New verify flag to return success if we have any certificate in the
[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  * 
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  * 
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  * 
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  * 
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  * 
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73 /* CRL score values */
74
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
78
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
82
83 /* CRL times valid */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
86
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
90
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
98
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
102
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
106
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
110
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121
122 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
123                         unsigned int *preasons,
124                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
128                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
129 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
130                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
131 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
132                                 unsigned int *preasons);
133 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
134 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
135                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
136                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
137
138 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
139 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
140
141
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
143         {
144         return ok;
145         }
146
147 #if 0
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
149         {
150         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
151         }
152 #endif
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
155         {
156         X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
157         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
158                 return 1;
159         else
160                 return 0;
161         }
162
163 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
164         {
165         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
166         int bad_chain = 0;
167         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
168         int depth,i,ok=0;
169         int num;
170         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
171         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
172         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
173                 {
174                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
175                 return -1;
176                 }
177
178         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
179
180         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
181          * present and that the first entry is in place */
182         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
183                 {
184                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
185                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
186                         {
187                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
188                         goto end;
189                         }
190                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
191                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
192                 }
193
194         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
195         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
196             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
197                 {
198                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
199                 goto end;
200                 }
201
202         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
203         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
204         depth=param->depth;
205
206
207         for (;;)
208                 {
209                 /* If we have enough, we break */
210                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
211                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
212                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
213                                          * code later.
214                                          */
215
216                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
217                 if (cert_self_signed(x))
218                         break;
219                 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
220                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
221                         {
222                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
223                         if (ok < 0)
224                                 return ok;
225                         /* If successful for now free up cert so it
226                          * will be picked up again later.
227                          */
228                         if (ok > 0)
229                                 {
230                                 X509_free(xtmp);
231                                 break;
232                                 }
233                         }
234
235                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
236                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
237                         {
238                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
239                         if (xtmp != NULL)
240                                 {
241                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
242                                         {
243                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
244                                         goto end;
245                                         }
246                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
247                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
248                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
249                                 x=xtmp;
250                                 num++;
251                                 /* reparse the full chain for
252                                  * the next one */
253                                 continue;
254                                 }
255                         }
256                 break;
257                 }
258
259         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
260          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
261          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
262
263         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
264          * is self signed.
265          */
266
267         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
268         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
269         if (cert_self_signed(x))
270                 {
271                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
272                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
273                         {
274                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
275                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
276                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
277                          */
278                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
279                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
280                                 {
281                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
282                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
283                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
284                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
285                                 bad_chain = 1;
286                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
287                                 if (!ok) goto end;
288                                 }
289                         else 
290                                 {
291                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
292                                  * so we get any trust settings.
293                                  */
294                                 X509_free(x);
295                                 x = xtmp;
296                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
297                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
298                                 }
299                         }
300                 else
301                         {
302                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
303                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
304                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
305                         num--;
306                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
307                         }
308                 }
309
310         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
311         for (;;)
312                 {
313                 /* If we have enough, we break */
314                 if (depth < num) break;
315
316                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
317                 if (cert_self_signed(x))
318                         break;
319
320                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
321
322                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
323                 if (ok == 0) break;
324
325                 x = xtmp;
326                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
327                         {
328                         X509_free(xtmp);
329                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
330                         return 0;
331                         }
332                 num++;
333                 }
334
335         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
336
337         i = check_trust(ctx);
338
339         /* If explicitly rejected error */
340         if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
341                 goto end;
342         /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
343         if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
344                 {
345                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
346                         {
347                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
348                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
349                         else
350                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
351                         ctx->current_cert=x;
352                         }
353                 else
354                         {
355
356                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
357                         num++;
358                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
359                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
360                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
361                         chain_ss=NULL;
362                         }
363
364                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
365                 bad_chain = 1;
366                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
367                 if (!ok) goto end;
368                 }
369
370         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
371         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
372
373         if (!ok) goto end;
374
375         /* Check name constraints */
376
377         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
378         
379         if (!ok) goto end;
380
381         ok = check_id(ctx);
382
383         if (!ok) goto end;
384
385         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
386         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
387
388         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
389          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
390          */
391
392         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
393         if(!ok) goto end;
394
395         i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
396                                                         ctx->param->flags);
397         if (i != X509_V_OK)
398                 {
399                 ctx->error = i;
400                 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
401                 ok = cb(0, ctx);
402                 if (!ok)
403                         goto end;
404                 }
405
406         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
407         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
408                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
409         else
410                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
411         if(!ok) goto end;
412
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
414         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
415         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
416         if (!ok) goto end;
417         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
418         if (!ok) goto end;
419 #endif
420
421         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
422         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
423                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
424         if(!ok) goto end;
425         if (0)
426                 {
427 end:
428                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
429                 }
