514573325e2c64a5d351ce545e1fffafa369b340
[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  * 
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  * 
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  * 
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  * 
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  * 
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73 /* CRL score values */
74
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
78
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
82
83 /* CRL times valid */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
86
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
90
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
98
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
102
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
106
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
110
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122                         unsigned int *preasons,
123                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
125                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
127                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
129                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131                                 unsigned int *preasons);
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
136
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
139
140
141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
142         {
143         return ok;
144         }
145
146 #if 0
147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
148         {
149         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
150         }
151 #endif
152
153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
154         {
155         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
156         X509_NAME *xn;
157         int bad_chain = 0;
158         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
159         int depth,i,ok=0;
160         int num;
161         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
162         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
163         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
164                 {
165                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
166                 return -1;
167                 }
168
169         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
170
171         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
172          * present and that the first entry is in place */
173         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
174                 {
175                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
176                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
177                         {
178                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
179                         goto end;
180                         }
181                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
182                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
183                 }
184
185         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
186         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
187             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
188                 {
189                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
190                 goto end;
191                 }
192
193         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
194         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
195         depth=param->depth;
196
197
198         for (;;)
199                 {
200                 /* If we have enough, we break */
201                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
202                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
203                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
204                                          * code later.
205                                          */
206
207                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
208                 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
209                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
210
211                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
212                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
213                         {
214                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
215                         if (xtmp != NULL)
216                                 {
217                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
218                                         {
219                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
220                                         goto end;
221                                         }
222                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
223                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
224                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
225                                 x=xtmp;
226                                 num++;
227                                 /* reparse the full chain for
228                                  * the next one */
229                                 continue;
230                                 }
231                         }
232                 break;
233                 }
234
235         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
236          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
237          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
238
239         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
240          * is self signed.
241          */
242
243         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
244         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
245         xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
246         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
247                 {
248                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
249                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
250                         {
251                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
252                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
253                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
254                          */
255                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
256                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
257                                 {
258                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
259                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
260                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
261                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
262                                 bad_chain = 1;
263                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
264                                 if (!ok) goto end;
265                                 }
266                         else 
267                                 {
268                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
269                                  * so we get any trust settings.
270                                  */
271                                 X509_free(x);
272                                 x = xtmp;
273                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
274                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
275                                 }
276                         }
277                 else
278                         {
279                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
280                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
281                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
282                         num--;
283                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
284                         }
285                 }
286
287         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
288         for (;;)
289                 {
290                 /* If we have enough, we break */
291                 if (depth < num) break;
292
293                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
294                 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
295                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
296
297                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
298
299                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
300                 if (ok == 0) break;
301
302                 x = xtmp;
303                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
304                         {
305                         X509_free(xtmp);
306                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
307                         return 0;
308                         }
309                 num++;
310                 }
311
312         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
313         xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
314
315         /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
316         if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
317                 {
318                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
319                         {
320                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
321                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
322                         else
323                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
324                         ctx->current_cert=x;
325                         }
326                 else
327                         {
328
329                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
330                         num++;
331                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
332                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
333                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
334                         chain_ss=NULL;
335                         }
336
337                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
338                 bad_chain = 1;
339                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
340                 if (!ok) goto end;
341                 }
342
343         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
344         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
345
346         if (!ok) goto end;
347
348         /* Check name constraints */
349
350         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
351         
352         if (!ok) goto end;
353
354         /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
355
356         if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
357
358         if (!ok) goto end;
359
360         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
361         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
362
363         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
364          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
365          */
366
367         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
368         if(!ok) goto end;
369
370         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
371         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
372                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
373         else
374                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
375         if(!ok) goto end;
376
377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
378         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
379         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
380         if (!ok) goto end;
381         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
382         if (!ok) goto end;
383 #endif
384
385         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
386         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
387                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
388         if(!ok) goto end;
389         if (0)
390                 {
391 end:
392                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
393                 }
394         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
395         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
396         return ok;
397         }
398
399
400 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
401  */
402
403 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
404 {
405         int i;
406         X509 *issuer;
407         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
408                 {
409                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
410                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
411                         return issuer;
412                 }
413         return NULL;
414 }
415
416 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
417
418 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
419 {
420         int ret;
421         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
422         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
423                 return 1;
424         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
425         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
426                 return 0;
427
428         ctx->error = ret;
429         ctx->current_cert = x;
430         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
431         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
