Make CBC decoding constant time.
[openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  * 
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  * 
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  * 
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  * 
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  * 
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58 /* ====================================================================
59  * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
60  *
61  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63  * are met:
64  *
65  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
67  *
68  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71  *    distribution.
72  *
73  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
75  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77  *
78  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
82  *
83  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86  *
87  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88  *    acknowledgment:
89  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91  *
92  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104  * ====================================================================
105  *
106  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
108  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109  *
110  */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
122
123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
124         {
125         /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126          * packet by another n bytes.
127          * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128          * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129          * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130          * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
131          */
132         int i,len,left;
133         long align=0;
134         unsigned char *pkt;
135         SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
136
137         if (n <= 0) return n;
138
139         rb    = &(s->s3->rbuf);
140         if (rb->buf == NULL)
141                 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
142                         return -1;
143
144         left  = rb->left;
145 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
146         align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
147         align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
148 #endif
149
150         if (!extend)
151                 {
152                 /* start with empty packet ... */
153                 if (left == 0)
154                         rb->offset = align;
155                 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
156                         {
157                         /* check if next packet length is large
158                          * enough to justify payload alignment... */
159                         pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
160                         if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
161                             && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
162                                 {
163                                 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164                                  * and its length field is insane, we can
165                                  * only be led to wrong decision about
166                                  * whether memmove will occur or not.
167                                  * Header values has no effect on memmove
168                                  * arguments and therefore no buffer
169                                  * overrun can be triggered. */
170                                 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
171                                 rb->offset = align;
172                                 }
173                         }
174                 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175                 s->packet_length = 0;
176                 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
177                 }
178
179         /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
180          * because the read operation returns the whole packet
181          * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
182         if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
183                 {
184                 if (left > 0 && n > left)
185                         n = left;
186                 }
187
188         /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
189         if (left >= n)
190                 {
191                 s->packet_length+=n;
192                 rb->left=left-n;
193                 rb->offset+=n;
194                 return(n);
195                 }
196
197         /* else we need to read more data */
198
199         len = s->packet_length;
200         pkt = rb->buf+align;
201         /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
202          * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
203          * 'left' extra ones at the end */
204         if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
205                 {
206                 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
207                 s->packet = pkt;
208                 rb->offset = len + align;
209                 }
210
211         if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
212                 {
213                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214                 return -1;
215                 }
216
217         if (!s->read_ahead)
218                 /* ignore max parameter */
219                 max = n;
220         else
221                 {
222                 if (max < n)
223                         max = n;
224                 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
225                         max = rb->len - rb->offset;
226                 }
227
228         while (left < n)
229                 {
230                 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
231                  * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
232                  * len+max if possible) */
233
234                 clear_sys_error();
235                 if (s->rbio != NULL)
236                         {
237                         s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
238                         i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
239                         }
240                 else
241                         {
242                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
243                         i = -1;
244                         }
245
246                 if (i <= 0)
247                         {
248                         rb->left = left;
249                         if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
250                             SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
251                                 if (len+left == 0)
252                                         ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
253                         return(i);
254                         }
255                 left+=i;
256                 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
257                  * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
258                  * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
259                 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
260                         {
261                         if (n > left)
262                                 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
263                         }
264                 }
265
266         /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
267         rb->offset += n;
268         rb->left = left - n;
269         s->packet_length += n;
270         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
271         return(n);
272         }
273
274 /* Call this to get a new input record.
275  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
276  * or non-blocking IO.