430         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
431         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
432         return ok;
433         }
434
435
436 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
437  */
438
439 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
440 {
441         int i;
442         X509 *issuer;
443         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
444                 {
445                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
446                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
447                         return issuer;
448                 }
449         return NULL;
450 }
451
452 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
453
454 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
455 {
456         int ret;
457         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
458         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
459                 {
460                 int i;
461                 X509 *ch;
462                 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
463                 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
464                         return 1;
465                 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
466                         {
467                         ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
468                         if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer))
469                                 {
470                                 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
471                                 break;
472                                 }
473                         }
474                 }
475
476         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
477                 return 1;
478         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
479         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
480                 return 0;
481
482         ctx->error = ret;
483         ctx->current_cert = x;
484         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
485         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
486         return 0;
487 }
488
489 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
490
491 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
492 {
493         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
494         if (*issuer)
495                 {
496                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
497                 return 1;
498                 }
499         else
500                 return 0;
501 }
502         
503
504 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
505  * with the supplied purpose
506  */
507
508 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
509 {
510 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
511         return 1;
512 #else
513         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
514         X509 *x;
515         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
516         int proxy_path_length = 0;
517         int purpose;
518         int allow_proxy_certs;
519         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
520
521         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
522            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
523                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
524            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
525                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
526            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
527                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
528         */
529         must_be_ca = -1;
530
531         /* CRL path validation */
532         if (ctx->parent)
533                 {
534                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
535                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
536                 }
537         else
538                 {
539                 allow_proxy_certs =
540                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
541                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
542                    software happy */
543                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
544                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
545                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
546                 }
547
548         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
549         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
550                 {
551                 int ret;
552                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
553                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
554                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
555                         {
556                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
557                         ctx->error_depth = i;
558                         ctx->current_cert = x;
559                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
560                         if (!ok) goto end;
561                         }
562                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
563                         {
564                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
565                         ctx->error_depth = i;
566                         ctx->current_cert = x;
567                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
568                         if (!ok) goto end;
569                         }
570                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
571                 switch(must_be_ca)
572                         {
573                 case -1:
574                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
575                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
576                                 {
577                                 ret = 0;
578                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
579                                 }
580                         else
581                                 ret = 1;
582                         break;
583                 case 0:
584                         if (ret != 0)
585                                 {
586                                 ret = 0;
587                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
588                                 }
589                         else
590                                 ret = 1;
591                         break;
592                 default:
593                         if ((ret == 0)
594                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
595                                         && (ret != 1)))
596                                 {
597                                 ret = 0;
598                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
599                                 }
600                         else
601                                 ret = 1;
602                         break;
603                         }
604                 if (ret == 0)
605                         {
606                         ctx->error_depth = i;
607                         ctx->current_cert = x;
608                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
609                         if (!ok) goto end;
610                         }
611                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
612                         {
613                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
614                         if ((ret == 0)
615                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
616                                         && (ret != 1)))
617                                 {
618                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
619                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
620                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
621                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
622                                 if (!ok) goto end;
623                                 }
624                         }
625                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
626                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
627                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
628                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
629                         {
630                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
631                         ctx->error_depth = i;
632                         ctx->current_cert = x;
633                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
634                         if (!ok) goto end;
635                         }
636                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
637                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
638                         plen++;
639                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
640                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
641                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
642                    CA certificate.  */
643                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
644                         {
645                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
646                                 {
647                                 ctx->error =
648                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
649                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
650                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
651                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
652                                 if (!ok) goto end;
653                                 }
654                         proxy_path_length++;
655                         must_be_ca = 0;
656                         }
657                 else
658                         must_be_ca = 1;
659                 }
660         ok = 1;
661  end:
662         return ok;
663 #endif
664 }
665
666 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
667         {
668         X509 *x;
669         int i, j, rv;
670         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
671         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
672                 {
673                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
674                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
675                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
676                         continue;
677                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
678                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
679                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
680                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
681                  */
682                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
683                         {
684                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
685                         if (nc)
686                                 {
687                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
688                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
689                                         {
690                                         ctx->error = rv;
691                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
692                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
693                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
694                                                 return 0;
695                                         }
696                                 }
697                         }
698                 }
699         return 1;
700         }
701
702 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
703         {
704         ctx->error = errcode;
705         ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
706         ctx->error_depth = 0;
707         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
708         }
709
710 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
711         {
712         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
713         X509 *x = ctx->cert;
714         if (vpm->host && !X509_check_host(x, vpm->host, vpm->hostlen, 0))
715                 {
716                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
717                         return 0;
718                 }
719         if (vpm->email && !X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0))
720                 {
721                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
722                         return 0;
723                 }
724         if (vpm->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0))
725                 {
726                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
727                         return 0;
728                 }
729         return 1;
730         }
731
732 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
733 {
734         int i, ok;
735         X509 *x = NULL;
736         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
737         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
738         /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
739         for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
740                 {
741                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
742                 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
743                 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
744                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
745                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
746                 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
747                  * not overridden.
