Check EVP errors for handshake digests.

[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_enc.c

diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index bb46f7f9ba5b7e5bceb183787f569db003d264fc..72015f5aad67c56869ad0484df19eff628eca653 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -915,18 +915,19 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
                if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
                        {
                        int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
-                       if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+                       EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
+                       if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
                                {
                                /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
                                err = 1;
                                }
                        else
                                {
-                               EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
-                               EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
-                               if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
+                               if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
+                                       !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
+                                       (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
                                        err = 1;
-                               q+=i;
+                               q+=hashsize;
                                }
                        }
                }
@@ -949,7 +950,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
        SSL3_RECORD *rec;
        unsigned char *seq;
        EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-       size_t md_size;
+       size_t md_size, orig_len;
        int i;
        EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
        unsigned char header[13];
@@ -996,6 +997,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
        else
                memcpy(header, seq, 8);
 
+       /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+       orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+       rec->type &= 0xff;
+
        header[8]=rec->type;
        header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
        header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
@@ -1014,7 +1019,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
                        mac_ctx,
                        md, &md_size,
                        header, rec->input,
-                       rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+                       rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
                        ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
                        ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
                        0 /* not SSLv3 */);
@@ -1025,6 +1030,13 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
                EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
                t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
                OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+               if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+                       tls_fips_digest_extra(
+                                       ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+                                       mac_ctx, rec->input,
+                                       rec->length, orig_len);
+#endif
                }
                
        if (!stream_mac)