2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
27 tls1_generate_master_secret,
28 tls1_change_cipher_state,
29 tls1_final_finish_mac,
30 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
31 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
33 tls1_export_keying_material,
35 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
36 tls_close_construct_packet,
40 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
44 tls1_generate_master_secret,
45 tls1_change_cipher_state,
46 tls1_final_finish_mac,
47 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
48 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
50 tls1_export_keying_material,
51 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
52 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
53 tls_close_construct_packet,
57 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
61 tls1_generate_master_secret,
62 tls1_change_cipher_state,
63 tls1_final_finish_mac,
64 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
65 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
67 tls1_export_keying_material,
68 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
69 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
70 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
71 tls_close_construct_packet,
75 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
78 tls13_setup_key_block,
79 tls13_generate_master_secret,
80 tls13_change_cipher_state,
81 tls13_final_finish_mac,
82 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
83 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
85 tls1_export_keying_material,
86 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
87 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 tls_close_construct_packet,
92 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
95 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
96 * http, the cache would over fill
105 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
111 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
113 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
117 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
122 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
123 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
125 s->version = s->method->version;
130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
133 int nid; /* Curve NID */
134 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
135 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
139 * Table of curve information.
140 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
141 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
143 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
144 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
145 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
146 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
147 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
148 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
149 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
150 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
151 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
152 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
153 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
154 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
155 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
156 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
157 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
158 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
159 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
160 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
161 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
163 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
164 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
165 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
167 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
168 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
172 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
175 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
181 /* The default curves */
182 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
183 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
184 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
185 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
186 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
189 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
190 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
191 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
194 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
196 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
197 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
198 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
200 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
202 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
206 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
209 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
210 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
217 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
219 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
220 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
221 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
222 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
223 * lists in the first place.
224 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
225 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
226 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
228 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
231 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
234 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
235 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
237 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
238 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
239 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
240 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
241 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
244 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
245 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
249 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
250 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
254 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
255 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
258 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
259 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
263 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
264 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
273 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
274 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
276 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
279 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
281 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
282 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
283 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
286 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
289 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
290 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
292 const unsigned char *curves;
293 size_t num_curves, i;
294 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
295 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
297 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
299 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
302 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
303 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
305 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
306 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
308 } else /* Should never happen */
311 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
313 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
314 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
315 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
321 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
322 * if there is no match.
323 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
324 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
325 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
327 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
329 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
330 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
333 /* Can't do anything on client side */
337 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
339 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
340 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
342 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
344 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
345 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
346 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
347 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
348 /* Should never happen */
351 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
355 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
356 * but s->options is a long...
358 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
359 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
361 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
362 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
363 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
364 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
366 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
368 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
369 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
371 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
372 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
373 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
376 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
378 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
386 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
390 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
391 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
393 unsigned char *glist, *p;
396 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
399 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
400 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
403 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
404 unsigned long idmask;
406 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
407 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
409 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
418 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
422 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
426 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
429 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
431 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
437 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
439 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
441 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
443 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
444 if (nid == NID_undef)
445 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
446 if (nid == NID_undef)
447 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
448 if (nid == NID_undef)
450 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
451 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
453 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
457 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
458 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
462 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
466 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
469 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
470 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
477 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
478 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
481 /* Determine curve ID */
482 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
483 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
484 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
488 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
490 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
492 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
493 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
495 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
496 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
498 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
504 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
505 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
506 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
508 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
509 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
512 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
513 * supported (see RFC4492).
515 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
516 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
517 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
518 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
519 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
522 if (i == num_formats)
527 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
528 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
531 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
533 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
534 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
535 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
536 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
537 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
541 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
542 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
547 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
554 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
558 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
560 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
561 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
562 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
564 *pformats = ecformats_default;
565 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
567 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
569 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
574 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
575 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
577 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
579 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
582 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
585 /* If not EC nothing to do */
586 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
588 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
592 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
595 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
599 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
602 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
608 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
609 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
610 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
611 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
612 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
614 return 0; /* Should never happen */
615 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
616 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
618 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
624 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
626 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
628 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
630 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
631 * is compatible with the client extensions.
633 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
635 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
638 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
641 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
642 unsigned char curve_id[2];
643 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
644 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
645 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
646 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
647 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
651 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
652 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
656 /* Need a shared curve */
657 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
661 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
665 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
670 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
672 /* Default sigalg schemes */
673 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
677 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
685 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
686 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
689 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
691 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
693 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
695 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
696 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
697 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
702 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
703 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
704 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
708 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
710 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
711 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
712 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
713 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
714 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
715 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
716 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
717 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
718 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
719 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
720 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
721 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
723 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
724 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
725 NID_undef, NID_undef},
726 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
727 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
728 NID_undef, NID_undef},
729 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
730 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
731 NID_undef, NID_undef},
732 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
733 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
734 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
735 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
736 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
737 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
738 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
739 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
740 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
741 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
742 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
743 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
745 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
746 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
747 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
748 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
749 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
750 NID_undef, NID_undef},
751 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
752 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
753 NID_undef, NID_undef},
754 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
755 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
756 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
759 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
760 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
761 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
762 NID_undef, NID_undef},
763 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
764 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
765 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
766 NID_undef, NID_undef},
767 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
768 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
769 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
770 NID_undef, NID_undef}
773 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
774 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
775 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
776 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
777 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
782 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
783 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
785 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
786 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
787 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
788 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
789 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
790 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
791 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512 /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
794 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
795 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
798 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
800 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
802 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
808 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
809 * is fixed by the certificate type.
