2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
136 /* start with empty packet ... */
137 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
138 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
139 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
140 s->packet_length = 0;
141 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
144 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
145 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
146 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
147 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
149 if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left)
150 n = s->s3->rbuf.left;
153 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
154 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
158 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
162 /* else we need to read more data */
167 /* avoid buffer overflow */
168 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
172 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
178 off = s->packet_length;
179 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
180 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
181 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
182 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
183 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
186 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
187 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
192 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
193 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
198 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
199 i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
209 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
213 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
214 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
215 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
216 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
219 n = newb; /* makes the while condition false */
223 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
224 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
225 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
226 s->packet_length += n;
227 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
231 /* Call this to get a new input record.
232 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
233 * or non-blocking IO.
234 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
235 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
236 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
237 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
239 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
240 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
242 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
243 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
247 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
256 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
257 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
260 if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
262 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
263 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 /* check if we have the header */
270 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
271 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
273 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
274 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
275 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
279 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
283 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
286 /* Lets check version */
287 if (!s->first_packet)
289 if (version != s->version)
291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
292 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
293 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
294 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
295 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
300 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
306 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
308 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
313 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
316 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
318 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
320 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
322 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
323 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
324 /* now n == rr->length,
325 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
328 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
330 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
331 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
333 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
335 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
336 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
337 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
338 * the decryption or by the decompression
339 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
340 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
342 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
343 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
345 /* check is not needed I believe */
346 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
348 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
353 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
356 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
359 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
364 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
365 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
369 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
370 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
371 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
372 (s->read_hash == NULL))
377 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
378 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
379 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
380 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
381 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
383 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
384 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
385 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
386 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
388 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
389 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
390 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
391 rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
393 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
398 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
400 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
401 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
402 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
403 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
406 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
407 rr->length -= mac_size;
411 /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
412 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
413 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
414 rr->length -= mac_size;
415 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
418 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
419 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
421 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
427 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
428 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
429 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
430 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
431 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
432 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
437 /* r->length is now just compressed */
438 if (s->expand != NULL)
440 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
442 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
446 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
448 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
454 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
456 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
462 /* So at this point the following is true
463 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
464 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
465 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
466 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
470 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
473 /* just read a 0 length packet */
474 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
479 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
484 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
490 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
491 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
492 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
502 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
508 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
509 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
510 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
511 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
522 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
523 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
525 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
527 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
528 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
531 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
535 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
537 i=s->handshake_func(s);
538 if (i < 0) return(i);
541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
549 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
550 nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
554 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
562 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
563 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
565 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
566 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
567 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
577 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
578 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
580 unsigned char *p,*plen;
581 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
587 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
588 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
589 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
590 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
592 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
593 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
595 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
598 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
601 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
608 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
609 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
610 (s->write_hash == NULL))
616 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
618 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
619 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
621 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
622 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
624 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
626 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
627 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
628 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
629 * together with the actual payload) */
630 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
634 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
636 /* insufficient space */
637 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
642 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
645 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
647 /* write the header */
652 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
653 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
655 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
659 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
662 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
664 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
667 /* first we compress */
668 if (s->compress != NULL)
670 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
672 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
678 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
682 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
683 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
684 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
688 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
689 wr->length+=mac_size;
694 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
695 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
697 /* record length after mac and block padding */
698 s2n(wr->length,plen);
700 /* we should now have
701 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
703 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
704 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
706 if (create_empty_fragment)
708 /* we are in a recursive call;
709 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
714 /* now let's set up wb */
715 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
718 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
719 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
720 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
721 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
722 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
724 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
725 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
730 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
731 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
737 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
738 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
739 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
740 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
751 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
753 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
754 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
761 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
764 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
765 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
768 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
769 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
770 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
771 point in using a datagram service */
772 s->s3->wbuf.left = 0;
776 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
781 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
782 * 'type' is one of the following:
784 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
785 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
786 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
788 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
789 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
791 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
792 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
793 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
794 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
795 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
796 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
797 * Change cipher spec protocol
798 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
800 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
802 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
803 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
804 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
805 * Application data protocol
806 * none of our business
808 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
813 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
815 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
816 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
819 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
820 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
826 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
827 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
829 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
830 unsigned char *dst = buf;
835 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
838 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
841 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
842 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
843 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
847 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
849 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
851 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
852 i=s->handshake_func(s);
853 if (i < 0) return(i);
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
861 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
863 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
864 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
865 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
866 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
869 /* get new packet if necessary */
870 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
872 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
873 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
876 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
878 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
879 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
880 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
882 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
887 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
888 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
889 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
892 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
897 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
899 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
900 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
901 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
902 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
904 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
909 if (len <= 0) return(len);
911 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
914 n = (unsigned int)len;
916 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
923 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
931 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
932 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
934 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
935 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
938 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
939 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
940 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
942 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
944 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
945 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
946 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
948 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
950 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
951 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
952 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
957 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
959 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
961 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
964 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
968 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
969 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
973 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
974 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
975 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
977 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
979 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
980 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
981 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
983 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
985 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
986 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
987 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
989 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
995 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
997 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
998 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1001 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1002 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1004 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1005 if (i < 0) return(i);
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1012 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1014 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1017 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1018 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1019 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1020 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1021 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1022 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1023 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1024 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1030 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1031 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1034 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1035 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1036 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1039 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1040 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1041 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1042 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1043 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1044 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1045 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1048 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1050 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1053 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1055 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1056 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1058 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1060 if (s->msg_callback)
1061 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1063 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1064 cb=s->info_callback;
1065 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1066 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1070 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1071 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1074 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1076 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1077 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1079 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1082 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1083 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1084 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1085 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1086 * expects it to succeed.
1088 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1089 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1091 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1093 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1098 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1102 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1103 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1105 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1106 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1107 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1108 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1113 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1121 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1123 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1128 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1130 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1131 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1132 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1133 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1135 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1140 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1141 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1143 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1150 if (s->msg_callback)
1151 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1153 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1154 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1160 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1161 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1163 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1164 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1166 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1167 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1168 * protocol violations): */
1169 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1173 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1177 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1178 if (i < 0) return(i);
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1185 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1187 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1190 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1191 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1192 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1193 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1194 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1195 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1196 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1197 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1208 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1209 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1215 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1218 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1220 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1221 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1222 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1223 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1224 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1227 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1228 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1229 * but have application data. If the library was
1230 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1231 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1232 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1233 * we will indulge it.
1235 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1236 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1238 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1239 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1240 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1242 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1243 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1244 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1248 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1253 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1261 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1266 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1272 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1273 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1275 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1277 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1279 if (s->session == NULL)
1281 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1286 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1287 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1290 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1293 /* we have to record the message digest at
1294 * this point so we can get it before we read
1295 * the finished message */
1296 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1298 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1299 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1303 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1304 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1307 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1308 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1309 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1310 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1315 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1317 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1318 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1319 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1320 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1321 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1322 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1323 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1324 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1326 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1327 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1328 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1329 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1330 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1331 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1332 * some time in the future */
1336 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1339 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1341 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1342 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1345 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1349 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1350 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1351 * we will not worry too much. */
1352 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1353 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1355 if (s->msg_callback)
1356 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1358 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1359 cb=s->info_callback;
1360 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1361 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1365 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1366 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);