1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
82 static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer);
83 static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl);
84 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
85 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
88 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
94 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
96 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
100 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
102 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
105 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
108 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
109 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
110 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
112 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
118 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
119 * present and that the first entry is in place */
120 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
122 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
123 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
125 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
128 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
129 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
132 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
133 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
134 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
136 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
140 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
141 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
147 /* If we have enough, we break */
148 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
149 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
150 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
154 /* If we are self signed, we break */
155 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
156 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
158 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
159 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
161 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
164 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
166 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
169 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
170 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
171 ctx->last_untrusted++;
174 /* reparse the full chain for
182 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
183 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
184 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
186 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
190 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
191 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
192 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
193 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
195 /* we have a self signed certificate */
196 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
198 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
199 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
200 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
202 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
203 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
205 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
207 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
208 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
215 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
216 * so we get any trust settings.
220 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
221 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
226 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
227 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
228 ctx->last_untrusted--;
230 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
234 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
237 /* If we have enough, we break */
238 if (depth < num) break;
240 /* If we are self signed, we break */
241 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
242 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
244 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
246 if (ok < 0) return ok;
250 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
253 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
259 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
260 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
262 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
263 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
265 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
267 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
268 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
270 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
276 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
278 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
279 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
280 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
284 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
290 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
291 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
295 /* Check name constraints */
297 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
301 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
303 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
307 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
308 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
310 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
311 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
314 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
317 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
318 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
321 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
325 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
326 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
328 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
332 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
333 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
334 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
339 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
341 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
342 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
347 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
350 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
354 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
356 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
357 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
363 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
365 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
368 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
369 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
371 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
372 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
376 ctx->current_cert = x;
377 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
378 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
382 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
384 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
386 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
389 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
397 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
398 * with the supplied purpose
401 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
403 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
406 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
408 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
409 int proxy_path_length = 0;
410 int allow_proxy_certs =
411 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
414 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
415 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
416 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
417 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
418 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
419 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
420 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
424 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
426 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
427 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
429 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
430 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
433 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
434 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
435 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
437 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
438 ctx->error_depth = i;
439 ctx->current_cert = x;
443 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
445 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
446 ctx->error_depth = i;
447 ctx->current_cert = x;
451 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
455 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
456 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
459 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
468 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
475 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
479 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
487 ctx->error_depth = i;
488 ctx->current_cert = x;
492 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
494 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
497 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
500 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
501 ctx->error_depth = i;
502 ctx->current_cert = x;
507 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
508 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
509 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
510 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
512 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
513 ctx->error_depth = i;
514 ctx->current_cert = x;
518 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
519 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
521 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
522 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
523 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
525 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
527 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
530 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
531 ctx->error_depth = i;
532 ctx->current_cert = x;
548 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
552 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
553 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
555 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
556 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
557 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
559 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
560 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
561 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
562 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
564 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
566 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
569 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
573 ctx->error_depth = i;
574 ctx->current_cert = x;
575 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
584 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
586 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
591 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
593 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
594 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
595 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
596 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
597 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
599 ctx->error_depth = i;
600 ctx->current_cert = x;
601 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
602 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
604 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
610 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
613 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
615 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
616 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
619 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
621 ctx->error_depth = i;
622 ok = check_cert(ctx);
628 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
630 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
633 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
634 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
635 ctx->current_cert = x;
636 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
637 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
638 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
639 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
644 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
645 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
648 ctx->current_crl = crl;
649 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
651 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
653 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
659 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
661 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
665 ctx->current_crl = crl;
666 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
667 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
671 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
674 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
675 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
681 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
682 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
686 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
688 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
692 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
693 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
699 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
700 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
705 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
710 /* Based on a set of possible CRLs decide which one is best suited
711 * to handle the current certificate. This is determined by a number
712 * of criteria. If any of the "must" criteria is not satisfied then
713 * the candidate CRL is rejected. If all "must" and all "should" are
714 * satisfied the CRL is accepted. If no CRL satisfies all criteria then
715 * a "best CRL" is used to provide some meaningful error information.
717 * CRL issuer name must match "nm" if not NULL.
719 * a. it must be consistent.
720 * b. onlyuser, onlyCA, onlyAA should match certificate being checked.
721 * c. indirectCRL must be FALSE.
722 * d. onlysomereason must be absent.
723 * e. if name present a DP in certificate CRLDP must match.
724 * If AKID present it should match certificate AKID.
725 * Check time should fall between lastUpdate and nextUpdate.
