2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
24 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
26 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
31 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
32 s->init_num, &written);
35 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
37 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
38 * ignore the result anyway
40 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
41 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
45 if (written == s->init_num) {
47 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
48 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
52 s->init_off += written;
53 s->init_num -= written;
57 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
61 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
62 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
65 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
71 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
73 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
76 /* Reset any extension flags */
77 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
80 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
81 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
84 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
85 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
88 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
89 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
90 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
93 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
94 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
97 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
98 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
100 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
108 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
110 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
113 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
114 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
115 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
116 /* Renegotiation is disabled */
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
119 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
121 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
123 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
124 * support secure renegotiation.
126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
127 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
131 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
133 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
136 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
137 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
139 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
141 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
142 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
145 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
148 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
155 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
156 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
158 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
159 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
161 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
162 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
164 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
165 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
167 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
170 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
171 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
172 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
173 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
174 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
175 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
177 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
180 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
181 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
182 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
184 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
185 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
186 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
187 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
188 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
189 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
190 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
195 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
199 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
208 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
210 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
211 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
212 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
213 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
214 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
216 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
217 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
218 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
220 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
224 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
226 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
231 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
237 /* Get the data to be signed */
238 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
243 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
247 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
248 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
254 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
259 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
260 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
261 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
262 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
267 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
268 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
269 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
270 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
271 s->session->master_key)
272 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
277 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
284 int pktype = lu->sig;
286 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
287 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
288 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
289 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
293 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
298 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
299 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
303 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
307 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
308 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
312 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
314 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
315 const unsigned char *data;
316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
317 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
319 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
323 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
326 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
327 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
328 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
335 peer = s->session->peer;
336 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
340 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
342 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
343 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
347 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
351 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
352 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
355 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
358 } else if (rv == 0) {
359 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
363 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
365 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
366 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
370 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
372 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
376 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
378 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
379 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
382 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
383 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
384 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
385 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
386 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
387 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
388 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
391 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
393 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
397 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
398 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
399 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
401 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
404 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
406 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
410 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
416 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
418 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
424 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
425 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
426 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
427 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
428 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
432 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
438 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
439 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
440 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
441 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
446 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
447 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
448 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
449 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
450 s->session->master_key)) {
451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
454 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
455 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
460 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
462 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
468 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
471 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
472 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
474 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
475 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
476 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
478 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
483 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
485 size_t finish_md_len;
489 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
491 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
494 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
499 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
500 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
501 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
504 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
505 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
506 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
512 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
513 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
515 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
516 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
519 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
521 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
522 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
527 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
529 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
535 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
536 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
538 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
539 s->session->master_key,
540 s->session->master_key_length)) {
541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
546 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
548 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
549 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
553 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
555 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
557 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
559 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
564 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
568 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
570 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
575 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
579 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
583 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
586 unsigned int updatetype;
588 s->key_update_count++;
589 if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
590 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
596 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
597 * be on a record boundary.
599 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
600 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
605 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
606 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
607 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
613 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
616 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
617 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
618 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
624 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
625 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
626 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
628 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
629 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
631 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
632 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
637 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
639 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
640 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
641 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
646 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
649 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
654 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
655 * the appropriate error.
657 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
660 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
661 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
663 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
664 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
667 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
670 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
674 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
679 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
681 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
682 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
683 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
687 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
688 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
689 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
690 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
692 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
697 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
699 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
704 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
705 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
706 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
711 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
712 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
713 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
718 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
719 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
721 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
722 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
726 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
727 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
730 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
734 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
736 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
737 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
738 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
741 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
743 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
747 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
749 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
752 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
753 * message must be on a record boundary.