748                  */
749                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
750                         {
751                         ctx->error_depth = i;
752                         ctx->current_cert = x;
753                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
754                         ok = cb(0, ctx);
755                         if (!ok)
756                                 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
757                         }
758                 }
759         /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
760          * certificate return success.
761          */
762         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
763                 {
764                 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
765                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
766                 }
767
768         /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
769          * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
770          */
771         return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
772 }
773
774 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
775         {
776         int i, last, ok;
777         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
778                 return 1;
779         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
780                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
781         else
782                 {
783                 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
784                 if (ctx->parent)
785                         return 1;
786                 last = 0;
787                 }
788         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
789                 {
790                 ctx->error_depth = i;
791                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
792                 if (!ok) return ok;
793                 }
794         return 1;
795         }
796
797 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
798         {
799         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
800         X509 *x;
801         int ok, cnum;
802         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
803         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
804         ctx->current_cert = x;
805         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
806         ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
807         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
808         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
809                 {
810                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
811                 if (ctx->get_crl)
812                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
813                 else
814                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
815                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
816                  * notify callback
817                  */
818                 if(!ok)
819                         {
820                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
821                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
822                         goto err;
823                         }
824                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
825                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
826                 if (!ok)
827                         goto err;
828
829                 if (dcrl)
830                         {
831                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
832                         if (!ok)
833                                 goto err;
834                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
835                         if (!ok)
836                                 goto err;
837                         }
838                 else
839                         ok = 1;
840
841                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
842                 if (ok != 2)
843                         {
844                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
845                         if (!ok)
846                                 goto err;
847                         }
848
849                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
850                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
851                 crl = NULL;
852                 dcrl = NULL;
853                 }
854         err:
855         X509_CRL_free(crl);
856         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
857
858         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
859         return ok;
860
861         }
862
863 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
864
865 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
866         {
867         time_t *ptime;
868         int i;
869         if (notify)
870                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
871         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
872                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
873         else
874                 ptime = NULL;
875
876         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
877         if (i == 0)
878                 {
879                 if (!notify)
880                         return 0;
881                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
882                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
883                         return 0;
884                 }
885
886         if (i > 0)
887                 {
888                 if (!notify)
889                         return 0;
890                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
891                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
892                         return 0;
893                 }
894
895         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
896                 {
897                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
898
899                 if (i == 0)
900                         {
901                         if (!notify)
902                                 return 0;
903                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
904                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
905                                 return 0;
906                         }
907                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
908                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
909                         {
910                         if (!notify)
911                                 return 0;
912                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
913                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
914                                 return 0;
915                         }
916                 }
917
918         if (notify)
919                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
920
921         return 1;
922         }
923
924 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
925                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
926                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
927         {
928         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
929         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
930         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
931         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
932         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
933
934         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
935                 {
936                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
937                 reasons = *preasons;
938                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
939
940                 if (crl_score > best_score)
941                         {
942                         best_crl = crl;
943                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
944                         best_score = crl_score;
945                         best_reasons = reasons;
946                         }
947                 }
948
949         if (best_crl)
950                 {
951                 if (*pcrl)
952                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
953                 *pcrl = best_crl;
954                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
955                 *pscore = best_score;
956                 *preasons = best_reasons;
957                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
958                 if (*pdcrl)
959                         {
960                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
961                         *pdcrl = NULL;
962                         }
963                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
964                 }
965
966         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
967                 return 1;
968
969         return 0;
970         }
971
972 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
973  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
974  */
975
976 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
977         {
978         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
979         int i;
980         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
