2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include "record_locl.h"
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
48 rl->packet_length = 0;
50 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
51 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
52 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
53 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
59 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
60 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
62 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
64 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
65 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
68 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
71 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
73 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
74 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
75 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
76 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
77 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
80 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
82 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
85 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
87 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
88 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
91 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
93 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
96 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
98 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
101 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
105 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
108 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
109 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
110 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
112 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
118 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
120 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
123 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
125 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
128 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
130 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
131 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
132 return "read header";
133 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
135 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
142 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
144 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
145 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
147 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
149 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
157 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
159 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
163 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
164 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
165 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
166 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
167 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
168 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
169 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
171 size_t len, left, align = 0;
178 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
180 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
184 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
185 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
186 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
190 /* start with empty packet ... */
193 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
195 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
198 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
199 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
200 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
202 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
203 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
204 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
205 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
206 * overrun can be triggered.
208 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
212 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
213 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
214 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
217 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
218 pkt = rb->buf + align;
220 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
221 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
223 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
224 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
225 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
226 rb->offset = len + align;
230 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
231 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
234 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
235 if (left == 0 && extend)
237 if (left > 0 && n > left)
241 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
243 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
250 /* else we need to read more data */
252 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
257 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
258 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
259 /* ignore max parameter */
264 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
265 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
273 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
274 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
279 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
280 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
281 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
282 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
292 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
294 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
299 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
300 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
301 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
303 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
305 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
309 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
312 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
313 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
319 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
320 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
322 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
325 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
327 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
328 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
329 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
331 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
335 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
336 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
338 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
339 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
340 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
341 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
342 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
343 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
344 * report the error in a way the user will notice
346 if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
351 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
352 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, NULL))
357 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
358 i = s->handshake_func(s);
362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
368 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
369 * will happen with non blocking IO
372 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
375 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
376 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
379 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
381 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
383 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
384 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
385 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
386 * compromise is considered worthy.
388 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
389 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
390 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
391 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
392 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
393 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
394 unsigned char aad[13];
395 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
399 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
400 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
401 max_send_fragment -= 512;
403 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
404 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
406 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
407 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
408 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
410 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
415 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
419 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
420 /* free jumbo buffer */
421 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
428 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
429 /* free jumbo buffer */
430 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
434 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
435 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
437 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
442 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
443 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
445 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
447 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
449 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
450 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
457 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
458 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
459 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
460 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
461 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
462 /* free jumbo buffer */
463 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
467 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
468 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
471 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
472 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
473 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
476 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
477 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
479 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
485 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
486 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
487 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
488 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
490 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
492 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
493 /* free jumbo buffer */
494 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
496 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
500 /* free jumbo buffer */
501 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
502 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
510 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
511 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
512 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
520 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
522 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
523 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
524 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
527 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
528 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
530 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
537 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
538 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
539 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
540 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
542 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
543 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
545 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
546 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
553 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
559 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
560 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
563 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
565 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
568 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
569 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
572 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
573 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
574 remain = n % numpipes;
575 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
576 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
582 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
585 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
586 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
591 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
592 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
594 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
595 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
597 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
599 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
601 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
603 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
612 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
613 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
614 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
616 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
617 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
620 unsigned char *recordstart;
621 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
622 size_t prefix_len = 0;
627 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
630 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
631 totlen += pipelens[j];
633 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
634 * will happen with non blocking IO
636 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
637 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
639 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
640 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
641 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
644 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
647 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
648 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
651 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
656 if ((sess == NULL) ||
657 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
658 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
661 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
662 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
668 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
670 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
672 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
673 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
676 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
678 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
679 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
680 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
683 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
686 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
691 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
692 /* insufficient space */
693 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
698 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
701 if (create_empty_fragment) {
702 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
703 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
705 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
706 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
707 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
709 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
710 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
712 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
713 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
714 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
715 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
716 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
720 } else if (prefix_len) {
721 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
722 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
723 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
724 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
725 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
726 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
727 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
732 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
735 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
736 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
737 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
738 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
740 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
741 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
742 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
743 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
744 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
751 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
752 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
753 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
754 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
755 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
756 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
759 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
760 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
761 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
762 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
763 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
768 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
769 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
770 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
771 unsigned int version = SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
772 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
774 unsigned int rectype;
779 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
781 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
784 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
785 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
789 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
790 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
792 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
793 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
794 version = TLS1_VERSION;
796 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
797 if (s->compress != NULL)
798 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
800 /* write the header */
801 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
802 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
803 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
805 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
807 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
813 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
814 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
815 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
816 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
817 totlen += pipelens[j];
820 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
824 /* first we compress */
825 if (s->compress != NULL) {
827 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
829 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
830 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
835 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
839 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
842 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
843 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
844 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
847 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
849 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
850 * For now, use no padding
855 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
856 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
860 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
863 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
864 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
871 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
872 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
873 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
875 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
878 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
881 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
882 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
886 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
887 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
889 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
890 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
891 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
894 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING) {
896 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
897 * send early data - so we need to use the the tls13enc function.
