3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
129 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
130 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
133 if (is_endian.little) break;
134 /* not reached on little-endians */
135 /* following test is redundant, because input is
136 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
137 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
141 if (l>128) return 128;
142 else if (l<-128) return -128;
146 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
148 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
151 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
158 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
163 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
165 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
166 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
169 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
171 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
173 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
174 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
176 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
177 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
179 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
180 unsigned char *priority);
181 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
183 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
185 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
187 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
189 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
191 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
192 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
194 s->packet = rdata->packet;
195 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
196 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
199 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
200 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
207 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
209 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
212 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
213 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
216 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
217 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
218 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
220 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
221 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
223 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
227 rdata->packet = s->packet;
228 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
229 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
230 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
234 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
235 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
243 s->packet_length = 0;
244 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
245 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
247 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
249 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
260 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
264 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
267 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
269 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
279 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
281 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
282 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
283 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
285 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
286 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
287 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
288 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
291 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
295 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
298 /* Check if epoch is current. */
299 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
300 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
302 /* Process all the records. */
303 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
305 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
306 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
308 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
309 s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
313 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
314 * have been processed */
315 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
316 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
325 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
329 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
330 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
332 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
337 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
338 if (item && item->priority == priority)
340 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
341 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
343 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
344 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
345 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
347 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
348 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
350 s->packet = rdata->packet;
351 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
352 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
353 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
355 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
358 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
368 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
375 unsigned int mac_size;
376 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
377 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
378 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
384 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
385 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
387 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
389 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
390 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
391 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
392 * the decryption or by the decompression
393 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
394 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
396 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
397 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
399 /* check is not needed I believe */
400 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
402 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
403 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
407 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
409 rr->orig_len=rr->length;
411 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
414 /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
415 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
417 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
421 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
422 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
426 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
427 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
428 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
429 (s->read_hash == NULL))
434 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
436 t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
437 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
440 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
442 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
443 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
444 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
447 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
450 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
451 if (rr->length >= mac_size)
453 rr->length -= mac_size;
454 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
458 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
459 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md,mac,mac_size) != 0)
461 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
465 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
467 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
469 s->packet_length = 0;
473 /* r->length is now just compressed */
474 if (s->expand != NULL)
476 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
478 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
479 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
482 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
484 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
485 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
490 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
492 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
498 /* So at this point the following is true
499 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
500 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
501 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
502 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
506 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
508 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
512 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
518 /* Call this to get a new input record.
519 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
520 * or non-blocking IO.
521 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
522 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
523 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
524 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
526 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
527 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
529 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
532 unsigned char *p = NULL;
533 unsigned short version;
534 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
535 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
539 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
540 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
541 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
543 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
544 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
547 /* get something from the wire */
549 /* check if we have the header */
550 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
551 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
553 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
554 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
555 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
557 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
558 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
560 s->packet_length = 0;
564 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
568 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
572 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
574 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
577 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
582 /* Lets check version */
583 if (!s->first_packet)
585 if (version != s->version)
587 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
589 s->packet_length = 0;
594 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
596 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
598 s->packet_length = 0;
602 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
604 /* record too long, silently discard it */
606 s->packet_length = 0;
610 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
613 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
615 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
617 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
619 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
620 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
622 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
626 s->packet_length = 0;
630 /* now n == rr->length,
631 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
633 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
635 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
636 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
640 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
641 goto again; /* get another record */
644 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
645 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
646 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
647 * since they arrive from different connections and
648 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
650 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
651 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
652 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
655 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
656 goto again; /* get another record */
659 /* just read a 0 length packet */
660 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
662 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
663 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
664 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
665 * anything while listening.
669 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
671 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
674 s->packet_length = 0;
678 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
681 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
682 goto again; /* get another record */
689 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
690 * 'type' is one of the following:
692 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
693 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
694 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
696 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
697 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
699 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
700 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
701 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
702 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
703 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
704 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
705 * Change cipher spec protocol
706 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
708 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
710 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
711 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
712 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
713 * Application data protocol
714 * none of our business
716 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
721 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
723 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
724 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
727 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
728 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
729 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
730 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
736 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
737 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
740 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
742 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
744 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
745 i=s->handshake_func(s);
746 if (i < 0) return(i);
749 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
755 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
757 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
758 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
759 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
760 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
763 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
764 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
765 * in advance, if any.
767 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
770 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
773 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
775 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
780 /* Check for timeout */
781 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
784 /* get new packet if necessary */
785 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
787 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
790 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
791 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
799 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
801 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
802 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
803 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
805 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
806 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
807 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
808 * than dropping the connection.
810 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
815 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
816 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
817 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
820 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
825 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
827 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
828 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
829 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
830 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
832 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
833 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
837 if (len <= 0) return(len);
839 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
842 n = (unsigned int)len;
844 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
851 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
859 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
860 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
862 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
863 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
866 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
867 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
868 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
870 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
872 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
873 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
874 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
876 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
878 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
879 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
880 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
882 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
883 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
885 /* Application data while renegotiating
886 * is allowed. Try again reading.
