2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1093 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1095 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1096 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1105 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1108 unsigned char *ret = p;
1109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1110 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1112 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1115 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1116 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1118 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1120 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1122 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1123 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1124 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1125 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1134 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1135 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1136 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1141 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1143 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1145 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1146 unsigned long size_str;
1149 /* check for enough space.
1150 4 for the servername type and entension length
1151 2 for servernamelist length
1152 1 for the hostname type
1153 2 for hostname length
1157 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1158 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1161 /* extension type and length */
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1163 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1165 /* length of servername list */
1166 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1168 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1169 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1171 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1175 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1180 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1186 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1188 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1191 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1201 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1202 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1203 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1205 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1206 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 /* check for enough space.
1213 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1214 1 for the srp user identity
1215 + srp user identity length
1217 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1219 /* fill in the extension */
1220 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1221 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1222 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1223 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1231 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1233 const unsigned char *plist;
1236 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1238 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1239 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1247 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1248 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1249 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1252 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1253 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1254 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1256 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1257 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1258 if (plistlen > 65532)
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1265 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1267 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1268 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1269 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1270 * resolves this to two bytes.
1273 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1276 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1278 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1281 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1282 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1283 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1284 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1286 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1287 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1288 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1290 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1291 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1293 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1297 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1298 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1300 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1303 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1304 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1308 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1314 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1317 const unsigned char *salg;
1318 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1319 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1321 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1322 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1324 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1328 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1329 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1331 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1333 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1335 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1338 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1341 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1346 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1349 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1353 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1355 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1356 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1364 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1371 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1372 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1373 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1375 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1376 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1378 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1380 /* save position of id len */
1381 unsigned char *q = ret;
1382 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1383 /* skip over id len */
1385 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1391 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1395 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1399 * 1: peer may send requests
1400 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1402 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1403 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1405 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1409 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1411 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1412 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1413 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1420 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1422 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1425 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1426 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1427 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1428 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1429 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1432 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1436 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1438 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1443 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1452 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1453 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1454 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1455 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1456 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1458 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1459 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1461 if (limit < ret + 6)
1464 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1465 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1467 *(ret++) = list_len;
1468 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1471 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1472 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1475 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1477 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1479 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1480 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1482 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1483 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1484 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1488 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1492 return NULL; /* error */
1493 if (cb_retval == -1)
1494 continue; /* skip this extension */
1496 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1498 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1500 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1505 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1506 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1507 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1509 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1510 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1513 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1514 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1515 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1517 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1519 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1521 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1527 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1529 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1535 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1542 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1545 unsigned char *ret = p;
1546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1547 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1550 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1551 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1552 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1553 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1555 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1556 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1560 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1562 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1566 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1570 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1574 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1580 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1585 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1597 const unsigned char *plist;
1599 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1602 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1604 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1605 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1612 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1613 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1614 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1615 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1619 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1620 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1622 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1623 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1625 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1626 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1630 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1632 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1637 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1638 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1640 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1642 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1644 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1650 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1659 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1661 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1663 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1666 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1674 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1675 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1676 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1677 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1678 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1679 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1680 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1681 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1682 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1683 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1684 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1690 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1691 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1693 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1696 * 1: peer may send requests
1697 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1699 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1700 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1702 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1708 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1709 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1710 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1712 const unsigned char *npa;
1713 unsigned int npalen;
1716 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1717 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1719 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1720 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1722 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1724 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1729 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1731 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1733 size_t authz_length;
1734 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1735 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1736 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1737 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1738 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1740 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1742 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1743 * uint8_t authz_type
1745 * uint8_t data[length]
1747 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1748 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1750 unsigned short length;
1754 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1756 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1760 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1768 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1769 * 2 bytes for extension type
1770 * 2 bytes for extension length
1771 * 1 byte for the list length
1772 * n bytes for the list */
1773 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1775 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1776 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1778 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1779 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1783 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1785 unsigned short length;
1790 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1792 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1795 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1802 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1803 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1807 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1810 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1812 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1814 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1815 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1817 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1818 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1821 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1824 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1828 return NULL; /* error */
