493 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1494         {
1495         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1496         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1497         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1498         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1499         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1500         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1501         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1502                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1503
1504         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1505          * is next certificate in chain.
1506          */
1507         else if (cnum < chnum)
1508                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1509         else
1510                 {
1511                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1512                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1513                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1514                         {
1515                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1516                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1517                         if(!ok) goto err;
1518                         }
1519                 }
1520
1521         if(issuer)
1522                 {
1523                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1524                  * been done
1525                  */
1526                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1527                         {
1528                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1529                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1530                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1531                                 {
1532                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1533                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1534                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1535                                 }
1536
1537                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1538                                 {
1539                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1540                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1541                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1542                                 }
1543
1544                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1545                                 {
1546                                 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1547                                         {
1548                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1549                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1550                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1551                                         }
1552                                 }
1553
1554                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1555                                 {
1556                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1557                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1558                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1559                                 }
1560
1561
1562                         }
1563
1564                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1565                         {
1566                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1567                         if (!ok)
1568                                 goto err;
1569                         }
1570
1571                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1572                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1573
1574                 if(!ikey)
1575                         {
1576                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1577                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1578                         if (!ok) goto err;
1579                         }
1580                 else
1581                         {
1582                         int rv;
1583                         rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1584                         if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1585                                 {
1586                                 ctx->error=rv;
1587                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1588                                 if (!ok)
1589                                         goto err;
1590                                 }
1591                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1592                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1593                                 {
1594                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1595                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1596                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1597                                 }
1598                         }
1599                 }
1600
1601         ok = 1;
1602
1603         err:
1604         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1605         return ok;
1606         }
1607
1608 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1609 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1610         {
1611         int ok;
1612         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1613         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1614          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1615          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
1616          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1617          */
1618         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1619                 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1620                 {
1621                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1622                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1623                 if(!ok)
1624                         return 0;
1625                 }
1626         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1627          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1628          */
1629         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1630                 {
1631                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1632                         return 2;
1633                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1634                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1635                 if (!ok)
1636                         return 0;
1637                 }
1638
1639         return 1;
1640         }
1641
1642 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1643         {
1644         int ret;
1645         if (ctx->parent)
1646                 return 1;
1647         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1648                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1649         if (ret == 0)
1650                 {
1651                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1652                 return 0;
1653                 }
1654         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1655         if (ret == -1)
1656                 {
1657                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1658                  * callback.
1659                  */
1660                 X509 *x;
1661                 int i;
1662                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1663                         {
1664                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1665                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1666                                 continue;
1667                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1668                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1669                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1670                                 return 0;
1671                         }
1672                 return 1;
1673                 }
1674         if (ret == -2)
1675                 {
1676                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1677                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1678                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1679                 }
1680
1681         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1682                 {
1683                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1684                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1685                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1686                         return 0;
1687                 }
1688
1689         return 1;
1690         }
1691
1692 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1693         {
1694         time_t *ptime;
1695         int i;
1696
1697         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1698                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1699         else
1700                 ptime = NULL;
1701
1702         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1703         if (i == 0)
1704                 {
1705                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1706                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1707                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1708                         return 0;
1709                 }
1710
1711         if (i > 0)
1712                 {
1713                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1714                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1715                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1716                         return 0;
1717                 }
1718
1719         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1720         if (i == 0)
1721                 {
1722                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1723                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1724                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1725                         return 0;
1726                 }
1727
1728         if (i < 0)
1729                 {
1730                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1731                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1732                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1733                         return 0;
1734                 }
1735
1736         return 1;
1737         }
1738
1739 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1740         {
1741         int ok=0,n;
1742         X509 *xs,*xi;
1743         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1744         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1745
1746         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1747
1748         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1749         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1750         n--;
1751         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1752
1753         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1754                 xs=xi;
1755         else
1756                 {
1757                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
1758                         {
1759                         xs = xi;
1760                         goto check_cert;
1761                         }
1762                 if (n <= 0)
1763                         {
1764                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1765                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1766                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1767                         goto end;
1768                         }
1769                 else
1770                         {
1771                         n--;
1772                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1773                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1774                         }
1775                 }
1776
1777 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1778         while (n >= 0)
1779                 {
1780                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1781
1782                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1783                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1784                  * just wastes time.