981         if (i >= 0)
982                 {
983                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
984                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
985                         return 0;
986                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
987                 }
988         else
989                 exta = NULL;
990
991         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
992
993         if (i >= 0)
994                 {
995
996                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
997                         return 0;
998                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
999                 }
1000         else
1001                 extb = NULL;
1002
1003         if (!exta && !extb)
1004                 return 1;
1005
1006         if (!exta || !extb)
1007                 return 0;
1008
1009
1010         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1011                 return 0;
1012
1013         return 1;
1014         }
1015
1016 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1017
1018 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1019         {
1020         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1021         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1022                         return 0;
1023         /* Base must have a CRL number */
1024         if (!base->crl_number)
1025                         return 0;
1026         /* Issuer names must match */
1027         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1028                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1029                 return 0;
1030         /* AKID and IDP must match */
1031         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1032                         return 0;
1033         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1034                         return 0;
1035         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1036         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1037                         return 0;
1038         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1039         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1040                         return 1;
1041         return 0;
1042         }
1043
1044 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1045  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1046  */
1047
1048 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1049                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1050         {
1051         X509_CRL *delta;
1052         int i;
1053         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1054                 return;
1055         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1056                 return;
1057         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1058                 {
1059                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1060                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1061                         {
1062                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1063                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1064                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1065                         *dcrl = delta;
1066                         return;
1067                         }
1068                 }
1069         *dcrl = NULL;
1070         }
1071
1072 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1073  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1074  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1075  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1076  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1077  */
1078
1079 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1080                         unsigned int *preasons,
1081                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1082         {
1083
1084         int crl_score = 0;
1085         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1086
1087         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1088
1089         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1090         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1091                 return 0;
1092         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1093         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1094                 {
1095                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1096                         return 0;
1097                 }
1098         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1099                 {
1100                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1101                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1102                         return 0;
1103                 }
1104         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1105         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1106                 return 0;
1107         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1108         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1109                 {
1110                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1111                         return 0;
1112                 }
1113         else
1114                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1115
1116         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1117                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1118
1119         /* Check expiry */
1120         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1121                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1122
1123         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1124         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1125
1126         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1127
1128         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1129                 return 0;
1130
1131         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1132
1133         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1134                 {
1135                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1136                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1137                         return 0;
1138                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1139                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1140                 }
1141
1142         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1143
1144         return crl_score;
1145
1146         }
1147
1148 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1149                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1150         {
1151         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1152         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1153         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1154         int i;
1155
1156         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1157                 cidx++;
1158
1159         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1160
1161         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1162                 {
1163                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1164                         {
1165                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1166                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1167                         return;
1168                         }
1169                 }
1170
1171         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1172                 {
1173                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1174                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1175                         continue;
1176                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1177                         {
1178                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1179                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1180                         return;
1181                         }
1182                 }
1183
1184         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1185
1186         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1187                 return;
1188
1189         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1190          * set of untrusted certificates.
1191          */
1192         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1193                 {
1194                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1195                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1196                         continue;
1197                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1198                         {
1199                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1200                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1201                         return;
1202                         }
1203                 }
1204         }
1205
1206 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1207  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1208  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1209  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 
1210  * practice.