1829 if (cb_retval == -1)
1830 break; /* skip this extension */
1831 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1833 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1835 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1843 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1845 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1846 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1848 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1850 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1854 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1858 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1866 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1867 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1868 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1873 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1874 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1875 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1876 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1878 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1879 unsigned short type, size;
1880 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1881 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1882 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1883 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1884 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1885 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1886 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1888 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1889 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1890 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1891 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1894 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1895 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1896 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1897 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1898 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1899 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1900 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1901 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1902 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1903 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1906 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1915 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1918 if (data+size > d+n)
1922 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1924 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1925 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1927 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1929 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1931 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1936 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1938 if (data + len != d+n)
1940 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1944 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1946 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1948 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1950 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1951 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1952 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1955 * returns: 0 on success. */
1956 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1957 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1961 const unsigned char *selected;
1962 unsigned char selected_len;
1965 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1971 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1972 * length-prefixed strings. */
1973 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1974 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1983 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1985 proto_len = data[i];
1991 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1997 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1998 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1999 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2000 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2001 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2002 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2003 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2005 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2008 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
2009 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2014 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2018 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2020 unsigned short type;
2021 unsigned short size;
2023 unsigned char *data = *p;
2024 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2027 s->servername_done = 0;
2028 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2030 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2033 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
2034 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
2035 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
2037 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
2038 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
2041 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2043 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2044 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2048 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2049 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2053 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2054 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2055 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2057 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2058 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2060 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2061 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2063 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2064 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2066 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2067 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2069 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2070 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2072 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2073 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2076 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2080 if (data > (d+n-len))
2083 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2088 if (data+size > (d+n))
2091 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2093 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2094 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2095 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2096 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2098 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2099 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2100 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2101 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2102 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2103 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2104 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2105 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2106 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2107 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2108 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2109 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2110 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2111 the value of the Host: field.
2112 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2113 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2114 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2115 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2119 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2121 unsigned char *sdata;
2127 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2134 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2147 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2150 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2151 switch (servname_type)
2153 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2156 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2158 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2163 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2166 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2168 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2171 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2172 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2173 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2174 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2175 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2176 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2179 s->servername_done = 1;
2183 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2184 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2185 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2197 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2203 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2205 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2207 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2210 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2212 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2215 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2217 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2218 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2220 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2229 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2231 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2232 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2234 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2235 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2237 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2242 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2244 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2245 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2247 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2248 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2250 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2253 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2254 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2257 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2258 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2259 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2260 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2261 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2264 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2266 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2267 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2268 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2270 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2271 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2273 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2278 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2280 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2284 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2286 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2289 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2290 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2293 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2294 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2295 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2296 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2297 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2300 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2301 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2302 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2304 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2312 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2314 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2318 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2319 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2320 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2321 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2323 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2324 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2326 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2331 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2333 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2334 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2336 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2340 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2342 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2344 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2346 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2349 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2351 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2356 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2358 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2361 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2363 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2369 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2372 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2373 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2377 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2378 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2383 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2387 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2389 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2391 const unsigned char *sdata;
2393 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2398 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2407 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2411 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2415 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2424 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2429 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2430 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2433 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2434 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2435 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2437 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2438 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2441 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2442 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2444 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2445 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2450 /* Read in request_extensions */
2453 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2460 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2466 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2468 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2469 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2472 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2473 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2475 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2476 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2478 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2483 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2487 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2490 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2494 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2495 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2497 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2498 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2499 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2501 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2508 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2509 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2511 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2514 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2515 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2516 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2517 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2518 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2519 * anything like that, but this might change).