432         return 0;
433 }
434
435 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
436
437 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
438 {
439         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
440         if (*issuer)
441                 {
442                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
443                 return 1;
444                 }
445         else
446                 return 0;
447 }
448         
449
450 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
451  * with the supplied purpose
452  */
453
454 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
455 {
456 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
457         return 1;
458 #else
459         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
460         X509 *x;
461         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
462         int proxy_path_length = 0;
463         int purpose;
464         int allow_proxy_certs;
465         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
466
467         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
468            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
469                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
470            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
471                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
472            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
473                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
474         */
475         must_be_ca = -1;
476
477         /* CRL path validation */
478         if (ctx->parent)
479                 {
480                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
481                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
482                 }
483         else
484                 {
485                 allow_proxy_certs =
486                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
487                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
488                    software happy */
489                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
490                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
491                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
492                 }
493
494         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
495         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
496                 {
497                 int ret;
498                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
499                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
500                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
501                         {
502                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
503                         ctx->error_depth = i;
504                         ctx->current_cert = x;
505                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
506                         if (!ok) goto end;
507                         }
508                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
509                         {
510                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
511                         ctx->error_depth = i;
512                         ctx->current_cert = x;
513                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
514                         if (!ok) goto end;
515                         }
516                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
517                 switch(must_be_ca)
518                         {
519                 case -1:
520                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
521                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
522                                 {
523                                 ret = 0;
524                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
525                                 }
526                         else
527                                 ret = 1;
528                         break;
529                 case 0:
530                         if (ret != 0)
531                                 {
532                                 ret = 0;
533                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
534                                 }
535                         else
536                                 ret = 1;
537                         break;
538                 default:
539                         if ((ret == 0)
540                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
541                                         && (ret != 1)))
542                                 {
543                                 ret = 0;
544                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
545                                 }
546                         else
547                                 ret = 1;
548                         break;
549                         }
550                 if (ret == 0)
551                         {
552                         ctx->error_depth = i;
553                         ctx->current_cert = x;
554                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
555                         if (!ok) goto end;
556                         }
557                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
558                         {
559                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
560                         if ((ret == 0)
561                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
562                                         && (ret != 1)))
563                                 {
564                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
565                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
566                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
567                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
568                                 if (!ok) goto end;
569                                 }
570                         }
571                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
572                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
573                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
574                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
575                         {
576                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
577                         ctx->error_depth = i;
578                         ctx->current_cert = x;
579                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
580                         if (!ok) goto end;
581                         }
582                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
583                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
584                         plen++;
585                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
586                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
587                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
588                    CA certificate.  */
589                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
590                         {
591                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
592                                 {
593                                 ctx->error =
594                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
595                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
596                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
597                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
598                                 if (!ok) goto end;
599                                 }
600                         proxy_path_length++;
601                         must_be_ca = 0;
602                         }
603                 else
604                         must_be_ca = 1;
605                 }
606         ok = 1;
607  end:
608         return ok;
609 #endif
610 }
611
612 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
613         {
614         X509 *x;
615         int i, j, rv;
616         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
617         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
618                 {
619                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
620                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
621                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
622                         continue;
623                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
624                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
625                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
626                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
627                  */
628                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
629                         {
630                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
631                         if (nc)
632                                 {
633                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
634                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
635                                         {
636                                         ctx->error = rv;
637                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
638                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
639                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
640                                                 return 0;
641                                         }
642                                 }
643                         }
644                 }
645         return 1;
646         }
647
648 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
649 {
650 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
651         return 1;
652 #else
653         int i, ok;
654         X509 *x;
655         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
656         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
657 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
658         i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
659         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
660         ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
661         if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
662                 return 1;
663         ctx->error_depth = i;
664         ctx->current_cert = x;
665         if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
666                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
667         else
668                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
669         ok = cb(0, ctx);
670         return ok;
671 #endif
672 }
673
674 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
675         {
676         int i, last, ok;
677         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
678                 return 1;
679         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
680                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
681         else
682                 {
683                 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
684                 if (ctx->parent)
685                         return 1;
686                 last = 0;
687                 }
688         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
689                 {
690                 ctx->error_depth = i;
691                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
692                 if (!ok) return ok;
693                 }
694         return 1;
695         }
696
697 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
698         {
699         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
700         X509 *x;
701         int ok, cnum;
702         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
703         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
704         ctx->current_cert = x;
705         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
706         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
707         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
708                 {
709                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
710                 if (ctx->get_crl)
711                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
712                 else
713                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
714                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
715                  * notify callback
716                  */
717                 if(!ok)
718                         {
719                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
720                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
721                         goto err;
722                         }
723                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
724                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
725                 if (!ok)
726                         goto err;
727
728                 if (dcrl)
729                         {
730                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
731                         if (!ok)
732                                 goto err;
733                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
734                         if (!ok)
735                                 goto err;
736                         }
737                 else
738                         ok = 1;
739
740                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
741                 if (ok != 2)