1211  */
1212
1213 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1214         {
1215         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1216         int ret;
1217         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1218         if (ctx->parent)
1219                 return 0;
1220         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1221                 return -1;
1222
1223         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1224         /* Copy verify params across */
1225         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1226
1227         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1228         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1229
1230         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1231         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1232
1233         if (ret <= 0)
1234                 goto err;
1235
1236         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1237
1238         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1239         err:
1240         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1241         return ret;
1242         }
1243
1244 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1245  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1246  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1247  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1248  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1249  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1250  */
1251
1252 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1253                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1254                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1255         {
1256         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1257         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1258         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1259         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1260                 return 1;
1261         return 0;
1262         }
1263
1264 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1265  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1266  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1267  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1268  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1269  */
1270
1271
1272 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1273         {
1274         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1275         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1276         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1277         int i, j;
1278         if (!a || !b)
1279                 return 1;
1280         if (a->type == 1)
1281                 {
1282                 if (!a->dpname)
1283                         return 0;
1284                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1285                 if (b->type == 1)
1286                         {
1287                         if (!b->dpname)
1288                                 return 0;
1289                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1290                                 return 1;
1291                         else
1292                                 return 0;
1293                         }
1294                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1295                 nm = a->dpname;
1296                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1297                 }
1298         else if (b->type == 1)
1299                 {
1300                 if (!b->dpname)
1301                         return 0;
1302                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1303                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1304                 nm = b->dpname;
1305                 }
1306
1307         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1308         if (nm)
1309                 {
1310                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1311                         {
1312                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);  
1313                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1314                                 continue;
1315                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1316                                 return 1;
1317                         }
1318                 return 0;
1319                 }
1320
1321         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1322
1323         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1324                 {
1325                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1326                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1327                         {
1328                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1329                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1330                                 return 1;
1331                         }
1332                 }
1333
1334         return 0;
1335
1336         }
1337
1338 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1339         {
1340         int i;
1341         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1342         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1343         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1344                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1345         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1346                 {
1347                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1348                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1349                         continue;
1350                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1351                         return 1;
1352                 }
1353         return 0;
1354         }
1355
1356 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1357
1358 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1359                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1360         {
1361         int i;
1362         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1363                 return 0;
1364         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1365                 {
1366                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1367                         return 0;
1368                 }
1369         else
1370                 {
1371                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1372                         return 0;
1373                 }
1374         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1375         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1376                 {
1377                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1378                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1379                         {
1380                         if (!crl->idp ||
1381                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1382                                 {
1383                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1384                                 return 1;
1385                                 }
1386                         }
1387                 }
1388         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1389                 return 1;
1390         return 0;
1391         }
1392
1393 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1394  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1395  */
1396         
1397 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1398                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1399         {
1400         int ok;
1401         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1402         int crl_score = 0;
1403         unsigned int reasons;
1404         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1405         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1406         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1407         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1408         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 
1409                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1410
1411         if (ok)
1412                 goto done;
1413
1414         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1415
1416         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1417
1418         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1419         if (!skcrl && crl)
1420                 goto done;
1421
1422         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1423
1424         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1425
1426         done:
1427
1428         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1429         if (crl)
1430                 {
1431                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1432                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1433                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1434                 *pcrl = crl;
1435                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1436                 return 1;
1437                 }
1438
1439         return 0;
1440         }
1441
1442 /* Check CRL validity */
1443 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1444         {
1445         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1446         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1447         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1448         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1449         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1450         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1451         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1452                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1453
1454         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1455          * is next certificate in chain.
1456          */
1457         else if (cnum < chnum)
1458                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1459         else
1460                 {
1461                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1462                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1463                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1464                         {
1465                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1466                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1467                         if(!ok) goto err;
1468                         }
1469                 }
1470
1471         if(issuer)
1472                 {
1473                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1474                  * been done
1475                  */
1476                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1477                         {
1478                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1479                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1480                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1481                                 {
1482                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1483                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1484                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1485                                 }
1486
1487                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1488                                 {
1489                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1490                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1491                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1492                                 }
1493
1494                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1495                                 {
1496                                 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1497                                         {
1498                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1499                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1500                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1501                                         }
1502                                 }
1503
1504                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1505                                 {
1506                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1507                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1508                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1509                                 }
1510
1511
1512                         }
1513
1514                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1515                         {
1516                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1517                         if (!ok)
1518                                 goto err;
1519                         }
1520
1521                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1522                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1523
1524                 if(!ikey)
1525                         {
1526                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1527                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1528                         if (!ok) goto err;
1529                         }
1530                 else
1531                         {
1532                         int rv;
1533                         rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1534                         if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1535                                 {
1536                                 ctx->error=rv;
1537                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1538                                 if (!ok)
1539                                         goto err;
1540                                 }
1541                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1542                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1543                                 {
1544                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1545                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1546                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1547                                 }
1548                         }
1549                 }
1550
1551         ok = 1;
1552
1553         err:
1554         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1555         return ok;
1556         }
1557
1558 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1559 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1560         {
1561         int ok;
1562         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1563         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1564          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1565          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
1566          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1567          */
1568         if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1569                 {
1570                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1571                         return 1;
1572                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1573                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1574                 if(!ok)
1575                         return 0;
1576                 }
1577         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1578          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1579          */
1580         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1581                 {
1582                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1583                         return 2;
1584                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1585                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1586                 if (!ok)
1587                         return 0;
1588                 }
1589
1590         return 1;
1591         }
1592
1593 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1594         {
1595         int ret;
1596         if (ctx->parent)
1597                 return 1;
1598         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1599                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1600         if (ret == 0)
1601                 {
1602                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1603                 return 0;
1604                 }
1605         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1606         if (ret == -1)
1607                 {
1608                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1609                  * callback.