2521 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2522 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2523 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2524 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2525 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2526 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2530 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2531 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2532 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2534 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2537 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2538 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2542 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2543 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2545 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2550 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2552 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2553 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2557 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2561 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2563 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2565 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2569 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2570 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2571 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2574 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2575 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2576 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2577 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2578 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2580 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2584 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2585 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2586 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2588 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2590 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2591 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2592 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2593 1 /* element size */,
2596 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2599 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2600 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2602 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2609 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2610 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2611 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2612 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2613 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2615 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2617 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2619 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2621 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2622 if (type == record->ext_type)
2626 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2627 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2629 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2631 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2636 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2637 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2640 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2641 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2642 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2643 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2644 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2645 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2647 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2648 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2651 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2652 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2664 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2666 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2667 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2669 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2671 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2674 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2675 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2676 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2681 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2684 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2686 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2690 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2699 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2700 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2701 * the length of the block. */
2702 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2704 unsigned int off = 0;
2718 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2720 unsigned short length;
2721 unsigned short type;
2722 unsigned short size;
2723 unsigned char *data = *p;
2724 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2725 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2728 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2731 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2733 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2734 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2738 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2739 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2742 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2746 if (data+length != d+n)
2748 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2752 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2757 if (data+size > (d+n))
2760 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2761 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2762 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2764 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2766 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2768 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2771 tlsext_servername = 1;
2774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2775 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2777 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2778 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2780 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2782 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2785 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2786 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2787 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2789 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2792 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2793 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2795 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2796 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2797 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2798 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2799 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2802 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2804 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2806 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2807 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2809 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2812 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2815 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2818 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2820 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2821 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2823 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2827 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2830 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2831 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2833 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2837 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2838 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2839 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2840 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2842 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2844 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2846 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2851 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2853 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2854 * a status request message.
2856 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2858 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2861 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2862 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2865 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2866 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2868 unsigned char *selected;
2869 unsigned char selected_len;
2871 /* We must have requested it. */
2872 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2874 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2877 /* The data must be valid */
2878 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2880 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2883 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2885 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2888 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2889 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2891 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2894 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2895 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2896 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2900 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2904 /* We must have requested it. */
2905 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2907 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2912 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2915 /* The extension data consists of:
2916 * uint16 list_length
2917 * uint8 proto_length;
2918 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2922 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2924 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2928 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2930 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2933 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2934 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2935 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2936 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2938 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2942 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2945 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2947 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2949 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2952 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2956 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2957 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2959 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2960 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2961 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2963 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2968 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2970 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2975 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2977 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2978 * an authz hello extension if the client
2979 * didn't request a proof. */
2980 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2981 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2983 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2985 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2991 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2995 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2996 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2998 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3002 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
3003 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
3004 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
3005 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
3007 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
3011 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
3014 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
3015 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
3017 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
3020 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
3022 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
3024 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
3025 if (record->ext_type == type)
3027 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
3039 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3043 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
3045 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
3047 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
3049 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
3050 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
3052 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3058 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3068 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
3069 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
3070 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
3071 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
3072 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
3073 * absence on initial connect only.
3075 if (!renegotiate_seen
3076 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
3077 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
3079 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3081 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
3089 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3092 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3096 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3098 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3103 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3105 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3106 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
3108 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3109 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3111 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3112 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3117 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3121 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
3122 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3129 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3134 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
3136 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3137 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3140 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3141 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3143 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3144 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3148 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3149 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3150 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3151 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3153 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3155 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
3156 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
3157 * so this has to happen here in
3158 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
3162 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3164 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3167 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3168 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3173 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3174 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3175 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3177 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3179 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3180 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3182 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3183 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3185 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3186 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3188 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3189 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3191 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3192 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3195 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3199 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3201 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3202 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3203 * abort the handshake.