742                         {
743                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
744                         if (!ok)
745                                 goto err;
746                         }
747
748                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
749                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
750                 crl = NULL;
751                 dcrl = NULL;
752                 }
753         err:
754         X509_CRL_free(crl);
755         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
756
757         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
758         return ok;
759
760         }
761
762 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
763
764 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
765         {
766         time_t *ptime;
767         int i;
768         if (notify)
769                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
770         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
771                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
772         else
773                 ptime = NULL;
774
775         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
776         if (i == 0)
777                 {
778                 if (!notify)
779                         return 0;
780                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
781                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
782                         return 0;
783                 }
784
785         if (i > 0)
786                 {
787                 if (!notify)
788                         return 0;
789                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
790                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
791                         return 0;
792                 }
793
794         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
795                 {
796                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
797
798                 if (i == 0)
799                         {
800                         if (!notify)
801                                 return 0;
802                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
803                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
804                                 return 0;
805                         }
806                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
807                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
808                         {
809                         if (!notify)
810                                 return 0;
811                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
812                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
813                                 return 0;
814                         }
815                 }
816
817         if (notify)
818                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
819
820         return 1;
821         }
822
823 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
824                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
825                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
826         {
827         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
828         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
829         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
830         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
831         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
832
833         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
834                 {
835                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
836                 reasons = *preasons;
837                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
838
839                 if (crl_score > best_score)
840                         {
841                         best_crl = crl;
842                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
843                         best_score = crl_score;
844                         best_reasons = reasons;
845                         }
846                 }
847
848         if (best_crl)
849                 {
850                 if (*pcrl)
851                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
852                 *pcrl = best_crl;
853                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
854                 *pscore = best_score;
855                 *preasons = best_reasons;
856                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
857                 if (*pdcrl)
858                         {
859                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
860                         *pdcrl = NULL;
861                         }
862                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
863                 }
864
865         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
866                 return 1;
867
868         return 0;
869         }
870
871 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
872  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
873  */
874
875 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
876         {
877         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
878         int i;
879         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
880         if (i >= 0)
881                 {
882                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
883                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
884                         return 0;
885                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
886                 }
887         else
888                 exta = NULL;
889
890         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
891
892         if (i >= 0)
893                 {
894
895                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
896                         return 0;
897                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
898                 }
899         else
900                 extb = NULL;
901
902         if (!exta && !extb)
903                 return 1;
904
905         if (!exta || !extb)
906                 return 0;
907
908
909         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
910                 return 0;
911
912         return 1;
913         }
914
915 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
916
917 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
918         {
919         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
920         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
921                         return 0;
922         /* Base must have a CRL number */
923         if (!base->crl_number)
924                         return 0;
925         /* Issuer names must match */
926         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
927                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
928                 return 0;
929         /* AKID and IDP must match */
930         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
931                         return 0;
932         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
933                         return 0;
934         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
935         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
936                         return 0;
937         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
938         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
939                         return 1;
940         return 0;
941         }
942
943 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
944  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
945  */
946
947 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
948                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
949         {
950         X509_CRL *delta;
951         int i;
952         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
953                 return;
954         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
955                 return;
956         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
957                 {
958                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
959                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
960                         {
961                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
962                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
963                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
964                         *dcrl = delta;
965                         return;
966                         }
967                 }
968         *dcrl = NULL;
969         }
970
971 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
972  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
973  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
974  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
975  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
976  */
977
978 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
979                         unsigned int *preasons,
980                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
981         {
982
983         int crl_score = 0;
984         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
985
986         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
987
988         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
989         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
990                 return 0;
991         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
992         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
993                 {
994                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
995                         return 0;
996                 }
997         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
998                 {
999                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1000                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1001                         return 0;
1002                 }
1003         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1004         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1005                 return 0;
1006         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1007         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1008                 {
1009                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1010                         return 0;
1011                 }
1012         else
1013                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1014
1015         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1016                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1017
1018         /* Check expiry */
1019         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1020                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1021
1022         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1023         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1024
1025         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1026
1027         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1028                 return 0;
1029
1030         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1031
1032         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1033                 {
1034                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1035                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1036                         return 0;
1037                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1038                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1039                 }
1040
1041         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1042
1043         return crl_score;
1044
1045         }
1046
1047 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1048                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1049         {
1050         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1051         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1052         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1053         int i;
1054
1055         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1056                 cidx++;
1057
1058         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1059
1060         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1061                 {
1062                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1063                         {
1064                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1065                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1066                         return;
1067                         }
1068                 }
1069
1070         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1071                 {
1072                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1073                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1074                         continue;
1075                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1076                         {
1077                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1078                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1079                         return;
1080                         }
1081                 }
1082
1083         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1084
1085         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1086                 return;
1087
1088         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1089          * set of untrusted certificates.