1610                  */
1611                 X509 *x;
1612                 int i;
1613                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1614                         {
1615                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1616                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1617                                 continue;
1618                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1619                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1620                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1621                                 return 0;
1622                         }
1623                 return 1;
1624                 }
1625         if (ret == -2)
1626                 {
1627                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1628                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1629                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1630                 }
1631
1632         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1633                 {
1634                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1635                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1636                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1637                         return 0;
1638                 }
1639
1640         return 1;
1641         }
1642
1643 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1644         {
1645         time_t *ptime;
1646         int i;
1647
1648         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1649                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1650         else
1651                 ptime = NULL;
1652
1653         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1654         if (i == 0)
1655                 {
1656                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1657                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1658                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1659                         return 0;
1660                 }
1661
1662         if (i > 0)
1663                 {
1664                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1665                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1666                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1667                         return 0;
1668                 }
1669
1670         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1671         if (i == 0)
1672                 {
1673                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1674                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1675                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1676                         return 0;
1677                 }
1678
1679         if (i < 0)
1680                 {
1681                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1682                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1683                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1684                         return 0;
1685                 }
1686
1687         return 1;
1688         }
1689
1690 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1691         {
1692         int ok=0,n;
1693         X509 *xs,*xi;
1694         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1695         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1696
1697         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1698
1699         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1700         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1701         n--;
1702         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1703
1704         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1705                 xs=xi;
1706         else
1707                 {
1708                 if (n <= 0)
1709                         {
1710                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1711                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1712                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1713                         goto end;
1714                         }
1715                 else
1716                         {
1717                         n--;
1718                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1719                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1720                         }
1721                 }
1722
1723 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1724         while (n >= 0)
1725                 {
1726                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1727
1728                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1729                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1730                  * just wastes time.
1731                  */
1732                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1733                         {
1734                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1735                                 {
1736                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1737                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1738                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1739                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1740                                 }
1741                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1742                                 {
1743                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1744                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1745                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1746                                 if (!ok)
1747                                         {
1748                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1749                                         goto end;
1750                                         }
1751                                 }
1752                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1753                         pkey=NULL;
1754                         }
1755
1756                 xs->valid = 1;
1757
1758                 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1759                 if (!ok)
1760                         goto end;
1761
1762                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1763                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1764                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1765                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1766                 if (!ok) goto end;
1767
1768                 n--;
1769                 if (n >= 0)
1770                         {
1771                         xi=xs;
1772                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1773                         }
1774                 }
1775         ok=1;
1776 end:
1777         return ok;
1778         }
1779
1780 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1781 {
1782         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1783 }
1784
1785 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1786         {
1787         char *str;
1788         ASN1_TIME atm;
1789         long offset;
1790         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1791         int i,j;
1792
1793         p=buff1;
1794         i=ctm->length;
1795         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1796         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1797                 {
1798                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1799                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1800                 p+=10;
1801                 str+=10;
1802                 }
1803         else
1804                 {
1805                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1806                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1807                 p+=12;
1808                 str+=12;
1809                 }
1810
1811         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1812                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1813         else
1814                 { 
1815                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1816                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1817                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1818                 if (*str == '.')