888 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
891 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
893 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
894 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
895 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
899 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
900 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
901 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
907 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
908 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
909 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
911 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
913 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
914 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
915 * non-existing alert...
919 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
924 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
925 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
927 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
930 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
934 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
935 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
936 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
938 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
940 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
941 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
942 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
944 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
946 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
947 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
948 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
950 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
955 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
958 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
959 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
961 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
962 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
966 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
968 i=s->handshake_func(s);
969 if (i < 0) return(i);
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
976 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
978 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
981 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
982 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
983 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
984 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
985 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
987 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
988 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
994 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
995 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
999 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
1001 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1002 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1004 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1006 if (s->msg_callback)
1007 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1008 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1010 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1011 cb=s->info_callback;
1012 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1013 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1017 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1018 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1021 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1023 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1024 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1026 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1030 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1031 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1032 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1035 unsigned int frag_off;
1036 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1041 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1042 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1044 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1046 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1047 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1048 send an alert ourselves */
1049 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1050 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1055 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1059 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1060 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1062 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1063 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1064 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1065 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1070 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1078 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1080 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1085 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1087 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1088 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1090 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1092 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1095 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1096 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1097 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1098 if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1099 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1101 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1108 if (s->msg_callback)
1109 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1110 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1112 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1113 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1115 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1120 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1122 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1123 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1126 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1127 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1129 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1130 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1135 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1136 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1139 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1141 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1142 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1143 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1149 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1150 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1152 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1154 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1157 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1162 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1163 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1165 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1166 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1167 * protocol violations): */
1168 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1172 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1176 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1177 if (i < 0) return(i);
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1184 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1186 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1189 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1190 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1191 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1192 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1193 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1194 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1195 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1196 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1207 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1208 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1214 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1217 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1219 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1220 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1221 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1222 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1223 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1226 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1227 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1228 * but have application data. If the library was
1229 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1230 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1231 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1232 * we will indulge it.
1234 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1235 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1237 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1238 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1239 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1241 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1242 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1243 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1247 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1252 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1260 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1266 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1270 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1272 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1273 if (i < 0) return(i);
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1281 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1287 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1292 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1295 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1299 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1300 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1302 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1303 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1308 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1311 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1314 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1315 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1316 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1326 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1327 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1329 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1333 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1334 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1335 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1339 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1341 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1342 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1349 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1350 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1351 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1353 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1354 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1357 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1358 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1360 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1363 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1366 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1373 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1374 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1375 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1382 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1387 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1389 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1390 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1391 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1393 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1394 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1397 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1399 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1400 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1401 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1402 * together with the actual payload) */
1403 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1404 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1407 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1409 /* insufficient space */
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1415 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1418 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1420 /* write the header */
1425 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1426 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1428 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1432 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1434 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1435 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1437 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1438 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1439 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1443 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1444 wr->length=(int)len;
1445 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1447 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1450 /* first we compress */
1451 if (s->compress != NULL)
1453 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1461 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1465 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1466 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1467 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1471 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
1473 wr->length+=mac_size;
1476 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1481 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1482 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1484 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1485 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1486 * the rest of randomness */
1490 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1492 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1493 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1494 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1496 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1498 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1502 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1504 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1506 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1508 /* we should now have
1509 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1510 * wr->length long */
1511 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1512 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1514 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1515 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1516 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1517 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1518 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1521 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1523 if (create_empty_fragment)
1525 /* we are in a recursive call;
1526 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1531 /* now let's set up wb */
1532 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1535 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1536 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1537 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1538 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1539 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1541 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1542 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1549 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1553 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1555 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1558 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1559 return 1; /* this record in new */
1562 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1563 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1564 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1565 return 0; /* record previously received */
1567 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1572 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1576 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1578 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1582 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1583 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1586 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1590 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1591 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1596 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1599 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1600 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1601 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1603 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1605 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1606 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1607 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1609 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1610 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1612 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1614 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1617 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1621 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1623 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1627 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1630 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1631 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1635 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1636 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1637 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1640 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1642 if (s->msg_callback)
1643 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1644 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1646 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1647 cb=s->info_callback;
1648 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1649 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1653 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1654 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1661 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1662 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1667 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1668 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1669 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1671 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1672 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1673 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1674 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1677 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1685 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1686 unsigned long *offset)
1689 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1690 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1691 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1694 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1695 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1697 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1699 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1700 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1701 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1702 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1704 unsigned short seq_num;
1705 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1706 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1708 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1710 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1711 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1712 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1716 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1717 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1721 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1722 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1723 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1724 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1726 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1727 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1728 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1730 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1731 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1732 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1736 *priority = seq_num;
1740 else /* unknown record type */
1749 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1752 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1754 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1756 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1758 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1759 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1763 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1764 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1768 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);