1090          */
1091         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1092                 {
1093                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1094                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1095                         continue;
1096                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1097                         {
1098                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1099                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1100                         return;
1101                         }
1102                 }
1103         }
1104
1105 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1106  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1107  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1108  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 
1109  * practice.
1110  */
1111
1112 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1113         {
1114         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1115         int ret;
1116         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1117         if (ctx->parent)
1118                 return 0;
1119         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1120                 return -1;
1121
1122         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1123         /* Copy verify params across */
1124         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1125
1126         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1127         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1128
1129         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1130         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1131
1132         if (ret <= 0)
1133                 goto err;
1134
1135         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1136
1137         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1138         err:
1139         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1140         return ret;
1141         }
1142
1143 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1144  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1145  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1146  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1147  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1148  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1149  */
1150
1151 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1152                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1153                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1154         {
1155         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1156         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1157         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1158         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1159                 return 1;
1160         return 0;
1161         }
1162
1163 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1164  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1165  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1166  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1167  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1168  */
1169
1170
1171 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1172         {
1173         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1174         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1175         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1176         int i, j;
1177         if (!a || !b)
1178                 return 1;
1179         if (a->type == 1)
1180                 {
1181                 if (!a->dpname)
1182                         return 0;
1183                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1184                 if (b->type == 1)
1185                         {
1186                         if (!b->dpname)
1187                                 return 0;
1188                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1189                                 return 1;
1190                         else
1191                                 return 0;
1192                         }
1193                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1194                 nm = a->dpname;
1195                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1196                 }
1197         else if (b->type == 1)
1198                 {
1199                 if (!b->dpname)
1200                         return 0;
1201                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1202                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1203                 nm = b->dpname;
1204                 }
1205
1206         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1207         if (nm)
1208                 {
1209                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1210                         {
1211                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);  
1212                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1213                                 continue;
1214                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1215                                 return 1;
1216                         }
1217                 return 0;
1218                 }
1219
1220         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1221
1222         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1223                 {
1224                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1225                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1226                         {
1227                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1228                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1229                                 return 1;
1230                         }
1231                 }
1232
1233         return 0;
1234
1235         }
1236
1237 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1238         {
1239         int i;
1240         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1241         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1242         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1243                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1244         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1245                 {
1246                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1247                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1248                         continue;
1249                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1250                         return 1;
1251                 }
1252         return 0;
1253         }
1254
1255 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1256
1257 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1258                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1259         {
1260         int i;
1261         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1262                 return 0;
1263         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1264                 {
1265                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1266                         return 0;
1267                 }
1268         else
1269                 {
1270                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1271                         return 0;
1272                 }
1273         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1274         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1275                 {
1276                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1277                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1278                         {
1279                         if (!crl->idp ||
1280                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1281                                 {
1282                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1283                                 return 1;
1284                                 }
1285                         }
1286                 }
1287         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1288                 return 1;
1289         return 0;
1290         }
1291
1292 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1293  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1294  */
1295         
1296 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1297                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1298         {
1299         int ok;
1300         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1301         int crl_score = 0;
1302         unsigned int reasons;
1303         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1304         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1305         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1306         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1307         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 
1308                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1309
1310         if (ok)
1311                 goto done;
1312
1313         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1314
1315         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1316
1317         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1318         if (!skcrl && crl)
1319                 goto done;
1320
1321         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1322
1323         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1324
1325         done:
1326
1327         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1328         if (crl)
1329                 {
1330                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1331                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1332                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1333                 *pcrl = crl;
1334                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1335                 return 1;
1336                 }
1337
1338         return 0;
1339         }
1340
1341 /* Check CRL validity */
1342 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1343         {
1344         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1345         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1346         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1347         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1348         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1349         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1350         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1351                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1352
1353         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1354          * is next certificate in chain.
