2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 static int pref_list[] =
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
347 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
349 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
351 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
355 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
358 unsigned char *ret = p;
360 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
361 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
362 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
367 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
369 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
371 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
372 unsigned long size_str;
375 /* check for enough space.
376 4 for the servername type and entension length
377 2 for servernamelist length
378 1 for the hostname type
379 2 for hostname length
383 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
384 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
387 /* extension type and length */
388 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
391 /* length of servername list */
394 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
395 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
397 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
401 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
406 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
412 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
417 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
427 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
428 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
429 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
431 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
432 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
438 /* check for enough space.
439 4 for the srp type type and entension length
440 1 for the srp user identity
441 + srp user identity length
443 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
445 /* fill in the extension */
446 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
447 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
448 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
449 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
455 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
456 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
458 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
461 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
462 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
470 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
471 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
472 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
473 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
475 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
476 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
478 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
481 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
482 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
489 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
490 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
492 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
493 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
494 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
495 * resolves this to two bytes.
497 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
498 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
499 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
501 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
503 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
506 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
507 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
508 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
509 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
511 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
512 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
513 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
515 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
516 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
518 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
522 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
523 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
525 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
528 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
533 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
539 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
541 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
543 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
544 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
545 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
546 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
547 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
550 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
551 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
552 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
554 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
556 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
558 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
564 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
569 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
570 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
573 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
577 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
579 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
580 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
586 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
588 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
595 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
597 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
599 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
600 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
602 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
604 /* save position of id len */
605 unsigned char *q = ret;
606 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
607 /* skip over id len */
609 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
615 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
619 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
620 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
625 * 1: peer may send requests
626 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
628 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
629 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
631 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
635 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
637 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
638 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
639 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
641 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
647 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
651 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
653 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
655 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
658 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
666 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
667 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
669 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
670 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
672 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
674 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
675 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
676 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
677 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
679 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
681 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
689 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
691 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
696 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
703 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
706 unsigned char *ret = p;
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
708 int next_proto_neg_seen;
711 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
712 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
716 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
718 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
720 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
722 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
726 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
730 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
736 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
738 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
741 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
751 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
752 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
754 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
757 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
758 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
759 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
765 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
766 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
767 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
768 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
769 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
772 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
773 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
775 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
776 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
778 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
779 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
783 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
785 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
786 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
790 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
791 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
792 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
794 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
796 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
798 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
801 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
804 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
814 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
816 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
821 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
830 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
831 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
832 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
833 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
834 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
835 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
836 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
837 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
838 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
839 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
840 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
846 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
847 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
849 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
851 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
854 * 1: peer may send requests
855 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
857 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
858 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
860 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
866 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
867 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
868 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
870 const unsigned char *npa;
874 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
875 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
877 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
878 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
880 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
882 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
887 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
895 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
896 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
897 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
902 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
903 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
904 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
905 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
907 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
908 unsigned short type, size;
909 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
910 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
911 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
912 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
913 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
914 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
915 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
917 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
918 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
919 0x01, /* 1 point format */
920 0x00, /* uncompressed */
923 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
924 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
925 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
926 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
927 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
928 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
929 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
930 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
931 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
932 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
944 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
951 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
953 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
954 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
956 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
958 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
960 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
965 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
967 if (data + len != d+n)
969 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
973 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
975 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
977 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
982 unsigned char *data = *p;
983 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
986 s->servername_done = 0;
987 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
989 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
993 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
994 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
998 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
999 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1000 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1002 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1006 if (data > (d+n-len))
1009 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1014 if (data+size > (d+n))
1017 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1019 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1020 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1021 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1022 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1024 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1025 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1026 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1027 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1028 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1029 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1030 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1031 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1032 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1033 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1034 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1035 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1036 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1037 the value of the Host: field.
1038 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1039 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1040 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1041 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1045 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1047 unsigned char *sdata;
1053 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1067 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1073 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1076 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1077 switch (servname_type)
1079 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1082 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1084 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1087 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1089 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1092 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1094 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1097 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1098 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1099 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1100 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1101 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1102 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1105 s->servername_done = 1;
1109 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1110 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1111 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1129 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1131 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1133 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1136 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1141 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1143 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1144 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1146 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1148 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1156 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1158 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1159 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1161 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1163 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1168 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1170 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1171 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1173 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1174 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1176 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1179 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1180 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1183 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1184 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1185 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1186 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1187 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1190 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1191 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1193 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1194 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1195 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1197 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1198 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1200 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1205 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1207 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1210 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1211 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1213 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1216 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1217 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1220 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1221 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1222 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1223 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1224 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1227 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1228 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1229 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1230 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1232 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1239 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1240 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1242 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1246 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1247 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1248 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1249 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1251 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1252 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1254 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1259 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1261 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1262 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1264 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1270 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1272 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1277 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1285 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1287 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1290 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1292 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1296 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1297 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1302 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1306 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1308 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1310 const unsigned char *sdata;
1312 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1326 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1330 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1339 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1343 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1348 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1352 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1353 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1354 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1356 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1357 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1360 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1361 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1363 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1364 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1369 /* Read in request_extensions */
1372 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1379 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1385 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1387 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1388 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1391 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1392 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1394 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1395 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1402 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1406 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1409 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1413 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1414 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1416 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1417 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1418 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1420 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1426 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1427 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1429 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1432 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1433 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1434 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1435 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1436 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1437 * anything like that, but this might change).
1439 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1440 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1441 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1442 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1443 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1444 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1448 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1450 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1452 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1465 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1467 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1468 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1470 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1472 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1480 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1481 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1482 * the length of the block. */
1483 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1485 unsigned int off = 0;
1499 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1501 unsigned short length;
1502 unsigned short type;
1503 unsigned short size;
1504 unsigned char *data = *p;
1505 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1506 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1509 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1513 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1514 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1517 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1521 if (data+length != d+n)
1523 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1527 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1532 if (data+size > (d+n))
1535 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1536 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1537 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1539 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1541 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1543 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1546 tlsext_servername = 1;
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1550 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1551 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1553 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1554 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1556 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1557 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1559 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1562 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1563 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1564 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1566 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1569 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1570 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1572 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1573 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1574 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1575 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1576 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1579 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1581 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1583 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1584 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1586 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1589 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1592 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1595 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1597 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1598 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1599 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1601 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1605 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1608 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1609 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1611 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1615 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1616 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1617 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1618 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1620 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1622 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1624 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1629 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1630 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1632 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1633 * a status request message.
1635 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1637 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1640 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1641 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1644 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1645 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1647 unsigned char *selected;
1648 unsigned char selected_len;
1650 /* We must have requested it. */
1651 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1653 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1656 /* The data must be valid */
1657 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1659 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1662 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1664 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1667 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1668 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1670 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1673 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1674 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1675 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1678 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1680 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1682 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1689 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1690 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1692 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1693 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1694 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1696 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1702 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1704 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1715 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1719 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1721 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1723 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1725 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1726 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1728 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1734 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1744 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1745 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1746 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1747 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1748 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1749 * absence on initial connect only.
1751 if (!renegotiate_seen
1752 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1753 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1755 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1757 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1765 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1768 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1769 * and elliptic curves we support.
1774 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1775 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1777 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1779 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1781 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1782 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1783 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1789 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1792 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1793 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1798 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1799 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1800 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1801 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1803 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1804 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1805 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1806 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1808 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1812 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1813 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1815 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1819 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1821 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1825 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1827 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1832 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1834 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1835 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1837 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1838 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1840 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1841 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1846 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1850 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1851 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1858 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1861 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1862 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1863 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1866 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1867 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1868 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1869 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1873 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1874 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1879 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1880 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1881 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1882 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1884 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1889 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1891 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1892 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1895 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1896 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1898 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1899 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1903 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1904 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1905 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1906 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1908 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1910 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1911 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1912 * so this has to happen here in
1913 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1917 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1919 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1922 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1923 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1928 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1929 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1930 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1932 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1934 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1935 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1937 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1938 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1940 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1941 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1943 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1944 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1946 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1950 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1954 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1956 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1957 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1958 * abort the handshake.
1960 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1961 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1969 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1970 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1973 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1974 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1977 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1978 s->servername_done=0;
1984 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1986 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1989 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1990 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1991 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1992 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1994 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1997 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1998 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1999 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2000 if (certpkey == NULL)
2002 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2005 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2006 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2008 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2009 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2012 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2013 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2014 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2016 /* status request response should be sent */
2017 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2018 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2019 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2021 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2023 /* something bad happened */
2024 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2025 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2026 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2036 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2037 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2040 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2041 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2049 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2051 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2052 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2055 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2056 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2057 * it must contain uncompressed.
2059 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2060 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2061 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2062 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2063 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2065 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2067 unsigned char *list;
2068 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2069 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2070 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2072 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2074 found_uncompressed = 1;
2078 if (!found_uncompressed)
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2084 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2085 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2087 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2088 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2089 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2090 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2092 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2093 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2095 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2096 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2098 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2100 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2101 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2104 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2105 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2106 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2107 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2109 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2110 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2115 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2118 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2119 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2122 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2123 * there is no response.
2125 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2127 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2128 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2130 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2131 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2134 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2135 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2146 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2147 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2150 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2151 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2154 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2155 s->servername_done=0;
2161 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2162 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2163 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2165 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2166 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2167 * extension, if any.
2168 * len: the length of the session ID.
2169 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2170 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2171 * point to the resulting session.
2173 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2174 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2175 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2178 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2179 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2180 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2181 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2182 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2183 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2184 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2187 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2188 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2189 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2190 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2191 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2192 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2194 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2195 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2197 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2198 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2202 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2204 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2205 * to permit stateful resumption.
2207 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2209 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2213 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2214 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2221 /* Skip past cipher list */
2226 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2231 /* Now at start of extensions */
2232 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2235 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2237 unsigned short type, size;
2240 if (p + size > limit)
2242 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2247 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2248 * currently have one. */
2249 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2252 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2254 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2255 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2256 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2257 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2258 * calculate the master secret later. */
2261 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2264 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2265 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2267 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2269 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2270 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2272 default: /* fatal error */
2281 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2283 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2284 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2285 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2286 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2287 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2288 * point to the resulting session.
2291 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2292 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2293 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2294 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2296 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2297 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2298 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2301 unsigned char *sdec;
2302 const unsigned char *p;
2303 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2304 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2307 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2308 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2311 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2312 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2313 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2314 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2316 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2317 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2328 /* Check key name matches */
2329 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2331 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2332 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2333 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2334 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2336 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2337 * integrity checks on ticket.
2339 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2346 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2347 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2348 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2349 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2350 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2352 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2353 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2354 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2355 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2356 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2359 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2362 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2363 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2365 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2370 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2373 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2377 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2378 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2379 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2380 * as required by standard.
2383 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2384 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2392 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2397 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2405 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2407 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2410 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2413 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2414 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2417 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2418 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2422 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2424 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2427 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2430 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2434 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2437 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2439 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2445 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2448 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2450 if (table[i].id == id)
2451 return table[i].nid;
2457 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2462 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2463 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2466 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2469 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2470 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2474 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2476 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2477 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2480 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2485 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2489 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2490 return EVP_sha224();
2492 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2493 return EVP_sha256();
2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2496 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2497 return EVP_sha384();
2499 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2500 return EVP_sha512();
2508 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2510 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2515 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2516 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2518 /* Should never happen */
2522 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2523 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2524 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2525 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2527 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2529 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2534 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2535 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2539 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2540 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2544 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2552 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2554 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2557 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2558 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2559 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2566 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2567 * supported it stays as NULL.
2569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2570 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2571 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2574 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2576 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2577 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2581 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2582 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2591 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2593 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2594 unsigned short hbtype;
2595 unsigned int payload;
2596 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2598 if (s->msg_callback)
2599 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2600 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2601 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2603 /* Read type and payload length first */
2604 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2605 return 0; /* silently discard */
2608 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2609 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2612 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2614 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2617 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2618 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2619 * payload, plus padding
2621 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2624 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2625 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2627 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2629 /* Random padding */
2630 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2632 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2634 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2635 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2636 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2637 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2639 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2644 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2648 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2649 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2650 * sequence number */
2653 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2656 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2664 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2666 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2668 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2669 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2671 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2672 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2673 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2679 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2680 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2686 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2687 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2693 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2694 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2696 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2698 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2699 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2700 * some random stuff.
2701 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2702 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2703 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2704 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2707 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2710 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2711 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2713 /* Sequence number */
2714 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2715 /* 16 random bytes */
2716 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2718 /* Random padding */
2719 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2721 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2724 if (s->msg_callback)
2725 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2726 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2727 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2729 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;