277  * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
278  * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
279  * ssl->s3->rrec.data,   - data
280  * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
281  */
282 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
283 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
284         {
285         int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
286         int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
287         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
288         SSL_SESSION *sess;
289         unsigned char *p;
290         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
291         short version;
292         unsigned mac_size;
293         int clear=0;
294         size_t extra;
295
296         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
297         sess=s->session;
298
299         if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
300                 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
301         else
302                 extra=0;
303         if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
304                 {
305                 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
306                  * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
307                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
308                 return -1;
309                 }
310
311 again:
312         /* check if we have the header */
313         if (    (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
314                 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 
315                 {
316                 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
317                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
318                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
319
320                 p=s->packet;
321
322                 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
323                 rr->type= *(p++);
324                 ssl_major= *(p++);
325                 ssl_minor= *(p++);
326                 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
327                 n2s(p,rr->length);
328 #if 0
329 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
330 #endif
331
332                 /* Lets check version */
333                 if (!s->first_packet)
334                         {
335                         if (version != s->version)
336                                 {
337                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
338                                 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
339                                         /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
340                                         s->version = (unsigned short)version;
341                                 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
342                                 goto f_err;
343                                 }
344                         }
345
346                 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
347                         {
348                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
349                         goto err;
350                         }
351
352                 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
353                         {
354                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
355                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
356                         goto f_err;
357                         }
358
359                 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
360                 }
361
362         /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
363
364         if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
365                 {
366                 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
367                 i=rr->length;
368                 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
369                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
370                 /* now n == rr->length,
371                  * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
372                 }
373
374         s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
375
376         /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
377          * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
378          */
379         rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
380
381         /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
382          * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
383          * need to be copied into rr->data by either
384          * the decryption or by the decompression
385          * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
386          * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 
387
388         /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
389          * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
390
391         /* check is not needed I believe */
392         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
393                 {
394                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
395                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
396                 goto f_err;
397                 }
398
399         /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
400         rr->data=rr->input;
401
402         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
403         if (enc_err == 0)
404                 {
405                 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
406                 goto err;
407                 }
408
409 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
410 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
411 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
412 printf("\n");
413 #endif
414
415         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
416         if (    (sess == NULL) ||
417                 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
418                 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
419                 clear=1;
420
421         if (!clear)
422                 {
423                 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
424                 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
425                 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
426                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
427                 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
428
429                 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
430                  * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
431                  * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
432                  * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
433                  */
434                 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
435                     /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
436                     (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
437                      rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
438                         {
439                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
440                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
441                         goto f_err;
442                         }
443
444                 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
445                         {
446                         /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
447                          * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
448                          * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
449                          * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
450                          * */
451                         mac = mac_tmp;
452                         ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
453                         rr->length -= mac_size;
454                         }
455                 else
456                         {
457                         /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
458                          * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
459                          * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
460                         rr->length -= mac_size;
461                         mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
462                         }
463
464                 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
465                 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
466                         enc_err = -1;
467                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
468                         enc_err = -1;
469                 }
470
471         if (enc_err < 0)
472                 {
473                 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
474                  * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
475                  * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
476                  * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
477                  * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
478                 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
479                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
480                 goto f_err;
481                 }
482
483         /* r->length is now just compressed */
484         if (s->expand != NULL)
485                 {
486                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
487                         {
488                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
489                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
490                         goto f_err;
491                         }
492                 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
493                         {
494                         al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
495                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
496                         goto f_err;
497                         }
498                 }
499
500         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
501                 {
502                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
503                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
504                 goto f_err;
505                 }
506
507         rr->off=0;
508         /* So at this point the following is true
509          * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
510          * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
511          * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
512          * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
513          *                         after use :-).
514          */
515
516         /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
517         s->packet_length=0;
518
519         /* just read a 0 length packet */
520         if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
521
522 #if 0
523 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
524 #endif
525
526         return(1);
527
528 f_err:
529         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
530 err:
531         return(ret);
532         }
533
534 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
535         {
536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
537         int i;
538         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
539
540         rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
541         i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
542                 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
543         if (i < 0)
544                 return(0);
545         else
546                 rr->length=i;
547         rr->data=rr->comp;
548 #endif
549         return(1);
550         }
551
552 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
553         {
554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
555         int i;
556         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
557
558         wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
559         i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
560                 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
561                 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
562         if (i < 0)
563                 return(0);
564         else
565                 wr->length=i;
566
567         wr->input=wr->data;
568 #endif
569         return(1);
570         }
571
572 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
573  * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
574  */
575 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
576         {
577         const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
578         unsigned int tot,n,nw;
579         int i;
580
581         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
582         tot=s->s3->wnum;
583         s->s3->wnum=0;
584
585         if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
586                 {
587                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