1355          */
1356         else if (cnum < chnum)
1357                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1358         else
1359                 {
1360                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1361                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1362                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1363                         {
1364                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1365                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1366                         if(!ok) goto err;
1367                         }
1368                 }
1369
1370         if(issuer)
1371                 {
1372                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1373                  * been done
1374                  */
1375                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1376                         {
1377                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1378                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1379                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1380                                 {
1381                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1382                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1383                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1384                                 }
1385
1386                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1387                                 {
1388                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1389                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1390                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1391                                 }
1392
1393                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1394                                 {
1395                                 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1396                                         {
1397                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1398                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1399                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1400                                         }
1401                                 }
1402
1403                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1404                                 {
1405                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1406                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1407                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1408                                 }
1409
1410
1411                         }
1412
1413                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1414                         {
1415                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1416                         if (!ok)
1417                                 goto err;
1418                         }
1419
1420                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1421                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1422
1423                 if(!ikey)
1424                         {
1425                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1426                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1427                         if (!ok) goto err;
1428                         }
1429                 else
1430                         {
1431                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1432                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1433                                 {
1434                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1435                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1436                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1437                                 }
1438                         }
1439                 }
1440
1441         ok = 1;
1442
1443         err:
1444         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1445         return ok;
1446         }
1447
1448 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1449 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1450         {
1451         int ok;
1452         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1453         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1454          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1455          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
1456          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1457          */
1458         if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1459                 {
1460                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1461                         return 1;
1462                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1463                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1464                 if(!ok)
1465                         return 0;
1466                 }
1467         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1468          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1469          */
1470         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1471                 {
1472                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1473                         return 2;
1474                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1475                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1476                 if (!ok)
1477                         return 0;
1478                 }
1479
1480         return 1;
1481         }
1482
1483 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1484         {
1485         int ret;
1486         if (ctx->parent)
1487                 return 1;
1488         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1489                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1490         if (ret == 0)
1491                 {
1492                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1493                 return 0;
1494                 }
1495         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1496         if (ret == -1)
1497                 {
1498                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1499                  * callback.
1500                  */
1501                 X509 *x;
1502                 int i;
1503                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1504                         {
1505                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1506                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1507                                 continue;
1508                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1509                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1510                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1511                                 return 0;
1512                         }
1513                 return 1;
1514                 }
1515         if (ret == -2)
1516                 {
1517                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1518                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1519                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1520                 }
1521
1522         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1523                 {
1524                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1525                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1526                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1527                         return 0;
1528                 }
1529
1530         return 1;
1531         }
1532
1533 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1534         {
1535         time_t *ptime;
1536         int i;
1537
1538         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1539                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1540         else
1541                 ptime = NULL;
1542
1543         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1544         if (i == 0)
1545                 {
1546                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1547                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1548                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1549                         return 0;
1550                 }
1551
1552         if (i > 0)
1553                 {
1554                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1555                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1556                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1557                         return 0;
1558                 }
1559
1560         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1561         if (i == 0)
1562                 {
1563                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1564                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1565                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1566                         return 0;
1567                 }
1568
1569         if (i < 0)
1570                 {
1571                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1572                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1573                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1574                         return 0;
1575                 }
1576
1577         return 1;
1578         }
1579
1580 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1581         {
1582         int ok=0,n;
1583         X509 *xs,*xi;
1584         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1585         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1586
1587         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1588
1589         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1590         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1591         n--;
1592         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1593
1594         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1595                 xs=xi;
1596         else
1597                 {
1598                 if (n <= 0)
1599                         {
1600                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1601                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1602                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1603                         goto end;
1604                         }
1605                 else
1606                         {
1607                         n--;
1608                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1609                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1610                         }
1611                 }
1612
1613 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1614         while (n >= 0)
1615                 {
1616                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1617
1618                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1619                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1620                  * just wastes time.