1819                         {
1820                         str++;
1821                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1822                         }
1823                 
1824                 }
1825         *(p++)='Z';
1826         *(p++)='\0';
1827
1828         if (*str == 'Z')
1829                 offset=0;
1830         else
1831                 {
1832                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1833                         return 0;
1834                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1835                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1836                 if (*str == '-')
1837                         offset= -offset;
1838                 }
1839         atm.type=ctm->type;
1840         atm.flags = 0;
1841         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1842         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1843
1844         if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1845                 return 0;
1846
1847         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1848                 {
1849                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1850                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1851                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1852                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1853
1854                 if (i < j) return -1;
1855                 if (i > j) return 1;
1856                 }
1857         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1858         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1859                 return -1;
1860         else
1861                 return i;
1862         }
1863
1864 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1865 {
1866         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1867 }
1868
1869 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1870         {
1871         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1872         }
1873
1874 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1875                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1876         {
1877         time_t t;
1878
1879         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1880         else time(&t);
1881
1882         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1883                 {
1884                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1885                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1886                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1887                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1888                                                                 offset_sec);
1889                 }
1890         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1891         }
1892
1893 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1894         {
1895         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1896         int i,j;
1897
1898         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1899
1900         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1901                 {
1902                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1903                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1904                         {
1905                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1906                         return 0;
1907                         }
1908                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1909                         break;
1910                 else
1911                         {
1912                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1913                         ktmp=NULL;
1914                         }
1915                 }
1916         if (ktmp == NULL)
1917                 {
1918                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1919                 return 0;
1920                 }
1921
1922         /* first, populate the other certs */
1923         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1924                 {
1925                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1926                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1927                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1928                 }
1929         
1930         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1931         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1932         return 1;
1933         }
1934
1935 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1936
1937 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1938                         EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1939         {
1940         X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1941         int i;
1942         STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1943         /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1944         if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
1945                         {
1946                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1947                         return NULL;
1948                         }
1949         /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1950         if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
1951                         {
1952                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1953                         return NULL;
1954                         }
1955         /* Issuer names must match */
1956         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1957                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1958                         {
1959                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1960                         return NULL;
1961                         }
1962         /* AKID and IDP must match */
1963         if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1964                         {
1965                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1966                         return NULL;
1967                         }
1968         if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1969                         {
1970                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1971                         return NULL;
1972                         }
1973         /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1974         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
1975                         {
1976                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1977                         return NULL;
1978                         }
1979         /* CRLs must verify */
1980         if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1981                         X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
1982                 {
1983                 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1984                 return NULL;
1985                 }
1986         /* Create new CRL */
1987         crl = X509_CRL_new();
1988         if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1989                 goto memerr;
1990         /* Set issuer name */
1991         if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1992                 goto memerr;
1993
1994         if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
1995                 goto memerr;
1996         if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
1997                 goto memerr;
1998
1999         /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2000
2001         if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2002                 goto memerr;
2003
2004         /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2005          * CRL number to correct value too.
2006          */
2007
2008         for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2009                 {
2010                 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2011                 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2012                 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2013                         goto memerr;
2014                 }
2015
2016         /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2017
2018         revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2019
2020         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2021                 {
2022                 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2023                 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2024                 /* Add only if not also in base.
2025                  * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2026                  * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2027                  */
2028                 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2029                         {
2030                         rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2031                         if (!rvtmp)
2032                                 goto memerr;
2033                         if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2034                                 {
2035                                 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2036                                 goto memerr;
2037                                 }
2038                         }
2039                 }
2040         /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2041
2042         if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2043                 goto memerr;
2044         
2045         return crl;
2046
2047         memerr:
2048         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2049         if (crl)
2050                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2051         return NULL;
2052         }
2053
2054 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2055              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2056         {
2057         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2058          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2059         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2060                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2061         }
2062
2063 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2064         {
2065         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2066         }
2067
2068 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2069         {
2070         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2071         }
2072
2073 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2074         {
2075         return ctx->error;
2076         }
2077
2078 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2079         {
2080         ctx->error=err;
2081         }
2082
2083 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2084         {
2085         return ctx->error_depth;
2086         }
2087
2088 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2089         {
2090         return ctx->current_cert;
2091         }
2092
2093 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2094         {
2095         return ctx->chain;
2096         }
2097
2098 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2099         {
2100         if (!ctx->chain)
2101                 return NULL;
2102         return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2103         }
2104
2105 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2106         {
2107         return ctx->current_issuer;
2108         }
2109
2110 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2111         {
2112         return ctx->current_crl;
2113         }
2114
2115 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2116         {
2117         return ctx->parent;
2118         }
2119
2120 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2121         {
2122         ctx->cert=x;
2123         }
2124
2125 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2126         {
2127         ctx->untrusted=sk;
2128         }
2129
2130 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2131         {
2132         ctx->crls=sk;
