From 51d009043670a627d6abe66894126851cf3690e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Polyakov Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2017 00:17:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] crypto/evp: harden RC4_MD5 cipher. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory (or bogus MAC value is produced if x86 MD5 assembly module is involved). Since hash operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS condition. Thanks to Robert Święcki for report. CVE-2017-3731 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz --- crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c b/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c index 5e92855dfd..93cfe3f107 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c +++ b/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c @@ -269,6 +269,8 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1]; if (!ctx->encrypt) { + if (len < MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) + return -1; len -= MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; p[arg - 2] = len >> 8; p[arg - 1] = len; -- 2.34.1