728 /* IDP name field matches CRLDP or IDP name not present */
729 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 4
730 /* AKID present and matches cert, or AKID not present */
731 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 2
733 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 1
735 #define CRL_SCORE_ALL 7
737 /* IDP flags which cause a CRL to be rejected */
739 #define IDP_REJECT (IDP_INVALID|IDP_INDIRECT|IDP_REASONS)
741 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
742 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
744 int i, crl_score, best_score = -1;
745 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
746 X509 *crl_issuer, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
747 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
751 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
752 if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
754 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
755 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
757 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
759 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REJECT)
761 if (idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
762 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
765 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
767 if (crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, &crl_issuer))
768 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
769 /* If CRL matches criteria and issuer is not different use it */
770 if (crl_score == CRL_SCORE_ALL && !crl_issuer)
773 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
777 if (crl_score > best_score)
780 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
781 best_score = crl_score;
787 ctx->current_issuer = best_crl_issuer;
788 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
794 static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer)
797 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
800 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
802 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
803 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
805 /* If crl_issuer is self issued we may get a match further along the
808 if (crl_issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
810 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
812 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
813 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
815 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
818 if (!(crl_issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
826 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
827 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
828 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
829 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
833 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
835 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
836 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
837 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
843 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
848 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
853 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
855 gens = b->name.fullname;
857 else if (b->type == 1)
861 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
862 gens = a->name.fullname;
866 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
869 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
871 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
872 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
874 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
880 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
882 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
884 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
885 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
887 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
888 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
897 /* Check IDP name matches at least one CRLDP name */
899 static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl)
902 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
904 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
906 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
911 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
914 if (!crl->idp->distpoint)
918 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
920 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
921 /* We don't handle these at present */
922 if (dp->reasons || dp->CRLissuer)
924 if (idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
930 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only
931 * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle
932 * CRLs partitioned on reason code later.
935 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
938 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
939 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
941 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
942 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
949 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
951 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
953 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
964 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, NULL, skcrl);
966 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
968 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
978 /* Check CRL validity */
979 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
982 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
983 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
984 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
985 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
986 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
987 if (ctx->current_issuer)
988 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
989 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
990 * is next certificate in chain.
992 else if (cnum < chnum)
993 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
996 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
997 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
998 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1000 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1001 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1008 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1009 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1010 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1012 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1013 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1017 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
1019 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1021 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1022 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1025 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_REASONS|IDP_INDIRECT))
1027 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE;
1028 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1031 if (!idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
1033 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1034 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1039 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1040 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1044 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1045 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1050 /* Verify CRL signature */
1051 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1053 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1054 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1060 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1067 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1071 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1072 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1075 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1076 * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
1077 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
1079 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(crl, NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x)) > 0)
1081 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1082 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1087 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1089 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1091 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1092 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1100 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1103 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1104 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1107 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1110 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1113 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1118 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1120 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1121 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1123 ctx->current_cert = x;
1124 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1125 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1132 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1133 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1134 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1137 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1139 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1140 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1141 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1148 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1153 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1154 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1158 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1161 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1162 ctx->current_cert=x;
1163 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1169 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1170 ctx->current_cert=x;
1171 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1175 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1178 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1179 ctx->current_cert=x;
1180 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1186 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1187 ctx->current_cert=x;
1188 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1195 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1199 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1200 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1204 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1205 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1207 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1209 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1215 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1216 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1224 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1228 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1234 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1236 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1237 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1241 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1242 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
1243 * this is a waste of time. That check should
1244 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
1245 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
1246 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
1247 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
1248 * been declared trusted. */
1250 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1251 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1255 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1259 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1265 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1269 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1270 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1271 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1279 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1287 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1289 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1292 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1297 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1302 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1303 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1305 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1312 if (i < 13) return 0;
1318 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1319 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1324 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1328 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1339 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1341 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1342 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1347 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1348 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1350 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1353 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1355 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1356 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1357 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1360 if (i < j) return -1;
1361 if (i > j) return 1;
1363 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1364 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1370 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1372 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1375 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
1380 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1384 if (s) type = s->type;
1385 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
1386 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
1387 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
1390 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1392 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1395 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1397 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1399 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1402 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1405 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1409 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1415 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1419 /* first, populate the other certs */
1420 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1422 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1423 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1424 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1427 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1428 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1432 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1433 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1435 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1436 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1437 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1438 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1441 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1443 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1446 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1448 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1451 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1456 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1461 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1463 return ctx->error_depth;
1466 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1468 return ctx->current_cert;
1471 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1476 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1480 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1481 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1482 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1484 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1485 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1490 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1495 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1500 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1505 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1507 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1510 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1512 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1515 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1516 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1517 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1518 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1519 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1520 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1521 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1522 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1525 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1526 int purpose, int trust)
1529 /* If purpose not set use default */
1530 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1531 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1535 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1538 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1539 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1542 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1543 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1545 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1548 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1549 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1552 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1554 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1555 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1559 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1562 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1563 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1568 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1569 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1573 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1575 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1576 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1579 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1582 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1586 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1588 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1592 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1593 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1597 ctx->current_method=0;
1599 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1601 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1602 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1606 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
1608 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1609 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1612 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
1616 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1620 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1626 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
1628 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
1632 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1633 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1639 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
1640 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
1644 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1648 if (store && store->check_issued)
1649 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1651 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1653 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1654 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1656 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1658 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1659 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1661 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1663 if (store && store->verify)
1664 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1666 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1668 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1669 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1671 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1673 if (store && store->get_crl)
1674 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1676 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1678 if (store && store->check_crl)
1679 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1681 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1683 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1684 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1686 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1688 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
1689 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
1691 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
1693 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
1694 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
1696 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
1698 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
1701 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1702 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1703 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1704 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1705 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1709 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1715 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1716 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1719 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1721 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1722 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1725 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1727 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1728 if (ctx->param != NULL)
1730 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1733 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
1735 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
1738 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1740 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1743 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1744 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1747 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
1749 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
1752 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
1754 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
1757 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
1759 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
1762 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1763 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1765 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1768 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1773 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1775 return ctx->explicit_policy;
1778 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
1780 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
1781 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
1784 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
1787 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1792 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
1795 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1799 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1800 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1802 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1804 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1805 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)