Do not include a timestamp in the Client/ServerHello Random field.
authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Sun, 20 Oct 2013 22:03:24 +0000 (15:03 -0700)
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Sun, 20 Oct 2013 22:03:24 +0000 (15:03 -0700)
commitd757097bbca11f677dd8204b6364db3764cfe17c
treeef6cddb163147d95e5075b5b6b20c360e666dd5a
parent7b112c2766a1e12c9f95ac70f1b3ed90649827ee
Do not include a timestamp in the Client/ServerHello Random field.

Instead, send random bytes, unless SSL_SEND_{CLIENT,SERVER}RANDOM_MODE
is set.

This is a forward-port of commits:
  4af793036f6ef4f0a1078e5d7155426a98d50e37
  f4c93b46edb51da71f09eda99e83eaf193a33c08
  3da721dac9382c48812c8eba455528fd59af2eef
  2583270191a8b27eed303c03ece1da97b9b69fd3

While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear.  This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:

    * It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.

    * If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
      handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
ssl/s23_clnt.c
ssl/s3_clnt.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_locl.h