X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=9d3e4586bf9d82194914481e8d262946a974630a;hp=7d332674dbe1defbf55c3e302d03dfb523f4640c;hb=5e60396fe7124f54ed7041570da20ad8d208825e;hpb=57912ed329f870b237f2fd9f2de8dec3477d1729 diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 7d332674db..9d3e4586bf 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -2,7 +2,89 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ - Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx] + + *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64 + (other platforms pending). + [Shay Gueron (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov] + + *) Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and + OCSP response extensions from RFC6962. + [Rob Stradling] + + *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) + for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to + bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) + [Bodo Moeller] + + *) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8. + This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most + common cases are optimized and there still is room for further + improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added. + [Andy Polyakov] + + *) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target. + [Marcelo Cerri (IBM)] + + *) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES, + SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases + are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. + Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported. + [Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)] + + *) Improved ARMv7 NEON support. + [Andy Polyakov] + + *) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first + implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1, + SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation. + [Andy Polyakov, David Miller] + + *) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a. + RSAZ. + [Shay Gueron (Intel Corp)] + + *) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2, + BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched" + implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support + for TLS encrypt. + + This work was sponsored by Intel Corp. + [Andy Polyakov] + + *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): + this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest, + MGF1 digest and OAEP label. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with + existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in + the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap + algorithms and include tests cases. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD + structure. + [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson] + + *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the + difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters + received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated + summary of the connection parameters. + [Steve Henson] + + *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary + of connection parameters. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions. + [Trevor Perrin and Ben Laurie] *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs from CRLDP extension in certificates. @@ -42,7 +124,7 @@ [Steve Henson] *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions. - Print out extension in s_server. + Print out extension in s_server and s_client. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature @@ -158,12 +240,12 @@ *) Fix OCSP checking. [Rob Stradling and Ben Laurie] - *) Backport support for partial chain verification: if an intermediate - certificate is explicitly trusted (using -addtrust option to x509 - utility for example) the verification is sucessful even if the chain - is not complete. - The OCSP checking fix depends on this backport. - [Steve Henson and Rob Stradling ] + *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs. + OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an + intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first + setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509 + utility) or reject. + [Steve Henson] *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied. @@ -173,18 +255,9 @@ platform support for Linux and Android. [Andy Polyakov] - *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so - the right response is stapled. Also change current certificate to - the certificate actually sent. - See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. - [Rob Stradling ] - *) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework. [Andy Polyakov] - *) RFC 5878 support. - [Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie (Google)] - *) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL. When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal, when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead. @@ -240,11 +313,233 @@ certificates. [Steve Henson] - Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [xx XXX xxxx] + *) New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of + the certificate. + Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info, + X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and + X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review. + + Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] + + *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the + SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that + g, A, B < N to SRP code. + + Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC + Group for discovering this issue. + (CVE-2014-3512) + [Steve Henson] + + *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate + TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message + is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a + downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a + higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records. + + Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and + researching this issue. + (CVE-2014-3511) + [David Benjamin] + + *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject + to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client + with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH + ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages. + + Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this + issue. + (CVE-2014-3510) + [Emilia Käsper] + + *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl + to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. + Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. + (CVE-2014-3507) + [Adam Langley] + + *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst + processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a + Denial of Service attack. + Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. + (CVE-2014-3506) + [Adam Langley] + + *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash + whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This + can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. + Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching + this issue. + (CVE-2014-3505) + [Adam Langley] + + *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed + session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write + up to 255 bytes to freed memory. + + Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this + issue. + (CVE-2014-3509) + [Gabor Tyukasz] + + *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer + dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not + properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a + Denial of Service attack. + + Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for + discovering and researching this issue. + (CVE-2014-5139) + [Steve Henson] + + *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as + X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information + from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing + output to the attacker. + + Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue. + (CVE-2014-3508) + [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson] + + *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) + for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to + bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) + [Bodo Moeller] + + Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] + + *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted + handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL + SSL/TLS clients and servers. + + Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and + researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224) + [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson] + + *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an + OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing + in a DoS attack. + + Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. + (CVE-2014-0221) + [Imre Rad, Steve Henson] + + *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can + be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS + client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary + code on a vulnerable client or server. + + Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195) + [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson] + + *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites + are subject to a denial of service attack. + + Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering + this issue. (CVE-2014-3470) + [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson] + + *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display + compilation flags. + [mancha ] + + *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure + in i2d_ECPrivateKey. + [mancha ] + + *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. + [mancha ] + + Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] + + *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension + can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or + server. + + Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to + Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for + preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) + [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] + + *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL + ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" + by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: + http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 + + Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this + flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) + [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] + + *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03 + + Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the + TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and + less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it + is at least 512 bytes long. + + [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] + + *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid + handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception. + Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues. + (CVE-2013-4353) + + *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission + structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need + to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which + avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be + Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for + several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug + is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing + 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer. + [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley] + + Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013] + + *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI + supporting platforms or when small records were transferred. + [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013] + + *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. + + This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by + Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found + at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ + + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and + Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. + (CVE-2013-0169) + [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] + + *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode + ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack. + Thanks go to and to Adam Langley for discovering + and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger + for independently discovering this issue. + (CVE-2012-2686) + [Adam Langley] + + *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. + This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) + [Steve Henson] *) Make openssl verify return errors. [Chris Palmer and Ben Laurie] + *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so + the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() + so it returns the certificate actually sent. + See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. + [Rob Stradling ] + *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. [Steve Henson] @@ -255,7 +550,7 @@ Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012] *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS - 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to avoid DoS attack. + 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack. Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic fuzzing as a service testing platform. @@ -308,17 +603,17 @@ [Adam Langley] *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello - record length exceeds 255 bytes: - + record length exceeds 255 bytes. + 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work. 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate - the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be + the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing: -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure. Most broken servers should now work. 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable - TLS 1.2 client support entirely. + TLS 1.2 client support entirely. [Steve Henson] *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH. @@ -607,6 +902,63 @@ Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] + Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013] + + *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. + + This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by + Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found + at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ + + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and + Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. + (CVE-2013-0169) + [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] + + *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. + This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so + the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() + so it returns the certificate actually sent. + See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. + (This is a backport) + [Rob Stradling ] + + *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012] + + [NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after + OpenSSL 1.0.1.] + + *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS + to fix DoS attack. + + Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic + fuzzing as a service testing platform. + (CVE-2012-2333) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. + Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012] + + *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio + BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer + in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. + + Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this + issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. + (CVE-2012-2110) + [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] + Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness @@ -1597,6 +1949,86 @@ *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] + Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013] + + *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. + + This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by + Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found + at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ + + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and + Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. + (CVE-2013-0169) + [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] + + *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. + This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so + the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() + so it returns the certificate actually sent. + See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. + (This is a backport) + [Rob Stradling ] + + *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012] + + *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS + to fix DoS attack. + + Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic + fuzzing as a service testing platform. + (CVE-2012-2333) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. + Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012] + + *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the + 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an + int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by + rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131) + [Tomas Hoger ] + + Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012] + + *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio + BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer + in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. + + Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this + issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. + (CVE-2012-2110) + [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] + + Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012] + + *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness + in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for + content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack + needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The + old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the + CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where + an MMA defence is not necessary. + Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering + this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a + client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to + Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. + [Steve Henson] + Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012] *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. @@ -1604,7 +2036,7 @@ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) [Antonio Martin] - + Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012] *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension