2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1093 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1095 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1096 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1105 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1108 unsigned char *ret = p;
1109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1110 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1112 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1115 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1116 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1118 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1120 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1122 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1123 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1124 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1125 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1134 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1135 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1136 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1141 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1143 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1145 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1146 unsigned long size_str;
1149 /* check for enough space.
1150 4 for the servername type and entension length
1151 2 for servernamelist length
1152 1 for the hostname type
1153 2 for hostname length
1157 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1158 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1161 /* extension type and length */
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1163 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1165 /* length of servername list */
1166 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1168 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1169 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1171 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1175 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1180 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1186 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1188 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1191 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1201 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1202 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1203 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1205 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1206 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 /* check for enough space.
1213 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1214 1 for the srp user identity
1215 + srp user identity length
1217 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1219 /* fill in the extension */
1220 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1221 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1222 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1223 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1231 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1233 const unsigned char *plist;
1236 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1238 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1239 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1247 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1248 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1249 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1252 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1253 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1254 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1256 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1257 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1258 if (plistlen > 65532)
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1265 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1267 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1268 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1269 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1270 * resolves this to two bytes.
1273 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1276 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1278 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1281 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1282 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1283 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1284 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1286 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1287 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1288 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1290 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1291 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1293 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1297 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1298 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1300 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1303 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1304 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1308 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1314 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1317 const unsigned char *salg;
1318 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1319 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1321 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1322 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1324 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1328 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1329 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1331 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1333 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1335 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1338 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1341 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1346 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1349 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1353 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1355 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1356 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1364 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1371 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1372 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1373 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1375 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1376 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1378 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1380 /* save position of id len */
1381 unsigned char *q = ret;
1382 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1383 /* skip over id len */
1385 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1391 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1395 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1399 * 1: peer may send requests
1400 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1402 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1403 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1405 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1409 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1411 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1412 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1413 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1420 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1422 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1425 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1426 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1427 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1428 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1429 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1432 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1436 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1438 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1443 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1452 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1455 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1457 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1459 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1460 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1462 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1463 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1464 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1468 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1472 return NULL; /* error */
1473 if (cb_retval == -1)
1474 continue; /* skip this extension */
1476 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1478 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1480 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1485 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1486 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1487 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1489 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1490 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1493 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1494 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1495 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1497 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1499 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1501 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1507 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1509 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1515 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1522 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1525 unsigned char *ret = p;
1527 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1529 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1532 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1533 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1534 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1535 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1537 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1538 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1542 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1544 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1546 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1548 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1552 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1556 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1562 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1564 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1567 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1579 const unsigned char *plist;
1581 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1584 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1586 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1587 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1595 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1596 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1597 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1601 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1602 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1604 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1605 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1607 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1608 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1612 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1614 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1615 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1619 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1620 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1622 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1624 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1626 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1632 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1641 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1643 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1645 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1648 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1656 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1657 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1658 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1659 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1660 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1661 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1662 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1663 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1664 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1665 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1666 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1672 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1673 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1675 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1678 * 1: peer may send requests
1679 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1681 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1682 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1684 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1690 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1691 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1692 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1694 const unsigned char *npa;
1695 unsigned int npalen;
1698 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1699 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1701 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1702 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1704 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1706 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1711 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1713 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1714 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1717 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1719 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1722 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1726 return NULL; /* error */
1727 if (cb_retval == -1)
1728 continue; /* skip this extension */
1729 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1731 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1733 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1737 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1739 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1740 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1742 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1744 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1748 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1752 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1760 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1761 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1762 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1767 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1768 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1769 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1770 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1772 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1773 unsigned short type, size;
1774 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1775 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1776 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1777 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1778 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1779 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1780 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1782 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1783 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1784 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1785 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1788 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1789 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1790 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1791 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1792 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1793 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1794 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1795 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1796 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1797 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1800 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1809 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1812 if (data+size > d+n)
1816 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1818 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1819 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1821 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1823 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1825 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1830 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1832 if (data + len != d+n)
1834 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1838 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1840 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1842 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1844 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1845 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1846 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1849 * returns: 0 on success. */
1850 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1851 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1855 const unsigned char *selected;
1856 unsigned char selected_len;
1859 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1865 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1866 * length-prefixed strings. */
1867 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1868 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1877 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1879 proto_len = data[i];
1885 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1891 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1892 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1893 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1894 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1895 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1896 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1897 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1899 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1902 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1903 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1908 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1912 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1914 unsigned short type;
1915 unsigned short size;
1917 unsigned char *data = *p;
1918 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1921 s->servername_done = 0;
1922 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1924 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1927 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1928 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1929 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1931 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1932 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1935 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1937 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1938 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1942 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1943 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1947 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1948 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1949 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1951 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1952 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1954 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1955 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1957 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1958 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1960 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1961 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1963 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1964 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1966 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1967 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1970 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1974 if (data > (d+n-len))
1977 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1982 if (data+size > (d+n))
1985 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1987 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1988 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1989 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1990 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1992 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1993 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1994 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1995 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1996 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1997 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1998 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1999 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2000 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2001 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2002 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2003 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2004 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2005 the value of the Host: field.