3205 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3206 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3214 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3215 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3218 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3219 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3222 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3223 s->servername_done=0;
3229 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3231 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3234 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3235 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3236 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3237 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3239 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3242 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3243 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3244 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3245 if (certpkey == NULL)
3247 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3250 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3251 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3253 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3254 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3257 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3258 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3259 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3261 /* status request response should be sent */
3262 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3263 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3264 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3266 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3268 /* something bad happened */
3269 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3270 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3271 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3276 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3281 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3282 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3285 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3286 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3294 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3296 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3297 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3300 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3301 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3302 * it must contain uncompressed.
3304 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3305 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3306 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3307 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3308 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3310 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3312 unsigned char *list;
3313 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3314 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3315 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3317 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3319 found_uncompressed = 1;
3323 if (!found_uncompressed)
3325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3329 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3330 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3332 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3333 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3334 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3335 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3337 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3338 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3340 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3341 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3343 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3345 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3346 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3349 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3350 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3351 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3352 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3354 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3355 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3360 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3363 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3364 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3367 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3368 * there is no response.
3370 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3372 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3373 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3375 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3376 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3379 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3380 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3384 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3385 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3391 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3392 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3395 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3396 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3399 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3400 s->servername_done=0;
3406 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3409 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3411 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3413 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3417 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3425 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3426 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3427 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3429 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3430 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3431 * extension, if any.
3432 * len: the length of the session ID.
3433 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3434 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3435 * point to the resulting session.
3437 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3438 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3439 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3442 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3443 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3444 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3445 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3446 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3447 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3448 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3451 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3452 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3453 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3454 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3455 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3456 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3458 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3459 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3461 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3462 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3466 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3468 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3469 * to permit stateful resumption.
3471 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3473 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3477 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3485 /* Skip past cipher list */
3490 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3495 /* Now at start of extensions */
3496 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3499 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3501 unsigned short type, size;
3504 if (p + size > limit)
3506 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3511 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3512 * currently have one. */
3513 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3516 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3518 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3519 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3520 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3521 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3522 * calculate the master secret later. */
3525 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3528 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3529 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3531 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3533 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3534 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3536 default: /* fatal error */
3545 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3547 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3548 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3549 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3550 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3551 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3552 * point to the resulting session.
3555 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3556 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3557 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3558 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3560 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3561 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3562 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3565 unsigned char *sdec;
3566 const unsigned char *p;
3567 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3568 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3571 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3572 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3575 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3576 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3577 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3578 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3580 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3581 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3592 /* Check key name matches */
3593 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3595 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3596 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3597 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3598 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3600 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3601 * integrity checks on ticket.
3603 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3606 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3610 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3611 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3612 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3613 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3614 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3616 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3617 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3618 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3619 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3620 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3623 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3626 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3627 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3630 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3633 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3637 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3638 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3639 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3640 * as required by standard.
3643 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3644 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3652 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3657 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3665 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3666 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3667 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3668 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3669 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3670 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3671 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3674 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3675 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3676 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3677 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3680 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3683 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3685 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3691 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3694 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3696 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3697 return table[i].nid;
3702 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3707 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3708 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3711 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3714 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3715 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3719 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3721 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3722 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3725 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3730 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3738 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3742 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3743 return EVP_sha224();
3745 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3746 return EVP_sha256();
3748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3749 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3750 return EVP_sha384();
3752 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3753 return EVP_sha512();
3761 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3766 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3767 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3770 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3771 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3774 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3775 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3781 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3782 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3783 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3785 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3786 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3788 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3790 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3791 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3793 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3795 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3797 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3798 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3800 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3804 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3805 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3806 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3808 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3811 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3812 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3813 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3814 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3816 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3817 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3818 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3820 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3821 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3823 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3825 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3827 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3832 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3833 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3834 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3836 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3847 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3848 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3850 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3851 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3853 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3855 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3856 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3857 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3859 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3860 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3862 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3864 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3865 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3868 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3869 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3873 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3874 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3880 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3881 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3883 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3886 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3889 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3890 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3891 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3896 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3898 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3904 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3905 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3906 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3908 /* Should never happen */
3912 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3913 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3915 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3916 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3918 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3920 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3921 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3923 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3924 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3926 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3928 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3930 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3933 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3934 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3935 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3936 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3937 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3939 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3940 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3946 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3947 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3949 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3950 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3952 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3953 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3954 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3955 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3957 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3958 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3963 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3964 * use the certificate for signing.