1785                  */
1786                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1787                         {
1788                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1789                                 {
1790                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1791                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1792                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1793                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1794                                 }
1795                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1796                                 {
1797                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1798                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1799                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1800                                 if (!ok)
1801                                         {
1802                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1803                                         goto end;
1804                                         }
1805                                 }
1806                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1807                         pkey=NULL;
1808                         }
1809
1810                 xs->valid = 1;
1811
1812                 check_cert:
1813                 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1814                 if (!ok)
1815                         goto end;
1816
1817                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1818                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1819                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1820                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1821                 if (!ok) goto end;
1822
1823                 n--;
1824                 if (n >= 0)
1825                         {
1826                         xi=xs;
1827                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1828                         }
1829                 }
1830         ok=1;
1831 end:
1832         return ok;
1833         }
1834
1835 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1836 {
1837         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1838 }
1839
1840 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1841         {
1842         char *str;
1843         ASN1_TIME atm;
1844         long offset;
1845         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1846         int i,j;
1847
1848         p=buff1;
1849         i=ctm->length;
1850         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1851         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1852                 {
1853                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1854                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1855                 p+=10;
1856                 str+=10;
1857                 }
1858         else
1859                 {
1860                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1861                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1862                 p+=12;
1863                 str+=12;
1864                 }
1865
1866         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1867                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1868         else
1869                 { 
1870                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1871                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1872                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1873                 if (*str == '.')
1874                         {
1875                         str++;
1876                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1877                         }
1878                 
1879                 }
1880         *(p++)='Z';
1881         *(p++)='\0';
1882
1883         if (*str == 'Z')
1884                 offset=0;
1885         else
1886                 {
1887                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1888                         return 0;
1889                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1890                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1891                 if (*str == '-')
1892                         offset= -offset;
1893                 }
1894         atm.type=ctm->type;
1895         atm.flags = 0;
1896         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1897         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1898
1899         if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1900                 return 0;
1901
1902         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1903                 {
1904                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1905                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1906                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1907                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1908
1909                 if (i < j) return -1;
1910                 if (i > j) return 1;
1911                 }
1912         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1913         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1914                 return -1;
1915         else
1916                 return i;
1917         }
1918
1919 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1920 {
1921         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1922 }
1923
1924 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1925         {
1926         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1927         }
1928
1929 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1930                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1931         {
1932         time_t t;
1933
1934         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1935         else time(&t);
1936
1937         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1938                 {
1939                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1940                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1941                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1942                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1943                                                                 offset_sec);
1944                 }
1945         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1946         }
1947
1948 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1949         {
1950         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1951         int i,j;
1952
1953         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1954
1955         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1956                 {
1957                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1958                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1959                         {
1960                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1961                         return 0;
1962                         }
1963                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1964                         break;
1965                 else
1966                         {
1967                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1968                         ktmp=NULL;
1969                         }
1970                 }
1971         if (ktmp == NULL)
1972                 {
1973                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1974                 return 0;
1975                 }
1976
1977         /* first, populate the other certs */
1978         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1979                 {
1980                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1981                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1982                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1983                 }
1984         
1985         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1986         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1987         return 1;
1988         }
1989
1990 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1991
1992 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1993                         EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1994         {
1995         X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1996         int i;
1997         STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1998         /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1999         if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
2000                         {
2001                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2002                         return NULL;
2003                         }
2004         /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2005         if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
2006                         {
2007                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2008                         return NULL;
2009                         }
2010         /* Issuer names must match */
2011         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
2012                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2013                         {
2014                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2015                         return NULL;
2016                         }
2017         /* AKID and IDP must match */
2018         if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
2019                         {
2020                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2021                         return NULL;
2022                         }
2023         if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
2024                         {
2025                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2026                         return NULL;
2027                         }
2028         /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2029         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
2030                         {
2031                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2032                         return NULL;
2033                         }
2034         /* CRLs must verify */
2035         if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2036                         X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
2037                 {
2038                 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2039                 return NULL;
2040                 }
2041         /* Create new CRL */
2042         crl = X509_CRL_new();
2043         if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2044                 goto memerr;
2045         /* Set issuer name */
2046         if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2047                 goto memerr;
2048
2049         if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2050                 goto memerr;
2051         if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2052                 goto memerr;
2053
2054         /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2055
2056         if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2057                 goto memerr;
2058
2059         /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2060          * CRL number to correct value too.
2061          */
2062
2063         for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2064                 {
2065                 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2066                 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2067                 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2068                         goto memerr;
2069                 }
2070
2071         /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2072
2073         revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2074
2075         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2076                 {
2077                 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2078                 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2079                 /* Add only if not also in base.