588                 if (i < 0) return(i);
589                 if (i == 0)
590                         {
591                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
592                         return -1;
593                         }
594                 }
595
596         n=(len-tot);
597         for (;;)
598                 {
599                 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
600                         nw=s->max_send_fragment;
601                 else
602                         nw=n;
603
604                 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
605                 if (i <= 0)
606                         {
607                         s->s3->wnum=tot;
608                         return i;
609                         }
610
611                 if ((i == (int)n) ||
612                         (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
613                          (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
614                         {
615                         /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
616                          * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
617                         s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
618                         
619                         return tot+i;
620                         }
621
622                 n-=i;
623                 tot+=i;
624                 }
625         }
626
627 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
628                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
629         {
630         unsigned char *p,*plen;
631         int i,mac_size,clear=0;
632         int prefix_len=0;
633         long align=0;
634         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
635         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
636         SSL_SESSION *sess;
637
638         if (wb->buf == NULL)
639                 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
640                         return -1;
641
642         /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
643          * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
644         if (wb->left != 0)
645                 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
646
647         /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
648         if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
649                 {
650                 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
651                 if (i <= 0)
652                         return(i);
653                 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
654                 }
655
656         if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
657                 return 0;
658
659         wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
660         sess=s->session;
661
662         if (    (sess == NULL) ||
663                 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
664                 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
665                 clear=1;
666
667         if (clear)
668                 mac_size=0;
669         else
670                 {
671                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
672                 if (mac_size < 0)
673                         goto err;
674                 }
675
676         /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
677         if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
678                 {
679                 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
680                  * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
681
682                 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
683                         {
684                         /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
685                          * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
686                          * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
687                          * together with the actual payload) */
688                         prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
689                         if (prefix_len <= 0)
690                                 goto err;
691
692                         if (prefix_len >
693                 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
694                                 {
695                                 /* insufficient space */
696                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
697                                 goto err;
698                                 }
699                         }
700                 
701                 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
702                 }
703
704         if (create_empty_fragment)
705                 {
706 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
707                 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
708                  * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
709                  * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
710                  * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
711                 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
712                 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
713 #endif
714                 p = wb->buf + align;
715                 wb->offset  = align;
716                 }
717         else if (prefix_len)
718                 {
719                 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
720                 }
721         else
722                 {
723 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
724                 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
725                 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
726 #endif
727                 p = wb->buf + align;
728                 wb->offset  = align;
729                 }
730
731         /* write the header */
732
733         *(p++)=type&0xff;
734         wr->type=type;
735
736         *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
737         *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
738
739         /* field where we are to write out packet length */
740         plen=p; 
741         p+=2;
742
743         /* lets setup the record stuff. */
744         wr->data=p;
745         wr->length=(int)len;
746         wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
747
748         /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
749          * wr->data */
750
751         /* first we compress */
752         if (s->compress != NULL)
753                 {
754                 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
755                         {
756                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
757                         goto err;
758                         }
759                 }
760         else
761                 {
762                 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
763                 wr->input=wr->data;
764                 }
765
766         /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
767          * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
768          * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
769
770         if (mac_size != 0)
771                 {
772                 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
773                         goto err;
774                 wr->length+=mac_size;
775                 wr->input=p;
776                 wr->data=p;
777                 }
778
779         /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
780         s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
781
782         /* record length after mac and block padding */
783         s2n(wr->length,plen);
784
785         /* we should now have
786          * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
787          * wr->length long */
788         wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
789         wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
790
791         if (create_empty_fragment)
792                 {
793                 /* we are in a recursive call;
794                  * just return the length, don't write out anything here
795                  */
796                 return wr->length;
797                 }
798
799         /* now let's set up wb */
800         wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
801
802         /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
803         s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
804         s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
805         s->s3->wpend_type=type;
806         s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
807
808         /* we now just need to write the buffer */
809         return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
810 err:
811         return -1;
812         }
813
814 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
815 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
816         unsigned int len)
817         {
818         int i;
819         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
820
821 /* XXXX */
822         if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
823                 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
824                         !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
825                 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
826                 {
827                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
828                 return(-1);
829                 }
830
831         for (;;)
832                 {
833                 clear_sys_error();
834                 if (s->wbio != NULL)
835                         {
836                         s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
837                         i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
838                                 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
839                                 (unsigned int)wb->left);
840                         }
841                 else
842                         {
843                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
844                         i= -1;
845                         }
846                 if (i == wb->left)
847                         {
848                         wb->left=0;
849                         wb->offset+=i;
850                         if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
851                             SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
852                                 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
853                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
854                         return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
855                         }
856                 else if (i <= 0) {
857                         if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
858                             s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
859                                 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
860                                    point in using a datagram service */
861                                 wb->left = 0;
862                         }
863                         return(i);
864                 }
865                 wb->offset+=i;
866                 wb->left-=i;
867                 }
868         }
869
870 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
871  * 'type' is one of the following:
872  *
873  *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
874  *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
875  *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
876  *
877  * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
878  * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
879  *
880  * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
881  * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
882  * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
883  * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
884  * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
885  * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
886  *     Change cipher spec protocol
887  *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
888  *     Alert protocol
889  *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
890  *     Handshake protocol
891  *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
892  *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
893  *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
894  *     Application data protocol
895  *             none of our business
896  */
897 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
898         {
899         int al,i,j,ret;
900         unsigned int n;
901         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
902         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
903
904         if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
905                 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
906                         return(-1);
907
908         if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
909             (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
910                 {
911                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