811 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
813 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
815 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
816 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
818 if (lu == NULL || ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL) {
823 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
825 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
826 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
828 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
830 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
833 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
837 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
840 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
844 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
845 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
846 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
847 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
849 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
850 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
853 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
854 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
859 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
860 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
861 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
863 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
864 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
865 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
866 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
867 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
868 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
870 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
871 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
876 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
877 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
880 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
882 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
883 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
885 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
886 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
887 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
889 /* Should never happen */
892 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
893 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
894 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
898 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
899 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
900 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
902 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
904 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1 with TLS 1.3. Check key type is
905 * consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
907 if (lu == NULL || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->hash == NID_sha1)
908 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
909 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
914 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
915 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
916 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
918 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
919 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
921 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
924 /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
925 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
930 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
932 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
933 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
935 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
939 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
940 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
941 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
942 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
944 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
948 * Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
949 * this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
950 * check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
951 * If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
953 if (curve != lu->curve) {
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
955 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
960 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
965 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
966 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
967 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
968 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
971 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
972 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
973 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
977 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
983 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
984 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
986 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
987 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
988 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
989 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
990 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
994 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
995 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
999 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1001 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1003 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1008 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1009 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1010 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1012 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1015 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1019 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1020 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1021 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1022 ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1024 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1025 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1026 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1027 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1029 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1031 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1032 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1033 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1039 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1040 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1041 * @c: cipher to check
1042 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1043 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1045 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1047 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1049 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1050 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1052 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1054 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1055 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1058 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1059 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1061 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1062 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1063 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1065 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1068 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1069 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1072 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1075 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1077 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1079 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1082 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1087 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1088 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1089 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1090 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1091 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1092 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1093 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1095 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1096 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1098 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1099 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1100 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1102 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1103 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1108 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1109 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1110 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1111 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1119 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1121 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1124 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1126 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1128 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1130 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1135 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1137 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1138 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1139 * point to the resulting session.
1141 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1142 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1143 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1146 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1147 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1148 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1149 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1150 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1151 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1152 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1155 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1156 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1157 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1158 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1159 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1160 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1162 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1167 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1170 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1173 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1174 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1177 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1180 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1181 if (!ticketext->present)
1184 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1187 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1190 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1191 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1193 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1195 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1196 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1197 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1198 * calculate the master secret later.
1200 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1203 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1204 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1206 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1207 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1208 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1210 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1211 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1213 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1214 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1215 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1218 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1223 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1225 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1226 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1227 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1228 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1229 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1230 * point to the resulting session.
1232 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1233 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1234 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1237 unsigned char *sdec;
1238 const unsigned char *p;
1239 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1240 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1242 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1243 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1244 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1245 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1247 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1248 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1250 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1251 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1253 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1256 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1257 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1258 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1263 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1269 /* Check key name matches */
1270 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1271 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1272 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1275 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1276 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1277 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1278 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1279 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1281 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1286 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1289 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1293 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1295 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1296 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1300 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1301 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1302 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1305 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1306 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1307 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1308 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1310 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1311 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1312 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1313 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1314 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1315 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1316 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1317 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1319 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1321 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1322 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1324 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1327 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1331 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1335 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1336 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
1337 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1338 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1341 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1342 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1343 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1347 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1348 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1351 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1353 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1357 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1359 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1361 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1362 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1366 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
1369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1371 return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
1373 * For now return RSA key for PSS. When we support PSS only keys
1374 * this will need to be updated.
