2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
35 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
36 s->init_num, &written);
39 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
45 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
49 if (written == s->init_num) {
51 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
52 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
56 s->init_off += written;
57 s->init_num -= written;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
65 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
69 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
75 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
82 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
83 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
85 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
86 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
89 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
91 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
92 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
93 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
97 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
99 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
105 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
108 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
109 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
111 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
113 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
114 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
116 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
127 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
130 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
135 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
136 * the appropriate error.
138 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
141 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
142 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
144 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
145 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
148 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
151 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
156 * Comparison function used in a call to qsort (see tls_collect_extensions()
158 * The two arguments |p1| and |p2| are expected to be pointers to RAW_EXTENSIONs
161 * 1 if the type for p1 is greater than p2
162 * 0 if the type for p1 and p2 are the same
163 * -1 if the type for p1 is less than p2
165 static int compare_extensions(const void *p1, const void *p2)
167 const RAW_EXTENSION *e1 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p1;
168 const RAW_EXTENSION *e2 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p2;
170 if (e1->type < e2->type)
172 else if (e1->type > e2->type)
179 * Gather a list of all the extensions. We don't actually process the content
180 * of the extensions yet, except to check their types.
182 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
183 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
184 * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their
185 * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully
186 * parsed, or an internal error occurred.
189 * TODO(TLS1.3): Refactor ServerHello extension parsing to use this and then
190 * remove tls1_check_duplicate_extensions()
192 int tls_collect_extensions(PACKET *packet, RAW_EXTENSION **res,
193 size_t *numfound, int *ad)
195 PACKET extensions = *packet;
196 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
197 RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL;
199 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
200 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
204 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
205 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
206 *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
212 if (num_extensions > 0) {
213 raw_extensions = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*raw_extensions)
215 if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
216 *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
221 /* Second pass: collect the extensions. */
222 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
223 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(packet, &raw_extensions[i].type) ||
224 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(packet,
225 &raw_extensions[i].data)) {
226 /* This should not happen. */
227 *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
233 if (PACKET_remaining(packet) != 0) {
234 *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
238 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
239 qsort(raw_extensions, num_extensions, sizeof(*raw_extensions),
241 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
242 if (raw_extensions[i - 1].type == raw_extensions[i].type) {
243 *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
249 *res = raw_extensions;
250 *numfound = num_extensions;
254 OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions);
260 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
265 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
267 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
268 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
269 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
271 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
272 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
273 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
274 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
275 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
276 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
278 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
283 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
285 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
290 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
291 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
292 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
297 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
298 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
299 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
305 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
307 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
308 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
312 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
313 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
316 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
320 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
322 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
323 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
324 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
327 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
332 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
333 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
334 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
338 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
340 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
342 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
343 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
348 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
350 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
356 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
359 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
360 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
362 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
364 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
365 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
367 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
370 /* In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state */
371 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
373 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
374 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
375 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
380 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
381 s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
382 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
383 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
387 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
388 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
389 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
396 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
398 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
399 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
400 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
403 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
405 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
407 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
414 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
416 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
417 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)
418 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
425 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
427 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
430 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
432 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
433 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
438 /* clean a few things up */
439 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
441 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
443 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
444 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
446 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
450 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
454 if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
455 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
460 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
462 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
463 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
465 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
467 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
469 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
470 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
473 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
474 cb = s->info_callback;
475 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
476 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
479 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
481 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
482 /* done with handshaking */
483 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
484 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
485 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
486 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
490 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
493 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
495 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
496 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
500 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
503 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
504 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
506 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
509 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
512 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
514 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
515 * in the middle of a handshake message.
517 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
518 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
520 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
523 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
524 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
525 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
526 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
528 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
529 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
533 s->init_num += readbytes;
538 if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
540 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
541 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
542 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
545 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
550 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
551 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
552 s->msg_callback_arg);
554 } while (skip_message);
555 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
558 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
560 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
562 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
565 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
566 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
568 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
569 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
570 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
572 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
573 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
576 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
577 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
578 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
582 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
584 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
590 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
594 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
600 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
601 /* We've already read everything in */
602 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
607 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
609 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
610 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
612 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
616 s->init_num += readbytes;
620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
622 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
623 * Finished verification.