2006 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2007 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2008 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2009 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2013 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2015 unsigned char *sdata;
2021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2041 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2045 switch (servname_type)
2047 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2050 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2052 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2055 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2057 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2060 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2062 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2066 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2067 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2068 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2069 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2070 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2073 s->servername_done = 1;
2077 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2078 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2079 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2091 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2097 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2099 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2106 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2111 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2112 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2114 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2116 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2123 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2125 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2126 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2128 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2129 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2131 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2138 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2139 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2141 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2142 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2144 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2147 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2148 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2151 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2152 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2153 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2154 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2155 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2160 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2161 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2162 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2164 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2165 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2172 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2174 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2177 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2178 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2180 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2183 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2187 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2188 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2189 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2190 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2191 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2194 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2195 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2196 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2198 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2202 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2205 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2206 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2213 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2214 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2215 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2217 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2218 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2220 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2225 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2227 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2228 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2230 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2236 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2238 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2240 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2243 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2245 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2255 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2263 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2266 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2267 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2271 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2276 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2280 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2282 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2284 const unsigned char *sdata;
2286 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2291 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2300 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2327 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2328 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2330 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2331 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2334 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2335 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2337 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2338 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 /* Read in request_extensions */
2346 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2359 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2361 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2362 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2365 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2366 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2368 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2369 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2371 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2376 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2380 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2383 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2387 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2388 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2390 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2391 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2392 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2394 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2400 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2401 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2402 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2404 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2407 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2408 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2409 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2410 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2411 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2412 * anything like that, but this might change).
2414 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2415 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2416 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2417 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2418 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2419 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2424 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2425 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2427 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2430 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2431 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2435 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2436 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2438 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2442 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2443 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2444 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2445 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2446 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2448 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2450 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2452 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2454 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2455 if (type == record->ext_type)
2457 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2470 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2472 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2473 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2475 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2477 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2480 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2481 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2482 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2487 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2490 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2492 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2496 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2505 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2506 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2507 * the length of the block. */
2508 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2510 unsigned int off = 0;
2524 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2526 unsigned short length;
2527 unsigned short type;
2528 unsigned short size;
2529 unsigned char *data = *p;
2530 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2531 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2534 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2537 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2539 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2540 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2544 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2545 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2548 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2552 if (data+length != d+n)
2554 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2558 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2563 if (data+size > (d+n))
2566 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2567 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2568 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2570 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2572 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2574 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2577 tlsext_servername = 1;
2580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2581 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2583 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2584 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2586 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2588 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2591 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2592 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2593 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2595 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2598 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2599 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2601 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2602 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2603 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2604 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2605 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2608 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2610 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2612 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2613 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2615 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2618 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2621 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2624 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2626 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2627 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2629 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2633 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2636 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2637 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2639 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2643 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2644 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2645 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2646 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2648 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2650 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2652 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2657 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2659 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2660 * a status request message.
2662 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2664 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2667 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2668 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2671 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2672 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2674 unsigned char *selected;
2675 unsigned char selected_len;
2677 /* We must have requested it. */
2678 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2680 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2683 /* The data must be valid */
2684 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2686 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2689 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2691 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2694 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2695 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2697 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2700 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2701 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2702 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2706 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2710 /* We must have requested it. */
2711 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2713 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2721 /* The extension data consists of:
2722 * uint16 list_length
2723 * uint8 proto_length;
2724 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2728 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2730 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2734 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2739 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2740 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2741 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2742 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2744 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2747 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2748 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2751 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2753 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2755 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2758 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2762 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2763 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2765 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2766 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2767 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2769 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2774 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2776 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2780 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2781 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2783 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2786 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2788 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2790 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2791 if (record->ext_type == type)
2793 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2805 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2809 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2811 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2813 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2815 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2816 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2818 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2824 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2834 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2835 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2836 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2837 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2838 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2839 * absence on initial connect only.