1621                  */
1622                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1623                         {
1624                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1625                                 {
1626                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1627                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1628                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1629                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1630                                 }
1631                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1632                                 {
1633                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1634                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1635                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1636                                 if (!ok)
1637                                         {
1638                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1639                                         goto end;
1640                                         }
1641                                 }
1642                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1643                         pkey=NULL;
1644                         }
1645
1646                 xs->valid = 1;
1647
1648                 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1649                 if (!ok)
1650                         goto end;
1651
1652                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1653                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1654                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1655                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1656                 if (!ok) goto end;
1657
1658                 n--;
1659                 if (n >= 0)
1660                         {
1661                         xi=xs;
1662                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1663                         }
1664                 }
1665         ok=1;
1666 end:
1667         return ok;
1668         }
1669
1670 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1671 {
1672         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1673 }
1674
1675 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1676         {
1677         char *str;
1678         ASN1_TIME atm;
1679         long offset;
1680         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1681         int i,j;
1682
1683         p=buff1;
1684         i=ctm->length;
1685         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1686         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1687                 {
1688                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1689                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1690                 p+=10;
1691                 str+=10;
1692                 }
1693         else
1694                 {
1695                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1696                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1697                 p+=12;
1698                 str+=12;
1699                 }
1700
1701         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1702                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1703         else
1704                 { 
1705                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1706                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1707                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1708                 if (*str == '.')
1709                         {
1710                         str++;
1711                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1712                         }
1713                 
1714                 }
1715         *(p++)='Z';
1716         *(p++)='\0';
1717
1718         if (*str == 'Z')
1719                 offset=0;
1720         else
1721                 {
1722                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1723                         return 0;
1724                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1725                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1726                 if (*str == '-')
1727                         offset= -offset;
1728                 }
1729         atm.type=ctm->type;
1730         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1731         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1732
1733         if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1734                 return 0;
1735
1736         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1737                 {
1738                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1739                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1740                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1741                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1742
1743                 if (i < j) return -1;
1744                 if (i > j) return 1;
1745                 }
1746         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1747         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1748                 return -1;
1749         else
1750                 return i;
1751         }
1752
1753 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1754 {
1755         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1756 }
1757
1758 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1759         {
1760         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1761         }
1762
1763 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1764                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1765         {
1766         time_t t;
1767
1768         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1769         else time(&t);
1770
1771         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1772                 {
1773                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1774                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1775                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1776                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1777                                                                 offset_sec);
1778                 }
1779         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1780         }
1781
1782 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1783         {
1784         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1785         int i,j;
1786
1787         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1788
1789         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1790                 {
1791                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1792                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1793                         {
1794                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1795                         return 0;
1796                         }
1797                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1798                         break;
1799                 else
1800                         {
1801                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1802                         ktmp=NULL;
1803                         }
1804                 }
1805         if (ktmp == NULL)
1806                 {
1807                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1808                 return 0;
1809                 }
1810
1811         /* first, populate the other certs */
1812         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1813                 {
1814                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1815                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1816                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1817                 }
1818         
1819         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1820         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1821         return 1;
1822         }
1823
1824 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1825              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1826         {
1827         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1828          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1829         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1830                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1831         }
1832
1833 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1834         {
1835         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1836         }
1837
1838 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1839         {
1840         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1841         }
1842
1843 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1844         {
1845         return ctx->error;
1846         }
1847
1848 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1849         {
1850         ctx->error=err;
1851         }
1852
1853 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1854         {
1855         return ctx->error_depth;
1856         }
1857
1858 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1859         {
1860         return ctx->current_cert;
1861         }
1862
1863 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1864         {
1865         return ctx->chain;
1866         }
1867
1868 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1869         {
1870         int i;
1871         X509 *x;
1872         STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1873         if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1874         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1875                 {
1876                 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1877                 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1878                 }
1879         return chain;
1880         }
1881
1882 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1883         {
1884         return ctx->current_issuer;
1885         }
1886
1887 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1888         {
1889         return ctx->current_crl;
1890         }
1891
1892 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1893         {
1894         return ctx->parent;
1895         }
1896
1897 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1898         {
1899         ctx->cert=x;
1900         }
1901
1902 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1903         {
1904         ctx->untrusted=sk;
1905         }
1906
1907 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1908         {
1909         ctx->crls=sk;
1910         }
1911
1912 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1913         {
1914         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1915         }
1916
1917 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1918         {
1919         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1920         }
1921
1922 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1923  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1924  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1925  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1926  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1927  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1928  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1929  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1930  */