2080                  * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2081                  * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2082                  */
2083                 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2084                         {
2085                         rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2086                         if (!rvtmp)
2087                                 goto memerr;
2088                         if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2089                                 {
2090                                 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2091                                 goto memerr;
2092                                 }
2093                         }
2094                 }
2095         /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2096
2097         if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2098                 goto memerr;
2099         
2100         return crl;
2101
2102         memerr:
2103         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2104         if (crl)
2105                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2106         return NULL;
2107         }
2108
2109 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2110              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2111         {
2112         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2113          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2114         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2115                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2116         }
2117
2118 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2119         {
2120         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2121         }
2122
2123 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2124         {
2125         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2126         }
2127
2128 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2129         {
2130         return ctx->error;
2131         }
2132
2133 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2134         {
2135         ctx->error=err;
2136         }
2137
2138 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2139         {
2140         return ctx->error_depth;
2141         }
2142
2143 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2144         {
2145         return ctx->current_cert;
2146         }
2147
2148 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2149         {
2150         return ctx->chain;
2151         }
2152
2153 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2154         {
2155         if (!ctx->chain)
2156                 return NULL;
2157         return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2158         }
2159
2160 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2161         {
2162         return ctx->current_issuer;
2163         }
2164
2165 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2166         {
2167         return ctx->current_crl;
2168         }
2169
2170 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2171         {
2172         return ctx->parent;
2173         }
2174
2175 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2176         {
2177         ctx->cert=x;
2178         }
2179
2180 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2181         {
2182         ctx->untrusted=sk;
2183         }
2184
2185 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2186         {
2187         ctx->crls=sk;
2188         }
2189
2190 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2191         {
2192         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2193         }
2194
2195 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2196         {
2197         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2198         }
2199
2200 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2201  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2202  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2203  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2204  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2205  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2206  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2207  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2208  */
2209
2210 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2211                                 int purpose, int trust)
2212 {
2213         int idx;
2214         /* If purpose not set use default */
2215         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2216         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2217         if (purpose)
2218                 {
2219                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2220                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2221                 if (idx == -1)
2222                         {
2223                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2224                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2225                         return 0;
2226                         }
2227                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2228                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2229                         {
2230                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2231                         if (idx == -1)
2232                                 {
2233                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2234                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2235                                 return 0;
2236                                 }
2237                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2238                         }
2239                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2240                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2241                 }
2242         if (trust)
2243                 {
2244                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2245                 if (idx == -1)
2246                         {
2247                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2248                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2249                         return 0;
2250                         }
2251                 }
2252
2253         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2254         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2255         return 1;
2256 }
2257
2258 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2259 {
2260         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2261         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2262         if (!ctx)
2263                 {
2264                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2265                 return NULL;
2266                 }
2267         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2268         return ctx;
2269 }
2270
2271 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2272 {
2273         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2274         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2275 }
2276
2277 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2278              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2279         {
2280         int ret = 1;
2281         ctx->ctx=store;
2282         ctx->current_method=0;
2283         ctx->cert=x509;
2284         ctx->untrusted=chain;
2285         ctx->crls = NULL;
2286         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2287         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2288         ctx->valid=0;
2289         ctx->chain=NULL;
2290         ctx->error=0;
2291         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2292         ctx->error_depth=0;
2293         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2294         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2295         ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2296         ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2297         ctx->current_reasons=0;
2298         ctx->tree = NULL;
2299         ctx->parent = NULL;
2300
2301         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2302
2303         if (!ctx->param)
2304                 {
2305                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2306                 return 0;
2307                 }
2308
2309         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2310          * use defaults.
2311          */
2312
2313
2314         if (store)
2315                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2316         else
2317                 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2318
2319         if (store)
2320                 {
2321                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2322                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2323                 }
2324         else
2325                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2326
2327         if (ret)
2328                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2329                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2330
2331         if (ret == 0)
2332                 {
2333                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2334                 return 0;
2335                 }
2336
2337         if (store && store->check_issued)
2338                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2339         else
2340                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2341
2342         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2343                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2344         else
2345                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2346
2347         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2348                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2349         else
2350                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2351
2352         if (store && store->verify)
2353                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2354         else
2355                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2356
2357         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2358                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2359         else
2360                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2361
2362         if (store && store->get_crl)
2363                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2364         else
2365                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2366
2367         if (store && store->check_crl)
2368                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2369         else
2370                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2371
2372         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2373                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2374         else
2375                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2376
2377         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2378                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2379         else
2380                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2381
2382         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2383                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2384         else
2385                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2386
2387         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2388
2389
2390         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2391          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2392          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2393         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2394         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2395                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2396                 {
2397                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2398                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2399                 return 0;
2400                 }
2401         return 1;
2402         }
2403
2404 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2405  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2406  */
2407
2408 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2409 {
2410         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2411         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2412 }
2413
2414 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2415         {
2416         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2417         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2418                 {
2419                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2420                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2421                 ctx->param=NULL;
2422                 }
2423         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2424                 {
2425                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2426                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2427                 }
2428         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2429                 {
2430                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2431                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2432                 }
2433         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2434         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2435         }
2436
2437 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2438         {
2439         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2440         }
2441
2442 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2443         {
2444         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2445         }
2446
2447 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2448         {
2449         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2450         }
2451
2452 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2453                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2454         {
2455         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2456         }
2457
2458 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2459         {
2460         return ctx->tree;
2461         }
2462
2463 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2464         {
2465         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2466         }
2467
2468 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2469         {
2470         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2471         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2472         if (!param)
2473                 return 0;
2474         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2475         }
2476
2477 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2478         {
2479         return ctx->param;
2480         }
2481
2482 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2483         {
2484         if (ctx->param)
2485                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2486         ctx->param = param;
2487         }
2488
2489 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2490 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2491
2492 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2493
2494 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2495 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)