2841 if (!renegotiate_seen
2842 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2843 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2845 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2847 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2855 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2858 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2862 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2864 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2869 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2871 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2872 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2874 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2875 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2877 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2878 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2883 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2887 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2888 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2895 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2900 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2902 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2903 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2906 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2907 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2909 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2910 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2914 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2915 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2916 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2917 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2919 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2921 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2922 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2923 * so this has to happen here in
2924 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2928 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2930 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2933 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2934 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2939 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2940 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2941 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2943 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2945 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2946 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2948 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2949 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2951 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2952 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2954 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2955 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2957 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2958 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2961 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2965 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2967 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2968 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2969 * abort the handshake.
2971 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2972 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2980 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2981 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2984 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2985 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2988 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2989 s->servername_done=0;
2995 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2997 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3000 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3001 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3002 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3003 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3005 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3008 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3009 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3010 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3011 if (certpkey == NULL)
3013 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3016 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3017 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3019 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3020 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3023 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3024 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3025 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3027 /* status request response should be sent */
3028 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3029 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3030 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3032 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3034 /* something bad happened */
3035 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3036 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3037 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3042 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3047 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3048 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3051 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3052 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3060 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3062 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3063 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3066 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3067 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3068 * it must contain uncompressed.
3070 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3071 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3072 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3073 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3074 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3076 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3078 unsigned char *list;
3079 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3080 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3081 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3083 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3085 found_uncompressed = 1;
3089 if (!found_uncompressed)
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3095 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3096 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3098 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3099 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3100 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3101 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3103 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3104 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3106 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3107 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3109 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3111 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3112 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3115 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3116 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3117 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3118 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3120 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3121 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3126 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3129 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3130 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3133 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3134 * there is no response.
3136 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3138 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3139 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3141 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3142 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3145 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3146 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3150 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3151 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3157 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3158 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3161 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3162 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3165 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3166 s->servername_done=0;
3172 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3175 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3177 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3179 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3183 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3191 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3192 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3193 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3195 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3196 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3197 * extension, if any.
3198 * len: the length of the session ID.
3199 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3200 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3201 * point to the resulting session.
3203 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3204 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3205 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3208 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3209 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3210 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3211 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3212 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3213 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3214 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3217 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3218 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3219 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3220 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3221 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3222 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3224 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3225 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3227 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3228 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3232 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3234 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3235 * to permit stateful resumption.
3237 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3239 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3243 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3251 /* Skip past cipher list */
3256 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3261 /* Now at start of extensions */
3262 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3265 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3267 unsigned short type, size;
3270 if (p + size > limit)
3272 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3277 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3278 * currently have one. */
3279 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3282 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3284 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3285 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3286 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3287 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3288 * calculate the master secret later. */
3291 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3294 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3295 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3297 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3299 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3300 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3302 default: /* fatal error */
3311 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3313 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3314 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3315 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3316 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3317 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3318 * point to the resulting session.
3321 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3322 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3323 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3324 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3326 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3327 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3328 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3331 unsigned char *sdec;
3332 const unsigned char *p;
3333 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3334 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3337 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3338 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3341 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3342 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3343 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3344 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3346 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3347 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3358 /* Check key name matches */
3359 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3361 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3362 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3363 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3364 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3366 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3367 * integrity checks on ticket.
3369 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3372 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3376 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3377 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3378 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3379 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3380 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3382 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3383 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3384 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3385 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3386 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3389 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3392 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3393 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3396 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3399 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3403 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3404 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3405 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3406 * as required by standard.
