X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=8adac3b6d415b380497c39c7ccdbfbbda06d183f;hb=99f5093347c65eecbd05f0668aea94b32fcf20d7;hp=bf2af58a4703fdc014b30371d75b6bfe619791d2;hpb=cf6a1dea19b6d4d810613515f024d6d475ed5487;p=openssl.git diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index bf2af58a47..8adac3b6d4 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -2,7 +2,208 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ - Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [xx XXX xxxx] + + *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. + This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so + the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() + so it returns the certificate actually sent. + See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. + (This is a backport) + [Rob Stradling ] + + *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012] + + *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS + to fix DoS attack. + + Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic + fuzzing as a service testing platform. + (CVE-2012-2333) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. + Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012] + + *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the + 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an + int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by + rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131) + [Tomas Hoger ] + + Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012] + + *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio + BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer + in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. + + Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this + issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. + (CVE-2012-2110) + [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] + + Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012] + + *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness + in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for + content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack + needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The + old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the + CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where + an MMA defence is not necessary. + Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering + this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a + client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to + Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012] + + *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. + Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and + Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and + preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) + [Antonio Martin] + + Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012] + + *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension + of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption + which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against + the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing + differences arising during decryption processing. A research + paper describing this attack can be found at: + http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann + and Michael Tuexen + for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) + [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] + + *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109) + [Ben Laurie, Kasper ] + + *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. + (CVE-2011-4576) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George + Kadianakis for discovering this issue and + Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. + Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw + and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) + [Rob Austein ] + + *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. + [Emilia Käsper (Google)] + + *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different + interpretations of the '..._len' fields). + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than + BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent + threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. + + This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING + lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of + BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, + the last update always remained unused). + [Emilia Käsper (Google)] + + *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular + for multi-threaded use of ECDH. + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs. + [Bodo Moeller] + + *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper + by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: + + http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf + + [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri] + + Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011] + + *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014 + [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] + + *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must + escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is + ambiguous. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010] + + *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers + and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack. + Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180 + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by + Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan + Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252 + [Ben Laurie] + + Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010] + + *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer + overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can + be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864 + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939 + [Steve Henson] + + *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use + the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of + some broken encodings work correctly. + [Steve Henson] + + *) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT + is also one of the inputs. + [Emilia Käsper (Google)] + + *) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist. + Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only + after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add + etc are non-op. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010] + + [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after + OpenSSL 1.0.0.] + + *) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory + access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742) + [Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen ] + + *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more + common in certificates and some applications which only call + SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail. + [Steve Henson] *) VMS fixes: Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com