2133         }
2134
2135 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2136         {
2137         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2138         }
2139
2140 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2141         {
2142         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2143         }
2144
2145 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2146  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2147  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2148  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2149  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2150  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2151  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2152  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2153  */
2154
2155 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2156                                 int purpose, int trust)
2157 {
2158         int idx;
2159         /* If purpose not set use default */
2160         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2161         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2162         if (purpose)
2163                 {
2164                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2165                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2166                 if (idx == -1)
2167                         {
2168                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2169                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2170                         return 0;
2171                         }
2172                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2173                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2174                         {
2175                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2176                         if (idx == -1)
2177                                 {
2178                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2179                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2180                                 return 0;
2181                                 }
2182                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2183                         }
2184                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2185                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2186                 }
2187         if (trust)
2188                 {
2189                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2190                 if (idx == -1)
2191                         {
2192                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2193                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2194                         return 0;
2195                         }
2196                 }
2197
2198         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2199         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2200         return 1;
2201 }
2202
2203 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2204 {
2205         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2206         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2207         if (!ctx)
2208                 {
2209                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2210                 return NULL;
2211                 }
2212         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2213         return ctx;
2214 }
2215
2216 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2217 {
2218         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2219         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2220 }
2221
2222 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2223              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2224         {
2225         int ret = 1;
2226         ctx->ctx=store;
2227         ctx->current_method=0;
2228         ctx->cert=x509;
2229         ctx->untrusted=chain;
2230         ctx->crls = NULL;
2231         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2232         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2233         ctx->valid=0;
2234         ctx->chain=NULL;
2235         ctx->error=0;
2236         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2237         ctx->error_depth=0;
2238         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2239         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2240         ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2241         ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2242         ctx->current_reasons=0;
2243         ctx->tree = NULL;
2244         ctx->parent = NULL;
2245
2246         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2247
2248         if (!ctx->param)
2249                 {
2250                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2251                 return 0;
2252                 }
2253
2254         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2255          * use defaults.
2256          */
2257
2258
2259         if (store)
2260                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2261         else
2262                 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2263
2264         if (store)
2265                 {
2266                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2267                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2268                 }
2269         else
2270                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2271
2272         if (ret)
2273                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2274                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2275
2276         if (ret == 0)
2277                 {
2278                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2279                 return 0;
2280                 }
2281
2282         if (store && store->check_issued)
2283                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2284         else
2285                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2286
2287         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2288                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2289         else
2290                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2291
2292         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2293                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2294         else
2295                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2296
2297         if (store && store->verify)
2298                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2299         else
2300                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2301
2302         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2303                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2304         else
2305                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2306
2307         if (store && store->get_crl)
2308                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2309         else
2310                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2311
2312         if (store && store->check_crl)
2313                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2314         else
2315                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2316
2317         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2318                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2319         else
2320                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2321
2322         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2323                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2324         else
2325                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2326
2327         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2328                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2329         else
2330                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2331
2332         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2333
2334
2335         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2336          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2337          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2338         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2339         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2340                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2341                 {
2342                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2343                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2344                 return 0;
2345                 }
2346         return 1;
2347         }
2348
2349 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2350  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2351  */
2352
2353 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2354 {
2355         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2356         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2357 }
2358
2359 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2360         {
2361         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2362         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2363                 {
2364                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2365                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2366                 ctx->param=NULL;
2367                 }
2368         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2369                 {
2370                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2371                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2372                 }
2373         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2374                 {
2375                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2376                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2377                 }
2378         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2379         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2380         }
2381
2382 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2383         {
2384         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2385         }
2386
2387 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2388         {
2389         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2390         }
2391
2392 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2393         {
2394         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2395         }
2396
2397 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2398                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2399         {
2400         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2401         }
2402
2403 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2404         {
2405         return ctx->tree;
2406         }
2407
2408 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2409         {
2410         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2411         }
2412
2413 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2414         {
2415         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2416         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2417         if (!param)
2418                 return 0;
2419         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2420         }
2421
2422 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2423         {
2424         return ctx->param;
2425         }
2426
2427 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2428         {
2429         if (ctx->param)
2430                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2431         ctx->param = param;
2432         }
2433
2434 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2435 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2436
2437 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2438
2439 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2440 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)