3409 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3410 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3418 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3423 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3431 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3432 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3433 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3434 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3435 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3436 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3437 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3440 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3441 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3442 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3443 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3446 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3449 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3451 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3457 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3460 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3462 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3463 return table[i].nid;
3468 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3473 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3474 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3477 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3480 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3481 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3485 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3487 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3488 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3491 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3496 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3504 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3508 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3509 return EVP_sha224();
3511 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3512 return EVP_sha256();
3514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3515 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3516 return EVP_sha384();
3518 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3519 return EVP_sha512();
3527 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3532 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3533 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3536 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3537 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3540 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3541 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3547 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3548 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3549 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3551 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3552 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3554 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3556 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3557 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3559 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3561 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3563 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3564 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3566 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3570 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3571 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3572 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3574 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3577 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3578 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3579 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3580 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3582 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3583 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3584 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3586 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3587 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3589 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3591 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3593 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3598 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3599 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3600 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3602 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3613 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3614 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3616 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3617 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3619 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3621 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3622 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3623 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3625 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3626 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3628 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3630 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3631 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3634 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3635 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3639 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3640 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3646 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3647 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3649 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3652 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3655 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3656 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3657 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3662 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3664 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3670 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3671 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3672 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3674 /* Should never happen */
3678 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3679 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3681 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3682 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3684 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3686 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3687 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3689 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3690 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3692 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3694 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3696 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3699 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3700 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3701 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3702 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3703 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3705 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3706 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3712 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3713 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3715 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3716 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3718 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3719 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3720 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3721 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3723 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3724 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3729 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3730 * use the certificate for signing.
3732 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3734 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3735 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3738 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3739 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3742 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3744 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3749 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3750 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3757 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3758 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3759 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3761 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3767 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3774 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3776 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3779 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3780 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3781 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3783 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3784 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3788 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3790 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3792 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3794 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3796 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3797 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3803 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3805 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3806 unsigned short hbtype;
3807 unsigned int payload;
3808 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3810 /* Read type and payload length first */
3815 if (s->msg_callback)
3816 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3817 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3818 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3820 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3822 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3825 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3826 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3827 * payload, plus padding
3829 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3832 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3833 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3835 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3837 /* Random padding */
3838 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3840 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3842 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3843 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3844 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3845 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3847 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3852 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3856 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3857 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3858 * sequence number */
3861 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3864 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3872 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3874 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3876 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3877 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3879 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3880 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3881 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3887 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3888 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3894 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3895 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3901 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3902 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3904 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3906 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3907 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3908 * some random stuff.
3909 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3910 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3911 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3912 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3915 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3918 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3919 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3921 /* Sequence number */
3922 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3923 /* 16 random bytes */
3924 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3926 /* Random padding */
3927 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3929 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3932 if (s->msg_callback)
3933 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3934 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3935 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3937 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3946 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3951 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3954 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3956 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3959 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3960 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3962 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3964 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3966 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3974 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3975 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3976 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3977 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3978 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3979 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3982 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3983 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3984 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3985 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3988 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3990 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3991 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3994 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3995 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3999 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4000 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4001 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4005 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4009 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4012 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4014 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4019 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4020 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4022 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4024 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4025 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4026 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4027 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4029 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4037 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4038 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4039 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4040 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4044 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4045 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4046 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4047 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4053 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4057 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4061 if (default_nid == -1)
4063 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4065 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4066 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4067 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4071 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4072 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4076 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4077 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4079 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4085 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4086 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4087 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4088 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4091 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4093 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4094 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4095 /* Strict mode flags */
4096 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4097 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4098 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4100 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4105 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4106 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4108 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4109 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4112 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4116 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4119 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4121 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4123 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4124 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4127 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4128 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4129 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4131 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4132 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4141 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4144 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4145 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4146 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4148 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4156 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4157 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4158 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4161 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4167 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4168 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4171 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4174 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4175 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4177 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4182 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4183 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4184 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4185 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4186 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4189 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4190 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4191 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4192 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4196 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4197 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4205 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4206 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4209 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4212 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4213 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4215 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4218 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4226 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4227 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4229 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4232 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4233 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4234 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4236 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4241 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4249 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4250 else if(check_flags)
4251 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4253 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4254 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4255 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4256 else if (!check_flags)
4259 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4260 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4261 else if (strict_mode)
4263 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4264 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4266 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4267 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4271 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4279 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4281 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4286 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4289 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4292 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4297 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4298 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4299 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4300 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4301 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4306 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4311 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4315 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4316 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4318 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4320 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4322 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4326 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4330 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4333 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4335 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4336 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4338 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4340 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4341 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4343 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4345 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4347 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4348 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4350 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4355 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4359 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4361 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4362 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4366 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4368 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4369 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4370 else if (cpk->digest)
4371 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4374 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4376 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4377 * if the chain is invalid.
4381 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4382 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4385 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4386 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4393 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4394 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4396 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4397 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4398 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4399 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4400 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4401 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4403 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4404 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4406 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);