912                 return -1;
913                 }
914
915         if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
916                 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
917                 {
918                 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
919                 unsigned char *dst = buf;
920                 unsigned int k;
921
922                 /* peek == 0 */
923                 n = 0;
924                 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
925                         {
926                         *dst++ = *src++;
927                         len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
928                         n++;
929                         }
930                 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
931                 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
932                         s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
933                 return n;
934         }
935
936         /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
937
938         if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
939                 {
940                 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
941                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
942                 if (i < 0) return(i);
943                 if (i == 0)
944                         {
945                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
946                         return(-1);
947                         }
948                 }
949 start:
950         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
951
952         /* s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
953          * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
954          * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
955          * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
956         rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
957
958         /* get new packet if necessary */
959         if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
960                 {
961                 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
962                 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
963                 }
964
965         /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
966
967         if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
968                                        * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
969                 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
970                 {
971                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
972                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
973                 goto f_err;
974                 }
975
976         /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
977          * (even in 'peek' mode) */
978         if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
979                 {
980                 rr->length=0;
981                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
982                 return(0);
983                 }
984
985
986         if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
987                 {
988                 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
989                  * are doing a handshake for the first time */
990                 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
991                         (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
992                         {
993                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
994                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
995                         goto f_err;
996                         }
997
998                 if (len <= 0) return(len);
999
1000                 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1001                         n = rr->length;
1002                 else
1003                         n = (unsigned int)len;
1004
1005                 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1006                 if (!peek)
1007                         {
1008                         rr->length-=n;
1009                         rr->off+=n;
1010                         if (rr->length == 0)
1011                                 {
1012                                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1013                                 rr->off=0;
1014                                 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1015                                         ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1016                                 }
1017                         }
1018                 return(n);
1019                 }
1020
1021
1022         /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1023          * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1024
1025         /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1026          * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1027          */
1028                 {
1029                 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1030                 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1031                 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1032
1033                 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1034                         {
1035                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1036                         dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1037                         dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1038                         }
1039                 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1040                         {
1041                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1042                         dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1043                         dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1044                         }
1045
1046                 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1047                         {
1048                         n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1049                         if (rr->length < n)
1050                                 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1051
1052                         /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1053                         while (n-- > 0)
1054                                 {
1055                                 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1056                                 rr->length--;
1057                                 }
1058
1059                         if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1060                                 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1061                         }
1062                 }
1063
1064         /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1065          * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1066          * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1067
1068         /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1069         if ((!s->server) &&
1070                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1071                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1072                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1073                 {
1074                 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1075
1076                 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1077                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1078                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1079                         {
1080                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1081                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1082                         goto f_err;
1083                         }
1084
1085                 if (s->msg_callback)
1086                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1087
1088                 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1089                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1090                         !s->s3->renegotiate)
1091                         {
1092                         ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1093                         if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1094                                 {
1095                                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1096                                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1097                                 if (i == 0)
1098                                         {
1099                                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1100                                         return(-1);
1101                                         }
1102
1103                                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1104                                         {
1105                                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1106                                                 {
1107                                                 BIO *bio;
1108                                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1109                                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1110                                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1111                                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1112                                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1113                                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1114                                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1115                                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1116                                                 return(-1);
1117                                                 }
1118                                         }
1119                                 }
1120                         }
1121                 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1122                  * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1123                 goto start;
1124                 }
1125         /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1126          * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1127          * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1128          */
1129         if (s->server &&
1130                 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1131                 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1132                 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1133                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1134                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1135                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1136                 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1137                 
1138                 {
1139                 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1140                 rr->length = 0;
1141                 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1142                 goto start;
1143                 }
1144         if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1145                 {
1146                 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1147                 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1148
1149                 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1150
1151                 if (s->msg_callback)
1152                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1153
1154                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1155                         cb=s->info_callback;
1156                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1157                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1158
1159                 if (cb != NULL)
1160                         {
1161                         j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1162                         cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1163                         }
1164
1165                 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1166                         {
1167                         s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1168                         if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1169                                 {
1170                                 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1171                                 return(0);
1172                                 }
1173                         /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1174                          * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1175                          * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1176                          * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1177                          * expects it to succeed.