3966 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3968 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3969 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3972 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3973 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3976 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3978 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3979 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3983 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3984 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3991 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3992 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3993 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3995 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
4001 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
4008 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
4010 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
4013 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
4014 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
4015 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
4017 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
4018 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
4022 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
4024 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
4026 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
4028 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
4030 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
4031 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
4035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
4037 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4039 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
4040 unsigned short hbtype;
4041 unsigned int payload;
4042 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4044 /* Read type and payload length first */
4049 if (s->msg_callback)
4050 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4051 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4052 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4054 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4056 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4059 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4060 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4061 * payload, plus padding
4063 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4066 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4067 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4069 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4071 /* Random padding */
4072 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4074 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4076 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4077 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4078 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4079 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4081 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4086 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4090 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4091 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4092 * sequence number */
4095 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4098 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4106 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4108 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4110 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4111 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4113 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4114 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4115 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4121 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4122 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4128 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4129 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4135 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4136 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4138 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4140 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4141 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4142 * some random stuff.
4143 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4144 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4145 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4146 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4149 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4152 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4153 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4155 /* Sequence number */
4156 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4157 /* 16 random bytes */
4158 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4160 /* Random padding */
4161 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4163 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4166 if (s->msg_callback)
4167 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4168 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4169 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4171 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4180 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4185 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4188 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4190 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4193 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4194 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4196 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4198 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4200 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4208 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4209 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4210 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4211 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4212 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4213 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4216 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4217 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4218 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4219 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4222 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4224 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4225 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4228 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4229 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4233 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4234 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4235 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4239 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4243 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4246 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4248 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4253 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4254 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4256 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4258 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4259 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4260 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4261 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4263 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4271 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4272 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4273 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4274 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4278 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4279 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4280 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4281 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4287 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4291 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4295 if (default_nid == -1)
4297 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4299 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4300 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4301 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4305 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4306 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4310 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4311 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4313 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4319 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4320 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4321 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4322 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4325 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4327 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4328 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4329 /* Strict mode flags */
4330 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4331 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4332 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4334 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4339 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4340 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4342 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4343 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4346 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4350 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4353 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4355 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4357 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4358 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4361 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4362 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4363 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4365 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4366 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4375 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4378 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4379 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4380 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4382 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4390 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4391 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4392 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4395 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4401 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4402 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4405 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4408 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4409 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4411 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4416 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4417 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4418 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4419 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4420 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4423 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4424 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4425 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4426 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4430 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4431 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4439 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4440 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4443 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4446 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4447 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4449 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4452 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4460 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4461 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4463 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4466 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4467 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4468 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4470 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4475 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4483 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4484 else if(check_flags)
4485 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4487 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4488 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4489 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4490 else if (!check_flags)
4493 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4494 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4495 else if (strict_mode)
4497 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4498 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4500 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4501 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4505 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4513 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4515 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4520 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4523 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4526 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4531 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4532 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4533 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4534 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4535 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4540 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4545 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4549 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4550 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4552 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4554 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4556 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4560 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4564 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4567 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4569 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4570 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4572 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4574 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4575 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4577 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4579 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4581 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4582 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4584 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4589 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4593 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4595 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4596 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4600 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4602 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4603 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4604 else if (cpk->digest)
4605 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4608 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4610 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4611 * if the chain is invalid.
4615 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4616 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4619 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4620 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4627 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4628 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4630 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4631 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4632 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4633 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4634 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4635 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4637 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4638 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4640 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);