1376 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1377 return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
1379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1381 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1385 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1388 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1389 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1391 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1392 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1394 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1395 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1401 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1402 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1404 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1407 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1408 if (lu == NULL || ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL)
1410 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1411 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1413 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1414 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(lu->sig) == -1)
1416 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1417 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1418 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1419 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1420 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1421 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1425 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1426 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1430 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1432 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1433 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1434 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1436 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1437 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1438 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1440 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1441 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1442 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1448 /* Any RSA-PSS signature algorithms also mean we allow RSA */
1449 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1451 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1457 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1463 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1470 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1472 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1474 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1477 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1478 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1483 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1484 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1486 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1488 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1491 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1492 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1
1494 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1495 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA && lu->hash != NID_sha1)))
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1503 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1504 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1505 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1506 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1508 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1509 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1510 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1511 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1513 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1514 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1516 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1517 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1528 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1529 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1531 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1532 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1534 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1536 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1538 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1539 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1540 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1541 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1542 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1543 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1544 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1545 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1546 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1547 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1549 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1550 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1553 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1554 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1558 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1559 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1561 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1563 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1566 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1570 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1571 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1575 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1577 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1583 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1584 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1586 /* Should never happen */
1590 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1592 /* Invalid data length */
1593 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1598 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1599 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
1600 * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
1601 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1603 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
1604 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1605 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
1613 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1616 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1619 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1622 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1625 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1626 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1627 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1629 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1630 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1632 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1633 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sig) != -1)
1634 pvalid[sigptr->sig_idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1639 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1640 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1641 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1643 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1644 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1645 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1648 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1650 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1654 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1656 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1657 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1659 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1661 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1662 if (psignhash != NULL)
1663 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1665 return (int)numsigalgs;
1668 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1669 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1670 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1672 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1673 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1675 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1676 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1678 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1680 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1682 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1683 if (psignhash != NULL)
1684 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1686 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1688 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1689 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1692 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1693 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1697 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1700 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1702 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1703 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1704 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1705 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1706 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1707 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1708 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1709 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1711 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1712 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1713 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1716 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1717 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1719 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1721 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1723 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1724 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1727 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1729 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1731 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1733 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1734 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1736 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1738 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1740 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1751 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1752 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1755 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1758 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1759 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1762 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1763 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1768 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1769 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1771 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1775 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1779 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1782 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1784 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1789 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1790 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1792 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1794 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1795 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1796 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1798 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1800 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1801 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1806 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1811 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1812 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1813 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1815 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1816 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1817 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1823 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1827 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1831 if (default_nid == -1)
1833 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1835 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1836 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1837 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1842 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1843 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1847 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1848 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1849 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1856 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1857 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1858 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1859 * attempting to use them.
1862 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1864 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1865 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1866 /* Strict mode flags */
1867 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1868 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1869 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1871 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1876 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1877 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1880 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1881 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1883 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1886 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1888 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1889 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1891 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1893 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1894 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1900 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
1903 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1905 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1906 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1908 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1915 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1916 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1917 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1918 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1919 else if (!check_flags)
1924 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1925 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1927 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1930 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1932 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1936 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1937 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1940 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1941 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1942 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1946 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1947 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1950 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1951 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1952 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1955 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1956 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1957 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1960 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1961 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1962 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1971 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1972 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1974 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1976 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1977 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1978 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
1980 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
1983 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
1990 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1991 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
1995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
1996 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
1997 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1998 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2000 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2007 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2008 else if (check_flags)
2009 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2011 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2012 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2013 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2014 else if (!check_flags)
2017 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2018 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2019 else if (strict_mode) {
2020 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2021 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2022 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2023 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2025 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2032 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2033 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2035 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2037 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2040 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2043 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2047 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2050 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2051 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2052 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2056 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2059 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2062 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2064 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2065 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2067 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2068 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2069 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2071 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2072 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2073 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2074 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2075 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2080 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2083 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2085 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2086 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2090 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2091 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2093 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2096 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2100 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2103 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2104 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2111 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2112 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2114 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2115 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2116 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2117 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2118 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2119 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2122 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2123 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2125 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2129 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2131 int dh_secbits = 80;
2132 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2133 return DH_get_1024_160();
2134 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2135 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2140 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2142 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2145 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2153 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2154 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2156 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2157 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2165 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2166 return DH_get_2048_224();
2167 return DH_get_1024_160();
2171 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2174 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2177 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2178 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2179 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2180 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2182 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2185 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2187 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2190 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2192 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2193 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
2194 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2195 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2197 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2198 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
2200 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
2201 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
2204 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2206 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2209 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2212 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2214 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2215 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2217 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2218 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2220 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2221 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2226 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2227 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2228 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2231 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2233 int rv, start_idx, i;
2235 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2240 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2244 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2245 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2246 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2254 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2255 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2257 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2258 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2260 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2261 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2262 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2264 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
2267 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2269 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2270 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2272 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2275 int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
2278 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2279 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2280 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2282 /* Skip SHA1, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2283 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2284 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2286 if (ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL)
2289 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2291 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2294 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2296 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2297 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
2298 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
2301 if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
2309 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2312 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2314 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2319 /* Find index corresponding to ciphersuite */
2320 idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
2321 /* If no certificate for ciphersuite return */
2324 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC) {
2325 /* Work out which GOST certificate is available */
2326 if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512)) {
2327 idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
2328 } else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256)) {
2329 idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
2330 } else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST01)) {
2331 idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
2335 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2339 } else if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx)) {
2342 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2347 /* Find index for client certificate */
2348 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2349 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2353 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2354 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2359 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2360 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2361 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2362 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2369 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2372 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2373 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2374 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2375 if (lu->sig_idx == idx)
2378 if (lu->sig_idx == idx
2379 && (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve))
2382 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
2385 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2388 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2394 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2396 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2397 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
2399 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx)) == NULL) {
2402 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2407 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2408 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2409 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2410 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
2413 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2417 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2422 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx)) == NULL) {
2425 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2433 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2438 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[idx];
2439 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2440 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;