755 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
756 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
761 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
762 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
763 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
767 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
769 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
771 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
772 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
777 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
779 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
785 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
787 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
788 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
793 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
795 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
797 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
799 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
803 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
804 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
806 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
808 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
809 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
810 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
814 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
815 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
816 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
817 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
820 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
821 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
825 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
830 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
832 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
833 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
834 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
837 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
839 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
841 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
848 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
849 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
853 unsigned char *outbytes;
855 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
858 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
861 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
862 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
864 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
869 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
876 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
877 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
881 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
882 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
883 X509_STORE *chain_store;
884 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
886 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
892 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
894 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
895 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
897 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
899 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
901 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
902 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
904 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
906 if (chain_store != NULL) {
907 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
909 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
913 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
914 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
919 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
920 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
921 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
922 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
924 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
925 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
927 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
928 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
931 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
936 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
940 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
941 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
942 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
944 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
945 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
949 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
951 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
956 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
958 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
959 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
960 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
971 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
974 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
976 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
977 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
978 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
987 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
988 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
991 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
993 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
996 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
998 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
999 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
1005 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1007 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1008 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1010 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1013 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s))
1018 if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
1019 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1022 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1024 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1027 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1029 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
1030 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1033 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1036 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1037 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1039 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
1041 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1042 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
1045 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1046 cb = s->info_callback;
1047 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1048 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1051 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1053 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1054 /* done with handshaking */
1055 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1056 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1057 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1058 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1063 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
1067 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1069 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1070 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1073 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1075 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1076 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
1078 size_t l, readbytes;
1080 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1083 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1084 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1086 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1089 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1092 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1094 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1095 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1097 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1098 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1100 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1103 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1104 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1105 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1106 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1108 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1109 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1113 s->init_num += readbytes;
1118 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1119 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1121 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1122 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1123 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1126 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1130 if (s->msg_callback)
1131 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1132 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1133 s->msg_callback_arg);
1135 } while (skip_message);
1136 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1139 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1141 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1143 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1146 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1147 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1149 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1150 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1151 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1153 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1154 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1157 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1158 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1159 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1163 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1165 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1171 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1175 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1177 size_t n, readbytes;
1181 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1182 /* We've already read everything in */
1183 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1188 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1190 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1191 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1193 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1197 s->init_num += readbytes;
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1203 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1204 * Finished verification.
1206 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1210 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1211 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1212 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1215 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1219 if (s->msg_callback)
1220 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1221 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1224 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1225 * processing the message
1227 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1228 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1229 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1231 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1235 if (s->msg_callback)
1236 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1237 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1238 s->msg_callback_arg);
1245 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1250 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1251 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1252 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1253 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1255 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1256 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1257 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1258 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1259 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1260 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1261 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1262 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1263 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1264 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1265 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1266 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1267 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1268 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1269 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1270 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1271 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1272 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1273 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1275 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1276 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1277 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1279 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1280 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1281 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1283 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1284 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1286 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1287 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1288 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1289 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1290 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1292 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1293 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1294 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1295 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1296 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1297 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1298 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1299 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1301 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1302 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1304 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1305 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1308 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1314 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1316 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1318 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1321 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1323 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1328 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1329 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1334 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1335 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1338 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1339 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1342 /* Must be in order high to low */
1343 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1345 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1347 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1350 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1352 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1355 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1357 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1360 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1362 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1365 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1367 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1372 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1373 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1376 /* Must be in order high to low */
1377 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1379 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1381 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1384 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1385 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1387 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1388 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1394 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1396 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1397 * @method: the intended method.
1399 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1401 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1403 int version = method->version;
1405 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1406 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1407 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1408 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1410 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1411 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1412 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1414 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1415 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1416 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1417 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1423 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1426 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1427 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1429 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1431 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1433 const version_info *vent;
1434 const version_info *table;
1436 switch (s->method->version) {
1438 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1439 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1440 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1441 table = tls_version_table;
1443 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1444 table = dtls_version_table;
1449 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1451 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1452 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1453 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1461 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1462 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1463 * supported protocol version.
1465 * @s server SSL handle.
1467 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1469 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1471 const version_info *vent;
1472 const version_info *table;
1475 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1476 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1479 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1483 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1484 * highest protocol version).
1486 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1487 table = tls_version_table;
1488 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1489 table = dtls_version_table;
1491 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1495 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1496 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1497 return s->version == vent->version;
1503 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1504 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1505 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1506 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1508 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1509 * @version: the intended limit.
1510 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1512 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1514 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1522 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1523 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1524 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1526 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1527 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1528 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1529 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1530 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1532 switch (method_version) {
1535 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1536 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1537 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1538 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1543 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1544 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1548 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1549 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1550 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1559 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1561 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1562 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1563 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1564 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1565 && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION)
1566 || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
1567 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1569 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1574 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1575 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1576 * the version specific method.