1178                          *
1179                          * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1180                          * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1181                          */
1182                         else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1183                                 {
1184                                 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1185                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1186                                 goto f_err;
1187                                 }
1188                         }
1189                 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1190                         {
1191                         char tmp[16];
1192
1193                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1194                         s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1195                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1196                         BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1197                         ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1198                         s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1199                         SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1200                         return(0);
1201                         }
1202                 else
1203                         {
1204                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1205                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1206                         goto f_err;
1207                         }
1208
1209                 goto start;
1210                 }
1211
1212         if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1213                 {
1214                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1215                 rr->length=0;
1216                 return(0);
1217                 }
1218
1219         if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1220                 {
1221                 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1222                  * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1223                 if (    (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1224                         (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1225                         {
1226                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1227                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1228                         goto f_err;
1229                         }
1230
1231                 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1232                 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1233                         {
1234                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1235                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1236                         goto f_err;
1237                         }
1238
1239                 rr->length=0;
1240
1241                 if (s->msg_callback)
1242                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1243
1244                 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1245                 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1246                         goto err;
1247                 else
1248                         goto start;
1249                 }
1250
1251         /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1252         if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&     !s->in_handshake)
1253                 {
1254                 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1255                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1256                         {
1257 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1258        * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1259        * protocol violations): */
1260                         s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1261                                 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1262                                 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1263 #else
1264                         s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1265 #endif
1266                         s->new_session=1;
1267                         }
1268                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1269                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1270                 if (i == 0)
1271                         {
1272                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1273                         return(-1);
1274                         }
1275
1276                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1277                         {
1278                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1279                                 {
1280                                 BIO *bio;
1281                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1282                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1283                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1284                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1285                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1286                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1287                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1288                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1289                                 return(-1);
1290                                 }
1291                         }
1292                 goto start;
1293                 }
1294
1295         switch (rr->type)
1296                 {
1297         default:
1298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1299                 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1300                 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1301                         {
1302                         rr->length = 0;
1303                         goto start;
1304                         }
1305 #endif
1306                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1307                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1308                 goto f_err;
1309         case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1310         case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1311         case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1312                 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1313                  * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1314                  * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1315                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1316                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317                 goto f_err;
1318         case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1319                 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1320                  * but have application data.  If the library was
1321                  * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1322                  * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1323                  * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1324                  * we will indulge it.
1325                  */
1326                 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1327                         (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1328                         ((
1329                                 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1330                                 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1331                                 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1332                                 ) || (
1333                                         (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1334                                         (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1335                                         (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1336                                         )
1337                                 ))
1338                         {
1339                         s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1340                         return(-1);
1341                         }
1342                 else
1343                         {
1344                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1345                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1346                         goto f_err;
1347                         }
1348                 }
1349         /* not reached */
1350
1351 f_err:
1352         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1353 err:
1354         return(-1);
1355         }
1356
1357 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1358         {
1359         int i;
1360         const char *sender;
1361         int slen;
1362
1363         if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1364                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1365         else
1366                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1367
1368         if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1369                 {
1370                 if (s->session == NULL) 
1371                         {
1372                         /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1373                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1374                         return (0);
1375                         }
1376
1377                 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1378                 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1379                 }
1380
1381         if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1382                 return(0);
1383
1384         /* we have to record the message digest at
1385          * this point so we can get it before we read
1386          * the finished message */
1387         if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1388                 {
1389                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1390                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1391                 }
1392         else
1393                 {
1394                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1395                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1396                 }
1397
1398         s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1399                 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1400
1401         return(1);
1402         }
1403
1404 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1405         {
1406         /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1407         desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1408         if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1409                 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1410         if (desc < 0) return -1;
1411         /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1412         if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1413                 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1414
1415         s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1416         s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1417         s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1418         if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1419                 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1420         /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1421          * some time in the future */
1422         return -1;
1423         }
1424
1425 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1426         {
1427         int i,j;
1428         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1429
1430         s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1431         i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1432         if (i <= 0)
1433                 {
1434                 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1435                 }
1436         else
1437                 {
1438                 /* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
1439                  * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1440                  * we will not worry too much. */
1441                 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1442                         (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1443
1444                 if (s->msg_callback)
1445                         s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1446
1447                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1448                         cb=s->info_callback;
1449                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1450                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1451
1452                 if (cb != NULL)
1453                         {
1454                         j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1455                         cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1456                         }
1457                 }
1458         return(i);
1459         }