1931
1932 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1933                                 int purpose, int trust)
1934 {
1935         int idx;
1936         /* If purpose not set use default */
1937         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1938         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1939         if (purpose)
1940                 {
1941                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1942                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1943                 if (idx == -1)
1944                         {
1945                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1946                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1947                         return 0;
1948                         }
1949                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1950                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1951                         {
1952                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1953                         if (idx == -1)
1954                                 {
1955                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1956                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1957                                 return 0;
1958                                 }
1959                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1960                         }
1961                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1962                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1963                 }
1964         if (trust)
1965                 {
1966                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1967                 if (idx == -1)
1968                         {
1969                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1970                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1971                         return 0;
1972                         }
1973                 }
1974
1975         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1976         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1977         return 1;
1978 }
1979
1980 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1981 {
1982         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1983         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1984         if (!ctx)
1985                 {
1986                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1987                 return NULL;
1988                 }
1989         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1990         return ctx;
1991 }
1992
1993 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1994 {
1995         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1996         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1997 }
1998
1999 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2000              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2001         {
2002         int ret = 1;
2003         ctx->ctx=store;
2004         ctx->current_method=0;
2005         ctx->cert=x509;
2006         ctx->untrusted=chain;
2007         ctx->crls = NULL;
2008         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2009         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2010         ctx->valid=0;
2011         ctx->chain=NULL;
2012         ctx->error=0;
2013         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2014         ctx->error_depth=0;
2015         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2016         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2017         ctx->tree = NULL;
2018         ctx->parent = NULL;
2019
2020         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2021
2022         if (!ctx->param)
2023                 {
2024                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2025                 return 0;
2026                 }
2027
2028         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2029          * use defaults.
2030          */
2031
2032
2033         if (store)
2034                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2035         else
2036                 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2037
2038         if (store)
2039                 {
2040                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2041                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2042                 }
2043         else
2044                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2045
2046         if (ret)
2047                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2048                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2049
2050         if (ret == 0)
2051                 {
2052                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2053                 return 0;
2054                 }
2055
2056         if (store && store->check_issued)
2057                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2058         else
2059                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2060
2061         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2062                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2063         else
2064                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2065
2066         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2067                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2068         else
2069                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2070
2071         if (store && store->verify)
2072                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2073         else
2074                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2075
2076         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2077                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2078         else
2079                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2080
2081         if (store && store->get_crl)
2082                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2083         else
2084                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2085
2086         if (store && store->check_crl)
2087                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2088         else
2089                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2090
2091         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2092                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2093         else
2094                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2095
2096         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2097                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2098         else
2099                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2100
2101         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2102                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2103         else
2104                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2105
2106         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2107
2108
2109         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2110          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2111          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2112         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2113         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2114                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2115                 {
2116                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2117                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2118                 return 0;
2119                 }
2120         return 1;
2121         }
2122
2123 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2124  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2125  */
2126
2127 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2128 {
2129         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2130         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2131 }
2132
2133 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2134         {
2135         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2136         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2137                 {
2138                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2139                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2140                 ctx->param=NULL;
2141                 }
2142         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2143                 {
2144                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2145                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2146                 }
2147         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2148                 {
2149                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2150                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2151                 }
2152         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2153         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2154         }
2155
2156 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2157         {
2158         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2159         }
2160
2161 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2162         {
2163         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2164         }
2165
2166 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2167         {
2168         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2169         }
2170
2171 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2172                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2173         {
2174         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2175         }
2176
2177 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2178         {
2179         return ctx->tree;
2180         }
2181
2182 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2183         {
2184         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2185         }
2186
2187 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2188         {
2189         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2190         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2191         if (!param)
2192                 return 0;
2193         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2194         }
2195
2196 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2197         {
2198         return ctx->param;
2199         }
2200
2201 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2202         {
2203         if (ctx->param)
2204                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2205         ctx->param = param;
2206         }
2207
2208 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2209 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2210
2211 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2212
2213 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2214 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)