899 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
902 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
906 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
912 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
913 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
914 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
915 || origlen > thiswr->length
916 || (thiswr->length > origlen
917 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
918 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
922 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
925 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
926 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
930 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
933 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
934 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
939 if (s->msg_callback) {
940 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
941 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
942 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
943 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
944 s->msg_callback_arg);
947 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
953 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
954 * is thiswr->length long
956 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
958 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
960 if (create_empty_fragment) {
962 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
966 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
970 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
974 /* now let's set up wb */
975 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
976 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
980 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
983 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
984 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
985 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
986 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
988 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
989 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
991 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
992 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
996 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
998 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1000 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1004 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1008 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1009 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1010 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1011 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1017 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1018 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1019 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1024 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1025 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1026 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1027 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1028 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1029 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1030 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1037 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1038 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1039 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1040 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1042 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1043 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1045 } else if (i <= 0) {
1046 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1048 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1049 * using a datagram service
1051 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1055 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1056 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1061 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1062 * 'type' is one of the following:
1064 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1065 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1066 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1068 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1069 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1071 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1072 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1073 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1074 * argument is non NULL.
1075 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1076 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1077 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1078 * Change cipher spec protocol
1079 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1081 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1082 * Handshake protocol
1083 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1084 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1085 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1086 * Application data protocol
1087 * none of our business
1089 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1090 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1093 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1096 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1098 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1100 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1101 /* Not initialized yet */
1102 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1106 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1107 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1109 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1114 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1115 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1117 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1118 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1123 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1126 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1129 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1130 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1131 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1133 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1134 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1141 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1144 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1145 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1146 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1155 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1158 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1159 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1160 * rr[i].data, - data
1161 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1162 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1164 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1165 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1168 /* get new records if necessary */
1169 if (num_recs == 0) {
1170 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1173 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1174 if (num_recs == 0) {
1175 /* Shouldn't happen */
1176 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1183 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1185 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1186 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1190 } while (num_recs == 0);
1194 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1195 * record that isn't an alert.
1197 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1198 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1199 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1201 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1203 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1204 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1205 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1206 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1212 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1215 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1216 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1217 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1221 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1222 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1223 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1224 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1226 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1227 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1228 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1231 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1232 * doing a handshake for the first time
1234 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1235 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1236 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1241 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1242 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1243 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1244 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1249 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1250 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1257 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1258 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1260 n = len - totalbytes;
1262 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1265 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1266 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1267 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1269 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1270 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1271 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1272 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1273 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1274 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1277 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1278 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1283 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1284 && totalbytes < len);
1285 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1286 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1289 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1290 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1291 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1292 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1293 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1298 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1299 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1300 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1304 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1306 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1308 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1309 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1310 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1311 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1313 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1318 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1319 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1321 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1322 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1323 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1324 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1326 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1327 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1333 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1334 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1337 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1338 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1339 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1341 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1342 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1343 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1344 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1345 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1346 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1347 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1348 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1351 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1352 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1353 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1354 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1356 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1358 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1359 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1360 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1361 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1364 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
1365 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1366 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1372 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1373 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1374 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1378 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1379 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1380 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1383 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1384 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1385 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1387 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1388 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1389 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1390 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1391 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1392 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1393 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1396 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1397 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1398 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1400 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1402 if (s->msg_callback)
1403 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1404 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1405 s->msg_callback_arg);
1407 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1408 cb = s->info_callback;
1409 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1410 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1413 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1414 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1417 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1418 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1419 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1421 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1422 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1423 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1428 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1429 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1433 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1434 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1435 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1436 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1437 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1438 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1440 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1441 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1444 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
1445 if (!ssl_end_of_early_data_seen(s)) {
1446 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1448 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA);
1453 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1456 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1457 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1459 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1460 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1461 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1462 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1463 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1466 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1474 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1476 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1477 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1478 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1482 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1483 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1489 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1490 * protocol violation)
1492 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1493 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1495 * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake
1496 * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init
1497 * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be
1500 assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s));
1501 if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s)) {
1502 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1507 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1508 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1510 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1518 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1519 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1520 /* no read-ahead left? */
1523 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1524 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1525 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1526 * problems in the blocking world
1528 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1529 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1530 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1531 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1538 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1541 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1542 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1543 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1544 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1545 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1547 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1550 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1552 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1554 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1555 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1556 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1558 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1563 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1564 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1565 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1566 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1567 * started), we will indulge it.
1569 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1570 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1572 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1574 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1575 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1576 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1577 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1578 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1579 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1582 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1583 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al))
1585 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1588 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1596 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1600 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1604 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1612 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1613 * format and false otherwise.
1615 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1617 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1621 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1623 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1625 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);