1578 * @s: server SSL handle.
1580 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1582 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1585 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1587 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1588 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1590 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1593 int server_version = s->method->version;
1594 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1595 const version_info *vent;
1596 const version_info *table;
1598 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1600 s->client_version = client_version;
1602 switch (server_version) {
1604 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1605 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1606 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1607 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1609 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1610 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1611 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1612 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1613 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1618 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1619 * a HelloRetryRequest
1622 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1623 table = tls_version_table;
1625 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1626 table = dtls_version_table;
1630 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1632 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1633 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1634 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1635 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1636 PACKET versionslist;
1638 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1640 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1641 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1642 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1645 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1646 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1647 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1648 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1650 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1651 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1652 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1654 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1657 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1660 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1661 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1663 method = vent->smeth();
1664 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1665 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1666 best_method = method;
1670 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1671 /* Trailing data? */
1672 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1675 if (best_vers > 0) {
1676 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1678 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1679 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1681 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1682 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1685 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1686 s->version = best_vers;
1687 s->method = best_method;
1690 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1694 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1695 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1697 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1698 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1701 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1704 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1705 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1707 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1708 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1710 method = vent->smeth();
1711 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1712 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1713 s->version = vent->version;
1719 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1723 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1724 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1725 * the version specific method.
1727 * @s: client SSL handle.
1728 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1729 * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
1730 * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
1732 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1734 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al)
1736 const version_info *vent;
1737 const version_info *table;
1740 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1741 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1742 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1744 if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1745 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1746 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1749 switch (s->method->version) {
1751 if (version != s->version) {
1752 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1753 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1756 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1757 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1758 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1759 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1760 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1763 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1764 table = tls_version_table;
1766 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1767 table = dtls_version_table;
1771 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1772 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1775 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1778 if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version)
1781 method = vent->cmeth();
1782 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1784 if (version == vent->version) {
1785 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1792 highver = vent->version;
1794 if (version != vent->version)
1797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1798 /* Check for downgrades */
1800 if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) {
1801 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1802 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1803 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1804 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1805 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1806 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1808 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1809 && version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1810 && highver > version) {
1811 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1812 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1813 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1814 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1815 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1816 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1823 s->version = version;
1827 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1828 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1832 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1833 * @s: The SSL connection
1834 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1835 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1837 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1838 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1839 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1840 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1841 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1843 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1844 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1845 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1847 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1848 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1850 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
1854 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1855 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1856 const version_info *table;
1857 const version_info *vent;
1859 switch (s->method->version) {
1862 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1863 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1864 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1865 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1866 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1868 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1870 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1871 table = tls_version_table;
1873 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1874 table = dtls_version_table;
1879 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1880 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1881 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1882 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1884 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1885 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1886 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1888 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1889 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1890 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1892 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1893 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1894 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1895 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1896 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1897 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1899 *min_version = version = 0;
1901 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1903 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1904 * "version capability" vector.
1906 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1910 method = vent->cmeth();
1911 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1915 *min_version = method->version;
1917 version = (single = method)->version;
1918 *min_version = version;
1923 *max_version = version;
1925 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1927 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1933 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1934 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1936 * @s: client SSL handle.
1938 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1940 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1942 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1944 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1949 s->version = ver_max;
1951 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1952 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
1953 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1955 s->client_version = ver_max;
1960 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1961 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1962 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1963 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1966 int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups,
1967 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
1971 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1974 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1975 if (group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0)
1977 || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1986 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
1987 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s)
1989 unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1991 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
1993 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
1995 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
1996 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1997 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2002 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2003 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
2006 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2007 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2008 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen;
2009 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2010 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2018 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2020 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2023 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2025 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2026 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2029 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2033 /* get the CA RDNs */
2034 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2036 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2040 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2041 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2042 unsigned int name_len;
2044 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2045 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2050 namestart = namebytes;
2051 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2055 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2060 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2062 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2068 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2069 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2081 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2083 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2085 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2086 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt))
2089 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2092 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2093 unsigned char *namebytes;
2094 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2098 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2099 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2101 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2107 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt))
2113 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2114 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(const SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2115 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2117 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2118 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2122 memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2123 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2125 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);