625 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
629 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
630 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
631 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
634 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
639 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
640 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
642 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
643 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
645 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
650 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
651 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
652 s->msg_callback_arg);
659 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
661 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
664 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
668 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
670 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
676 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
677 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
678 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
679 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
680 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
681 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
686 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
691 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
692 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
693 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
694 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
696 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
697 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
698 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
699 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
700 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
701 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
702 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
703 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
704 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
705 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
706 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
707 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
708 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
709 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
710 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
711 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
712 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
713 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
714 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
716 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
717 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
718 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
720 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
721 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
722 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
724 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
725 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
727 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
728 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
729 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
730 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
731 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
733 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
734 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
735 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
736 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
737 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
738 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
739 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
740 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
742 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
743 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
745 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
746 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
749 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
755 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
757 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
759 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
762 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
764 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
769 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
770 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
775 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
776 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
779 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
780 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
783 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
785 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
787 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
790 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
792 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
795 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
797 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
800 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
802 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
805 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
807 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
812 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
813 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
816 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
818 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
820 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
823 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
824 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
826 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
827 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
833 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
835 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
836 * @method: the intended method.
838 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
840 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
842 int version = method->version;
844 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
845 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
846 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
847 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
849 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
850 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
851 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
853 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
854 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
855 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
856 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
857 else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
858 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
864 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
867 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
868 * @version: Protocol version to test against
870 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
872 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
874 const version_info *vent;
875 const version_info *table;
877 switch (s->method->version) {
879 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
880 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
881 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
882 table = tls_version_table;
884 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
885 table = dtls_version_table;
890 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
892 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
893 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
894 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
902 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
903 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
904 * supported protocol version.
906 * @s server SSL handle.
908 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
910 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
912 const version_info *vent;
913 const version_info *table;
916 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
917 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
920 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
924 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
925 * highest protocol version).
927 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
928 table = tls_version_table;
929 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
930 table = dtls_version_table;
932 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
936 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
937 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
938 return s->version == vent->version;
944 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
945 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
946 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
947 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
949 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
950 * @version: the intended limit.
951 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
953 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
955 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
963 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
964 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
965 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
967 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
968 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
969 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
970 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
971 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
973 switch (method_version) {
976 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
977 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
978 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
979 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
984 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
985 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
989 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
990 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
991 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1001 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1002 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1003 * the version specific method.
1005 * @s: server SSL handle.
1007 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1009 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1012 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1014 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1015 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1017 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1020 int server_version = s->method->version;
1021 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1022 const version_info *vent;
1023 const version_info *table;
1025 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1027 s->client_version = client_version;
1029 switch (server_version) {
1032 * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
1033 * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
1034 * renegotiation for TLS1.3
1036 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1037 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1039 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1040 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1041 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1042 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1043 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1046 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1047 table = tls_version_table;
1049 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1050 table = dtls_version_table;
1054 suppversions = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1055 hello->num_extensions,
1056 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions);
1058 if (suppversions != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1059 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1060 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1061 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1062 PACKET versionslist;
1064 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1065 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1066 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1069 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1070 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1071 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1072 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1074 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1075 * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1076 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1078 if ((int)candidate_vers > s->client_version)
1079 s->client_version = candidate_vers;
1080 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1083 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1086 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1087 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1089 method = vent->smeth();
1090 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1091 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1092 best_method = method;
1096 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1097 /* Trailing data? */
1098 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1101 if (best_vers > 0) {
1102 s->version = best_vers;
1103 s->method = best_method;
1106 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1110 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1111 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1113 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1114 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1117 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1120 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1121 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1123 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1124 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1126 method = vent->smeth();
1127 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1128 s->version = vent->version;
1134 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1138 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1139 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1140 * the version specific method.
1142 * @s: client SSL handle.
1143 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1145 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1147 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
1149 const version_info *vent;
1150 const version_info *table;
1152 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1153 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1154 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1156 switch (s->method->version) {
1158 if (version != s->version)
1159 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1161 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1162 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1163 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1164 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1165 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1168 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1169 table = tls_version_table;
1171 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1172 table = dtls_version_table;
1176 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1177 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1180 if (version != vent->version)
1182 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1184 method = vent->cmeth();
1185 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1189 s->version = version;
1193 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1197 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1198 * @s: The SSL connection
1199 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1200 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1202 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1203 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1204 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1205 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1206 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1208 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1209 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1210 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1212 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1213 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1215 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1220 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1221 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1222 const version_info *table;
1223 const version_info *vent;
1225 switch (s->method->version) {
1228 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1229 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1230 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1231 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1232 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1234 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1236 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1237 table = tls_version_table;
1239 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1240 table = dtls_version_table;
1245 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1246 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1247 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1248 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1250 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1251 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1252 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1254 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1255 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1256 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1258 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1259 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1260 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1261 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1262 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1263 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1265 *min_version = version = 0;
1267 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1269 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1270 * "version capability" vector.
1272 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1276 method = vent->cmeth();
1277 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1281 *min_version = method->version;
1283 version = (single = method)->version;
1284 *min_version = version;
1289 *max_version = version;
1291 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1293 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1299 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1300 * the initial ClientHello.
1302 * @s: client SSL handle.
1304 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1306 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1308 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1310 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1315 s->client_version = s->version = ver_max;